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专业财务管理

班级B080510

姓名郭静

学号B08051019

导师王化中

OptimalCapitalStructure:

Reflectionsoneconomicandothervalues

ByMarcSchauten&

JaapSpronk1

1.Introduction

Despiteavastliteratureonthecapitalstructureofthefirm(seeHarrisandRaviv,1991,GrahamandHarvey,2001,Bravetal.,2005,foroverviews)therestillisabiggapbetweentheoryandpractice(seee.g.Cools,1993,Tempelaar,1991,Boot&

Cools,1997).StartingwiththeseminalworkbyModigliani&

Miller(1958,1963),muchattentionhasbeenpaidtotheoptimalityofcapitalstructurefromtheshareholders’pointofview.

Overthelastfewdecadesstudieshavebeenproducedontheeffectofotherstakeholders’interestsoncapitalstructure.Well-knownexamplesaretheinterestsofcustomerswhoreceiveproductorserviceguaranteesfromthecompany(seee.g.Grinblatt&

Titman,2002).Anotherareathathasreceivedconsiderableattentionistherelationbetweenmanagerialincentivesandcapitalstructure(Ibid.).Furthermore,theissueofcorporatecontrol2(seeJensen&

Ruback,1983)and,related,theissueofcorporategovernance3(seeShleifer&

Vishney,1997),receivealion’spartofthemorerecentacademicattentionforcapitalstructuredecisions.

Fromallthesestudies,onethingisclear:

Thecapitalstructuredecision(orrather,themanagementofthecapitalstructureovertime)involvesmoreissuesthanthemaximizationofthefirm’smarketvaluealone.Inthispaper,wegiveanoverviewofthedifferentobjectivesandconsiderationsthathavebeenproposedintheliterature.Wemakeadistinctionbetweentwobroadlydefinedsituations.Thefirstisthetraditionalcaseofthefirmthatstrivesforthemaximizationofthevalueofthesharesforthecurrentshareholders.Wheneverotherconsiderationsthanvaluemaximizationentercapitalstructuredecisions,theseconsiderationshavetobeinstrumentaltothegoalofvaluemaximization.Thesecondcaseconcernsthefirmthatexplicitlychoosesformoreobjectivesthanvaluemaximizationalone.Thismaybebecausetheshareholdersadoptamultiplestakeholdersapproachorbecauseofadifferentownershipstructurethantheusualcorporatestructuredominatingfinanceliterature.Anexampleofthelatteristheco-operation,alegalentitywhichcanbefoundina.o.manyEuropeancountries.Foradiscussiononwhyfirmsarefacingmultiplegoals,werefertoHallerbachandSpronk(2002a,2002b).

InSection2wewilldescribeobjectivesandconsiderationsthat,directlyorindirectly,clearlyhelptocreateandmaintainacapitalstructurewhichis'

optimal'

forthevaluemaximizingfirm.Thethirdsectiondescribesotherobjectivesandconsiderations.Someofthesemayhaveaclearnegativeeffectoneconomicvalue,othersmaybeneutralandinsomecasestheeffectoneconomicvalueisnotalwayscompletelyclear.Section4showshow,forbothcases,capitalstructuredecisionscanbeframedasmultiplecriteriadecisionproblemswhichcanthenbenefitfrommultiplecriteriadecisionsupporttoolsthatarenowwidelyavailable.

2.Maximizingshareholdervalue

Accordingtotheneoclassicalviewontheroleofthefirm,thefirmhasonesingleobjective:

maximizationofshareholdervalue.Shareholderspossessthepropertyrightsofthefirmandarethusentitledtodecidewhatthefirmshouldaimfor.Sinceshareholdersonlyhaveoneobjectiveinmind-wealthmaximization-thegoalofthefirmismaximizationofthefirm'

scontributiontothefinancialwealthofitsshareholders.Thefirmcanaccomplishthisbyinvestinginprojectswithpositivenetpresentvalue4.Partofshareholdervalueisdeterminedbythecorporatefinancingdecision5.Twotheoriesaboutthecapitalstructureofthefirm-thetrade-offtheoryandthepeckingordertheory-assumeshareholderwealthmaximizationastheoneandonlycorporateobjective.Wewilldiscussboththeoriesincludingseveralmarketvaluerelatedextensions.Basedonthisdiscussionweformulatealistofcriteriathatisrelevantforthecorporatefinancingdecisioninthisessentiallyneoclassicalview.

TheoriginalpropositionIofMillerandModigliani(1958)statesthatinaperfectcapitalmarkettheequilibriummarketvalueofafirmisindependentofitscapitalstructure,i.e.thedebt-equityratio6.IfpropositionIdoesnotholdthenarbitragewilltakeplace.Investorswillbuysharesoftheundervaluedfirmandsellsharesoftheovervaluedsharesinsuchawaythatidenticalincomestreamsareobtained.Asinvestorsexploitthesearbitrageopportunities,thepriceoftheovervaluedshareswillfallandthatoftheundervaluedshareswillrise,untilbothpricesareequal.

Whencorporatetaxesarei

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