Urban Regulation and the New Economy.docx

1、Urban Regulation and the New EconomyNIMBYs and Knowledge: Urban Regulation and the New Economy By Stephen MalpezziDraft, August 29, 2001 The Center for Urban Land Economics Research The University of Wisconsin 975 University Avenue Madison, WI 53706-1323 smalpezzibus.wisc.eduhttp:/wiscinfo.doit.wisc

2、.edu/realestate Stephen Malpezzi is associate professor, and Wangard Faculty Scholar, in theDepartment of Real Estate and Urban Land Economics, and an associate member of theDepartment of Urban and Regional Planning, of the University of Wisconsin-Madison. This paper is preliminary and will be revis

3、ed. Statistical results in particular may wellchange. Comments and criticisms are particularly welcome. Please contact me for acopy of the revised version of the paper. Thanks to Vicki Elmer, Dennis Gale, John Landis, John Quigley, and other participants atthe American Real Estate and Urban Economic

4、s Association Midyear 2001 specialsession on Housing and the New Economy for comments and suggestions. Remainingerrors are the responsibility of the author. 21. Introduction The purpose of this paper is to explore possible relationships between certainaspects of what used to1 be called the “New Econ

5、omy,” in particular the economicstructure of a metropolitan area, and some aspects of the housing market, namelyNIMBYism2 and land use regulation; housing prices, and urban form (“sprawl”). If we took the time to fully discuss what is meant by the New Economy, or theNext Economy, or the Knowledge Ec

6、onomy, wed quickly use up most of the pageseven the most patient reader would plow through. So from this point on, well bedeliberately fuzzy; well use the term “High Tech,” dropping the quotes, to looselycharacterize localities (metropolitan areas, in this paper) that have above-average sharesof the

7、ir economy devoted to activities that have (or are thought to have) high technologycontent, whatever that means. Of course, when we use specific measures of “tech-ness,”well describe these more fully, but there is no consensus on exactly what this termmeans or how to operationalize it. We will try t

8、o examine several alternative measures,to see if any of our refractory findings are robust. This paper is largely discursive and descriptive. Some plots and some single-equation regression models are presented, but the specifications of the latter are largelyad hoc; we have not developed any formal

9、models based on optimizing behavior ofproducers or consumers. Consider the paper as an exercise in exploratory data analysis. Our aim is to develop some stylized facts, and to frame some hypotheses that can be1 “Used to?” How quickly fads come and go, whether were talking pop economics jargon or NAS

10、DAQbubbles. Don Nichols has argued for the term “Next Economy.” 2 NIMBY is a common acronym for “Not In My Back Yard.” Other acronyms spawned by resistance toone form of development or another include Locally Undesirable Land Use (LULU) and Not on PlanetEarth (NOPE). examined more rigorously in futu

11、re research. In this fairly loose way, we examine thefollowing questions: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) What characterizes High Tech locations (metro areas), other thanthe obvious (their “industrial organization” or economic structure)? For example, is there any data consistent with the story that high-amenit

12、y locations attract footloose high tech industries? What roledoes education play? Are High Tech locations (metro areas) systematically growing anddeveloping faster than the rest of the country? For that matter,how important is industrial structure generally as a predictor ofdevelopment? Are High Tec

13、h metro areas characterized by more stringent development regulation than other areas? Do High Tech locations have systematically higher housing prices than the rest of the country? Can we disentangle the effects of faster growth, regulation, and other determinants? Are High Tech locations systemati

14、cally more decentralized or “sprawling” than other metropolitan areas? The plan of the paper, roughly following our five questions, is as follows. Insection two, we will briefly discuss some measurement issues, regarding firstNIMBYism, or more specifically, its manifestation, development regulation;

15、 andsecondly, the high-tech-ness of a local economy. With this as prologue, we willexamine the correlates of a few measures of “tech-ness,” focusing particularly on ameasure from DeVol (1999). Next, we will examine whether High Tech regions are infact growing faster. The fourth section explains the

16、relationship between NIMBYism andHigh Tech, and growth generally. The fifth section explains the relationship betweenthese phenomena and house prices. Finally, we present some initial evidence on therelationship between the structure of the local economy and urban form. 22. “High Tech” and the “New

