创业融资外文翻译Word格式.docx

创业融资外文翻译Word格式.docx

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本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译@#@题 目 大学生创业融资渠道研究专 业 财务管理@#@EntrepreneurialFinancing@#@Thefinancingofstartupsentailspotentiallyextremeadverseselectioncostsgiventheabsenttrackrecordofthefirmsseekingcapital,andgiventheriskynatureoftheindustriesinwhichmanyofthemoperate.Exacerbatingtheproblem,thisscenarioofteninvolvesaninnovatorwhohasextensivetechnicalknowledgebuthasneithertheaccumulatedreputationnorthebondablewealthnecessarytoconveythisinformationcredibly.@#@Barrycharacterizesventurecapitalashavingevolvedpreciselytofillthisstartupfinancingniche:

@#@@#@Atthelevelofsmall,riskyventures,accesstocapitalmarketsisrestricted.Notallentrepreneurscanself-financetheirprojects,andnotallcanfindbankersorangelswhowillcarrytheshortfall.Venturecapitalistsofferthemasourceoffundsthatisspecificallydesignedforuseinriskysettings.Theventurecapitaliststhemselvesperformduediligencepriortoinvesting,andinformationgleanedinthatprocesscangreatlyreducetheadverseselectionproblem..@#@Thisoutlookraisesseveralquestions.Whyisitassumedthatbankscannot（orchoosenotto）performthesamelevelofduediligenceasventurecapitalists（VCs）?

@#@Inwhatsenseisventurecapital“designed”forriskysettings?

@#@ThepuzzledeepenswhenonenotesthatstraightdebtistypicallyadvocatedasasolutiontotheadverseselectionproblemwhereasinpracticeVCsoftenholdconvertiblepreferredequity.Indeed,adefiningcharacteristicoftheventurecapitalmarketisthatcontractsarefairlyhigh-poweredinthesensethatexpectedpayoffscomedisproportionatelyfromtheequitycomponentor“upside”.@#@Thesequestionscanbeaddressedbyreflectinguponthecostlyduediligenceto@#@whichBarryrefers.Bydirectlyrevealingtheproject’squality,duediligencereducesinformationasymmetrybetweenentrepreneursandtheVC.Bycontrast,ifqualityweresignaled—thetraditionalsolutiontotheadverseselectionproblem—costlyduediligencewouldbeunnecessarysincetherewouldbenomoreinformationtoconvey.Inotherwise,eithersignalingorcostlyduediligencecansolvetheadverseselectionproblem.Thetwomechanismsaresubstitutes;@#@thequestionthenbecomeswhichismorecost-effective.@#@Thefirstcontributionofthepaperistoshowthatsignalingcanbeprohibitivelyexpensiveinentrepreneurialfinancingmarkets,andsocostlyduediligencedominates.The“cost”ofsignalingisdrivenbytheincentivesofbadfirmstopool.Yet,forstartups,iffundingisnotobtainedthenthefirmmayhavealmostnovalue.Withsuchlowreservationvalues,badentrepreneursattempttopoolatnearlyanycost.Astheanalysisshows,securitiesisunattractiveenoughtodriveoutbadentrepreneurs—andthustoserveasacrediblesignal—tendtobeunattractivetogoodentrepreneursaswell.Costlyduediligenceemergesasthepreferredsolution.@#@Astestamenttotheempiricalimportanceofduediligencecostsinventurecapitalmarkets,FriedandHanscharacterizetheVCfundingprocessascomposedofsixdistinct,progressivelyrigorousstagesofscreening.Thisduediligencetakesanaverageof97daystocompleteevenbeforethefirstroundoffundingisinitiated.Themajorityoffundingproposalsdonotsuccessfullypassthroughthefirstscreen,letalonesubsequentscreens,andthefullprocessisdescribedas“muchmoreinvolvedinbankloanreviews.@#@Thesecondcontributionofthepaperistoillustratealinkbetweencostlyduediligenceandhigh-powered（orequity-like）financialcontracts.Theintuitionbehindthislinkissimple.Bydefinition,low-poweredcontractsaresafe;@#@i.e.,expectedpayoffsvarylittleacrossfirms.High-poweredcontractsmagnifythedifferentialinpayoffbetweenfundinggoodandbadprojects,andhencemagnifytheincentivestoscreenoutbadprojects.Ineffect,high-poweredcontractsmaketheVCbearthecostofchoosingentrepreneursunwisely.Thereforehigh-poweredcontractsencourageduediligence.@#@Tosummarize,thismodelisdesignedtomakethreesimplepoints:

@#@

（1）upsidesharingistobeexpectedgivencostlyevaluation,

（2）suchcostlyevaluationsserveasasubstitutetraditionalsolutionstotheadverseselectionproblem,and（3）traditionalsolutionsaredominatedforparameterizationsofthemodelthatcorrespondtoventurecapitalmarkets.@#@Followingthepath-breakingempiricalworkofSaar,atheoreticalliteratureonVCcontractdesignemerged.Onecommonfeatureofthesepapersisthattheyrationalizetheoptimalityofconvertiblesecurities.Asecondcommonfeatureofthesemodelsistheadmissionofagencycosts.Forexample,VCs andentrepreneursmayhavedifferentpreferencesregardingprojectriskorexitstrategy.@#@Inpart,theliterature’srelianceonagencycostsowestoawidespreadbeliefintheirempiricalrelevance.Itisalsopresumablyrelatedto