股权激励外文文献中英对照.docx

股权激励外文文献中英对照.docx

《股权激励外文文献中英对照.docx》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《股权激励外文文献中英对照.docx（16页珍藏版）》请在冰豆网上搜索。

股权激励外文文献中英对照

外文文献原文

TheDiffusionofEquityIncentivePlansinItalianListedCompanies

1.INTRODUCTION

PaststudieshavebroughttolightthedissimilaritiesinthepaypackagesofmanagersinAnglo—Saxoncountriesascomparedwithothernations（e。

g.,Bebchuk,FriedandWalker，2002;CheffinsandThomas，2004；Zattoni，2007）。

IntheUKand,aboveallintheUS，remunerationencompassesavarietyofcomponents,andshortandlongtermvariablepaycarriesmoreweightthanelsewhere（ConyonandMurphy，2000）。

Inothercountries，however，fixedwageshavealwaysbeenthemainingredientintopmanagers'payschemes。

Overtime，variableshort-termpayhasbecomemoresubstantialandtheimpactoffringebenefitshasgraduallygrown。

Notwithstanding，incentiveslinkedtoreachingmediumtolong—termcompanygoalshaveneverbeenwidelyused（TowersPerrin，2000）。

Inrecentyears，however,paypackagesofmanagershaveundergoneanappreciablechangeasvariablepayhasincreasedconsiderably,evenoutsidetheUSandtheUK.Inparticular,managersinmostcountrieshaveexperiencedanincreaseinthevariablepayrelatedtolong-termgoals.Withinthecontextofthisgeneraltrendtowardmediumandlong-termincentives,thereisapronouncedtendencytoadoptplansinvolvingstocksorstockoptions（TowersPerrin，2000；2005）.Thedriversofthediffusionoflongtermincentiveplansseemtobesomerecentchangesintheinstitutionalandmarketenvironmentatthelocalandgloballevels。

ParticularlyimportanttriggersoftheconvergencetowardtheUSpayparadigmarebothmarketorienteddrivers,suchastheevolvingshareownershippatternsortheinternationalizationofthelabormarket,andlaw—orienteddrivers,suchascorporateortaxregulation（CheffinsandThomas，2004）。

Drivenbythesechangesintheinstitutionalandmarketenvironment，weobserveaglobaltrendtowardthe“Americanizationofinternationalpaypractices,”characterizedbyhighincentivesandverylucrativecompensationmechanisms（e。

g。

，Cheffins,2003;CheffinsandThomas,2004）.

Ironically,thespreadoftheUSpayparadigmaroundtheworldhappenswhenitishotlydebatedathome.Inparticular，thecriticsareconcernedwithboththelevelofexecutivecompensationpackagesandtheuseofequityincentiveplans（CheffinsandThomas，2004）.CriticsstressedthatUStopmanagers,andparticularlytheCEOs，receiveverylucrativecompensationpackages。

The’80sand’90ssawanincreasingdisparitybetweenCEO’spayandthatofrank—and—fileworkers.Thankstothiseffect,theirdirectcompensationhasbecomeahundredtimesthatofanaverageemployee（HallandLiebman，1998）.ThemaindeterminantsoftheincreasinglevelofCEOs’andexecutives’compensationareannualbonusesand，aboveall,stockoptiongrants（ConyonandMurphy，2000）。

Stockoptionplanshaverecentlybeencriticizedbyscholarsandpublicopinionbecausetheycharacteristicallyaretoogenerousandsymptomaticofamanagerialextractionofthefirm'svalue（Bebchuketal.，2002；BebchukandFried，2006）.

Inlightoftheserecenteventsandoftheincreasedtendencytoadoptequityincentiveplans，thispaperaimsatunderstandingthereasonsbehindthedisseminationofstockoptionandstockgrantingplansoutsidetheUSandtheUK。

ThechoicetoinvestigatethisphenomenoninItalyreliesonthefollowingarguments。

First，thelargemajorityofpreviousstudiesanalyzetheevolutionofexecutivecompensationandequityincentiveplansintheUSand,toasmallerextent，intheUK。

Second,ownershipstructureandgovernancepracticesincontinentalEuropeancountriesaresubstantiallydifferentfromtheonesinAnglo-Saxoncountries.Third,continentalEuropeancountries，andItalyinparticular，almostignoredtheuseoftheseinstrumentsuntiltheendofthe’90s.

Ourgoalistocomparetheexplanatorypowerofthreecompetingviewsonthediffusionofequityincentiveplans:

1）theoptimalcontractingview,whichstatesthatcompensationpackagesaredesignedtominimizeagencycostsbetweenmanagersandshareholders（JensenandMurphy,1990）；2）therentextractionview，whichstatesthatpowerfulinsidersmayinfluencethepayprocessfortheirownbenefit（Bebchuketal。

2002）；and3）theperceived—costview（HallandMurphy，2003），whichstatesthatcompaniesmayfavorsomecompensationschemesfortheir（supposedorreal）costadvantages.