17、Economy” Of course, humankind has had many “new economies” over history. Consider,for example, some of the innovations humankind has experienced since the “invention”of agriculture circa 10,000 years ago and the advent of civilization. For most of the last10,000 years, the expected rate of growth ov

18、er any individuals lifetime was, to severaldecimal places, zero.3 A highly stylized long run per capita growth rate can be“estimated” as follows. The worst basket-case economies today have GDP per capita ofaround $300 (World Bank 1999). Very crudely, incomes per capita in a then-rich countrylike Bri

19、tain or Holland might have been something like $2,000 in 1800 (Bairoch 1988,Maddison 1983, Kindleberger 1996).4 Let us be conservative and estimate per capitaincome 10,000 years ago at $100. This implies very long run growth rate of 0.03 percentper annum from 8000 B.C. to circa 1800. This compares t

20、o modern growth rates thataverage about 2 percent per annum. Another new economy was the first industrial revolution, circa 1880, based ontextile weaving and steam; income per capita began to grow as fast as 1 percent aroundthat period.5 The second industrial revolution, based on steel, electricity

21、and the internal3 Of course, postulating “an expected growth rate of zero over an individuals lifetime” is not the same asclaiming there was never any growth in the first 9,500 years or so of civilization. First, there was somemodest rate of growth, as later in this paragraph. Second, even in ancien

22、t times there were examples offaster growth by selected peoples in selected periods. See Jones (1988) and Cipolla (1993) for examplesand discussion. 4 Need to survey more literature for next draft, these numbers are very speculative in any case. 5 We should note that there is debate about the exact

23、nature of the industrial revolution, including whether itwas truly a revolution at all, or merely a slight acceleration of previous growth. See, for example, Cole andDeane (1962) and Crafts (1983). 3combustion engine, phased out in the first half of the 20th century. Growth ratesaccelerated to somet

24、hing like 2 percent. It is not much appreciated that the average growth rate in the first half of the 20thcentury was about the same as the growth rate in the second half of the 20th century,roughly 2 percent per capita in the U.S. (Of course, some non-U.S. economies havegrown much faster than 2 per

25、cent over several decades, see Malpezzi 2001 fordiscussion.) The big difference in growth rates between the two halves of the 20thcentury is not about the average rate of growth, it is about the variance. Figure 1 showsthe decline. The annual real growth rate in GDP per capita from 1890-1950 was 2.0

26、percent, and from 1950 to 1999 was slightly higher, at 2.2 percent. But the standarddeviation of annual real growth rates in GDP per capita from 1890-1950 was 7.2 percent,and from 1950 to 1999 was only 2.3 percent. From the housing perspective, we can date several “new housing economies”from the fir

27、st permanent housing circa 8000 B.C.6 to such innovations as brick (Sumeria,circa 5000 B.C.? check), balloon frame construction (1850), piped water, and theeponymous invention of Thomas Crapper (circa 1870?).7 According to Witold Rybzinski(1987), the Dutch circa 1400 were responsible for the inventi

28、on of the concept of “home”as a private family space with its current connotation of hearth and refuge. At one level, there can be hardly any doubt that technology affects development. The early development of cities ten thousand years ago was tied to technologicalimprovements in agriculture that pe

29、rmitted at least a few members of society to engage in6 Currently searching more literature on this history; bibliographic suggestions much appreciated. 7 Thomas Crapper, plumber, did hold several plumbing patents but his invention of the flush toilet is,unfortunately, myth. And recently Chinese arc

30、heologists have unearthed what may have been the worldsfirst water closet, circa 100 B.C. See . 4activities other than gathering enough calories to stay alive. Many studies have exploredthe role of such technical innovations as the steam engine, electricity, and railroads in thehistory of economic d

31、evelopment in the United States. Adams and Sveikauskas (1993) demonstrate the linkages between academicscience, applied research and development, and economic development. Among othermeasures, they use the number of industry scientists as a measure of R&D and academicpapers as crude measures of scientific output. Their findings demonstrate that firstscience and at a later stage R&D are a powerful mover of the entire structural production and they appear to be a potent force responsible for capital deepening in the U.S. andother economies. Other studies such as Jaffe (1989), Beeson and M