Cyber ThisCyber That So What.docx

Cyber ThisCyber That So What.docx

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CyberThisCyberThatSoWhat

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Published:

1March2010

Air&SpacePowerJournal-Spring2010

CyberThis,CyberThat...SoWhat?

MajEricD.Trias,PhD,USAF

CaptBryanM.Bell,USAF

Youhavetoknowthepasttounderstandthepresent.—CarlSagan

Revolutionsinwarfarerarelytakeplaceinone’slifetime.Rather,anevolutionbasedontheinnovativeuseofavailabletechnologyandhumaningenuitysteadilyoccurs.1Istheubiquityofcyberspaceoperationsandtechnologysucharevolution?

Perhaps.However,anyrevolutionshouldnotcompelustoleavebehindlessonslearnedfromtheagebeforecyberspace.Assiduousstudentsofwarfarewillstillfindthatbooksonmilitaryhistory,theoriesofwar,doctrines,andpublicationsonpastconflictsareinvaluable.CyberspacedoesnotchangetheprinciplesofwarorthetenetsofairpowerfromtheAirman’sperspective.Atanevenmoregranularlevel,onlyminorchangesarerequiredtotheUSAirForce’sairandspace（andcyberspace）functions.

WhenthechiefofstaffandsecretaryoftheAirForceaddedcyberspacetotheservice’smissionstatementinDecember2005,itbecamepowerfullyclearthattheAirForcewasseriousaboutitsroleinprovidingcapabilitiesincyberspaceoperationstothejointfight.2Asaresult,theAirForcecommunity,alongwithitscounterpartsinotherservices,hasbeenbusydevelopingsupportingdocumentsandguidancetodefineandfocuswhatthefledglingmissionareameanstotheforce.Cyberspaceiseverywhereweturn;itisanessentialpartofourdailymissionandactivities.However,wemustrememberthatourfundamentalfunctionsasanAirForcehavenotchanged.

Thisarticleendorsestheideathatcyberoperationsmaybeconductedinallwar-fightingdomains:

air,space,cyberspace,land,andsea.Inaddition,despitetheimmaturityofcyberspaceoperationaldoctrines,thedoctrinesfromairandspaceremainrelevantandapplicabletothecyberspacedomain.Cyberoperationsarejustanothersetoftoolsinthecommander’stoolbox.Althoughcyberoperationshavedistinctwaysofachievingeffects,fromanAirForceperspectivetheyaresimilartootherairandspaceoperationsthatsupportairandspace（andcyberspace）functions.Knownandestablishedcyberoperationsprovidewarfighterswithviableoptionstokineticmeans.Thisarticlehighlightstheroleofcyberoperationsinsupportingtheairandspacefunctions.

Lastly,weaddanewfunction,countercyberspace,tothe17AirForcefunctions（seetable）.PastAirForcedoctrinehasuseddifferentnomenclaturebuthasnotmadetheimportanceofcountercyberspacecompletelyclearuntilrecently.Forthisreason,thenewfunctionnecessitatesadjustmentstotheexistinginformationoperations（IO）functiontoaccountforduplication.Byshowingthatcyberoperationsarejustanothersetoftools,wecanintegratepreviouslydefinedsupportingoperationsinaninitialdevelopmentofcyberspaceoperationsdoctrine.Eventually,amoreconcreteAirForcecyberspacedoctrinewillevolveasprescribedbylessonsfromhistoryandfutureevents.

Doctrineisanintegratedcollectionoflessonslearnedfromexperiments,exercises,andpastengagementsthatweacceptasthebestpracticesforconductingwarfare.3Stillintheirinfancy,cyberspaceoperationsconsequentlylackthehistoryofexperiencevitalforestablishingsounddoctrinalstatements.Dr.DavidLonsdaleremarkedthat“newordevelopingmethodsofwarfarerequiredoctrinalandtheoreticaldevelopment[that]shouldbegroundedin,andinformedby,experience,historicalknowledge,andtheworkoftheuniversaltheorists,mostespeciallyCarlvonClausewitzandSunTzu.”4AirForcestrategistsarestrugglingtocreatedoctrinalprinciplesforcyberwarfareintheformofAirForceDoctrineDocument（AFDD）2-11,“CyberspaceOperations,”nowseveralyearsindraft.However,wemustbecarefultoderivecyberdoctrineandstrategyfromtheprovenmethodsofpreviousdocumentsandmustexaminehowwecanemploycyberspaceoperationsinsupportofAirForcefunctions.

TheAirForcefunctionsdefinedinAFDD1,AirForceBasicDoctrine,arethosespecificresponsibilitiesthatenabletheservicetofulfillitslegallyestablishedrolesasnotedinTitle10,UnitedStatesCode,section8013.Theoperationalfunctionslistedinthetablearethe“broad,fundamental,andcontinuingactivities”ofair,space,andcyberspacepower.5“TheyarenotnecessarilyuniquetotheAirForce...buttogethertheydorepresent”howtheservicefulfillsitsassignedmissions.6Thefollowingsectionsaddresseachoftheairandspacefunctions,discussinghowcyberspaceoperationscanprovidethesameeffectsandserveastheappropriatefoundationforcyberspacedoctrine.