Tothispurpose,weconductedanempiricalstudyonthereasonswhyItalianlistedcompaniesadoptedequityincentiveplanssincetheendofthe’90s。

Togainadeepunderstandingofthephenomenon，wecollecteddataandinformationbothontheevolutionofthenationalinstitutionalenvironmentinthelastdecadeandonthediffusionandthecharacteristics（i.e。

，technicalaspectsandobjectives）ofequityincentiveplansadoptedbyItalianlistedcompaniesin1999and2005.Weusedbothlogitmodelsanddifference-of—meansstatisticaltechniquestoanalyzedata.Ourresultsshowthat：

1）firmsize,andnotitsownershipstructure,isadeterminantoftheadoptionoftheseinstruments;2）theseplansarenotextensivelyusedtoextractcompanyvalue,althoughafewcasessuggestthispossibility；and3）plans’characteristicsareconsistentwiththeonesdefinedbytaxlawtoreceivespecialfiscaltreatment。

Ourfindingscontributetothedevelopmentoftheliteratureonboththerationalesbehindthespreadingofequityincentiveschemesandthediffusionofnewgovernancepractices。

Theyshow，infact,thatequityincentiveplanshavebeenprimarilyadoptedtotakeadvantageoflargetaxbenefits，andthatinsomeoccasionstheymayhavebeenusedbycontrollingshareholderstoextractcompanyvalueattheexpenseofminorityshareholders.Inotherwords,ourfindingssuggestthatItalianlistedcompaniesadoptedequityincentiveplanstoperformasubtleformofdecoupling。

Ontheonehand,theydeclaredthatplanswereaimedtoalignshareholders’andmanagers’interestsandincentivevaluecreation.Ontheotherhand，thankstothelackoftransparencyandpreviousknowledgeabouttheseinstruments,companiesusedthesemechanismstotakeadvantageoftaxbenefitsandsometimesalsotodistributealargeamountofvaluetosomepowerfulindividuals.Theseresultssupportasymbolicperspectiveoncorporategovernance，accordingtowhichtheintroductionofequityincentiveplanspleasestakeholders–fortheirimplicitalignmentofinterestsandincentivetovaluecreation–withoutimplyingasubstantiveimprovementofgovernancepractices。

2。

CorporateGovernanceinItalianListedCompanies

Italiancompaniesaretraditionallycontrolledbyalargeblockholder（Zattoni,1999）.Banksandotherfinancialinstitutionsdonotownlargeshareholdingsanddonotexertasignificantinfluenceongovernanceoflargecompanies,atleastasfarastheyareabletorepaytheirfinancialdebt（Bianchi，BiancoandEnriques,2001）。

Institutionalinvestorsusuallyplayamarginalrolebecauseoftheirlimitedshareholding,theirstrictconnectionswithItalianbanks，andaregulatoryenvironmentthatdoesnotofferincentivesfortheiractivism.Finally，thestockmarketisrelativelysmallandundeveloped，andthemarketforcorporatecontrolisalmostabsent（Bianco,2001）.Inshort，theItaliangovernancesystemcanbedescribedasasystemof“weakmanagers,strongblockholders,andunprotectedminorityshareholders”（Melis，2000:

354）.

Theboardofdirectorsistraditionallyonetier,butashareholders’generalmeetingmustappointalsoaboardofstatutoryauditorsaswellwhosemaintaskistomonitorthedirectors’performance（Melis,2000）.Further,somestudiespublishedinthe’90sshowedthattheboardofdirectorswasundertherelevantinfluenceoflargeblockholders。

Bothinsideandoutsidedirectorswereinfactrelatedtocontrollingshareholdersbyfamilyorbusinessties（Melis，1999;2000；Molteni,1997）.

Consistentwiththispicture，fixedwageshavebeenthemainingredientoftopmanagers’remuneration，andincentiveschemeslinkedtoreachingmediumtolongtermcompanygoalshaveneverbeenwidelyused（Melis，1999）.EquityincentiveschemesadoptedbyItaliancompaniesissuestockstoallemployeesunconditionallyforthepurposeofimprovingthecompanyatmosphereandstabilizingthesharevalueontheStockExchange。

Onlyveryfewcanbecomparedwithstockoptionplansinthetruesenseoftheterm。

Eveninthiscase,however，directorsandtopmanagerswererarelyevaluatedthroughstockreturns,becauseofthesupposedlimitedabilityoftheItalianstockmarkettomeasurefirm’sperformance（Melis,1999）.

3。

TheEvolutionofItalianInstitutionalContext

TheinstitutionalcontextinItalyhasevolvedradicallyinthelastdecade，creatingthepossibilityforthedisseminationofequityincentiveplans.Themainchangesregardedthedevelopmentofcommerciallaw,theintroductionandupdatingofthecodeofgoodgovernance，theissueofsomereportsencouragingtheuseofequityincentiveplans，andtheevolutionofthetaxlaw（Zattoni,2006）.

Concerningthenationallawandregulations，somereformsinthecommerciallaw（1998,2003，and2005）andtheintroduction（1999）andupdate（2002）ofthenationalcodeofgoodgovernancecontributedtotheimprovementofthecorporategovernanceoflistedcompanies（Zattoni，2006）.FinancialmarketsandcorporatelawreformsimprovedtheefficiencyoftheStockExchangeandcreatedaninstitutionalenvironmentmorefavorabletoinstitutionalinvestors’activism（BianchiandEnriques,2005）。

Atthesametimetheintroductionandupdateofthecodeofgoodgovernancecontributedtotheimprovementofgovernancepracticesattheboardlevel.ThesereformsdidnotproduceanimmediateeffectongovernancepracticesofItalianlistedcompanies,alt