Table.AirForceair,space,andcyberspacefunctions

Function

GeneralDefinition

AirandSpaceExample

CyberTasks

StrategicAttack

Systematicapplicationofforceagainstenemycentersofgravity

Destroyingleadership,power,andcommunicationhubs

AttackonsupervisorycontrolanddataacquisitionandInternettraffic

Counterair,Counterspace,Counterland,Countersea

Operationsconductedtoattainandmaintainadesireddegreeofsuperioritywithinadomainwhiledenyinganadversaryuseofthatsamedomain

Airinterdiction,closeairsupport,suppressionofenemyairdefenses,jammingsatelliteup/downlinkfrequencies

Manipulatingdatabases,images,power/controlsofaweaponsystem

InformationOperations

Actionstosupportcommanders’abilitytoassesstheoperationalenvironmentandenhancetheirobserve-orient-decide-actloop

Influenceoperations,electronicwarfare,militarydeception,counterintelligence

ManipulationofWebcontent,e-mail“leaflets”

Airlift,AirRefueling,Spacelift

Activitiesthatextendthereachofpersonnelandmaterielinordertoproviderapid,functional,flexible,timely,andresponsiveoptions

Intratheaterairlift,operationalsupportairlift,deploymentlaunch

Messaginge-mail,Webpages,remotenetworkadministration

Intelligence,SurveillanceandReconnaissance

Activitiesthatcontributetothecreationoftheintelligencepreparationofthebattlespaceinordertoprovidecommandersdetailedknowledgethathelpsthembetterunderstandandknowtheenemy

U-2s,remotelypilotedaircraft,nationalassets,humanintelligence

Searchengines,networkenumeration,honeypots,packetsniffing

SpecialOperations

Operationsthatusemobilityindeniedterritory,surgicalfirepower,andspecialtacticstoconductlow-visibility,covert,orclandestinemilitaryactions

Specialreconnaissance,psychologicaloperations,counterterrorism

Addressmasking,Internetcafes,botnets

CombatSupport,CommandandControl,CombatSearchandRescue,NavigationandPositioning,WeatherServices

Actionsthatenablethewarfightertofocusonandsuccessfullycarryoutthoseoperationsrelatedtotheabovefunctions

Aircraftmaintenance,airandspaceoperationscenter,globalpositioningsystemsatellites,NationalOceanicandAtmosphericAdministrationsatellites

Net-centricoperations,commandandcontrol,andnetworkterrainpackets

Countercyberspace

Operationsconductedtoattainandmaintainadesireddegreeofcyberspacesuperioritybydestroying,degrading,denying,deceiving,disrupting,orexploitingtheenemy’scyberspacecapability

Bombingserverbuildings

Softwareexploits

DerivedfromAirForceDoctrineDocument1,AirForceBasicDoctrine,17November2003,39–58,http:

//www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/afdd1.pdf（accessed8December2009）.

StrategicAttack

Thegoalofstrategicattackistoapplyforcesystematicallyagainstenemycentersofgravityinordertoproducethegreatesteffectfortheleastcostindollarsandlives.7AsillustratedbyColJohnWarden’sfivestrategicrings,thesecentersmaybematerial（infrastructure）ornonmaterial（populacesupport）innature.Hefurtheradvocatesattackingthethreeelementsofcommand—informationgathering,decisionmaking,andcommunication（e.g.,bombingIraq’scommunicationsinfrastructureduringOperationDesertStorm,asshownonCableNewsNetwork）.8

Thecyberspacedomainprovidesadversariesanewenvironmenttoconductoffensiveanddefensiveoperations.Inaddition,cyberoperationsofferthemeanstoexpediteotheroperationalfunctionspreviouslyconductedthroughotherdomains.“Intheefforttoinfluence—whetherfocusedonanindividual,anorganization,oranentiresociety—cyberspaceisakeyoperationalmediumviawhich‘strategicinfluence’isconducted.”9However,consideringmodernorganizations’andnations’dependenceontheworld’scyberspaceinfrastructure,newsourcesofvulnerabilitiesaretemptingtargetsforstrategicattack,especiallyfromanasymmetricformofwarfare.

Overthepastfewyears,theabilitytousecyberoperationsasanavenueforstrategicattackhasbecomeevident.In2007theIdahoNationalLaboratoryfortheDepartmentofHomelandSecuritysimulatedacyberattackonatestpowerstation.ThesimulationdemonstratedanexploitationofasoftwarevulnerabilityinSupervisoryControlandDataAcquisition（SCADA）systems,thecomputersystemsthatcontrolelectric,water,andchemicalplantsthroughouttheUnitedStates.Designedwithminimalsecurityprotection,manyofthesesystemsremainvulnerabletocyberattacks.EventerroristorganizationsareinterestedinthevulnerabilitiesofstrategicsystemslikeSCADA.10ExamplesincludethevirtualshutdownoftheEstoniangovernmentviaitsInternetinfrastructureandtheRussian/Georgianconflictof2008,duringwhichRussianmilitaryforcesorchestratedawaveofcyber-relatedoperationsagainstGeorgiapriortoaninvasion.Coordinatedthrough