人力资源管理专业 文献翻译原文.docx

1、人力资源管理专业 文献翻译原文Stages of the Recruitment Process andthe Referrers Performance EffectValery YakubovichThe Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 3620 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104,valeryywharton.upenn.eduDaniela LupGraduate School of Business, University of Chicago, 5807 S. Woodl

2、awn Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60637,daniela.lupchicagogsb.eduAlthough the existing theory predicts that a referrals chances of being hired increase with the job performance of the referrer, no empirical evidence is available to support this claim. To address this discrepancy, we decompose the recrui

3、tment process into objective selection, subjective selection, and self-selection and theorize that the likelihood of passing a particular recruitment stage increases with the performance of the referrer under objective selection and selfselection, but remains undetermined at a stage of subjective se

4、lection. Our analysis of unique comprehensive data on online recruitment of sales agents in a virtual call center supports these arguments. The effectiveness of personnel 人事 as a recruitment channel 招聘渠道varies with随着 the type of the recruitment stage and performance of the referrer. When the firm ev

5、aluates评估 candidates申请者 by an objective criterion客观标准, the advantage优势 of a referral被推荐 increases with the performance of his or her referrer; those referred by relatively high-performing workers are significantly better than the applicants who learned about the job from Internet ads. When job candi

6、dates self-select into the next stage of the online application process, the referral of any agent is more likely to continue than a nonreferral, and this likelihood increases with the performance of the referrer. On a subjective stage, the outcome is contingent on the intricacies of the recruitment

7、 process. In our case, an applicants chances of being hired increase with the performance of his or her referrer because the firm rejects the referrals of low-performing workers at a higher rate than it does nonreferrals, while it treats equally the referrals of high-performing workers and nonreferr

8、als.The studys contributions to the literature on social networks in labor markets are discussed.Key words: labor markets; social networks; virtual recruitment; hiring through referrals; contingent workersIntroductionA few recent case studies of organizations carefully document the role of referrals

9、 in recruitment. The existing theory posits that recruitment is an inherently social process in which personal relationships among employers,job seekers, and intermediaries play a leading role, providing intensive, hard-to-measure information, attracting candidates who would not apply through formal

10、 labor market channels, and securing a smoother adjustment and more effective training for new hires. Job candidates候考者 referred被参考 by the firms current workers当前工人 are more likely to survive the selection process and perform well on the job because they possess more appropriate observable and unobs

11、ervable characteristics, have a deeper understanding of the jobs requirements and the firms culture, and receive informal help with training and socialization (for review of the literature, see Fernandez et al. 2000, Granovetter 1995, Marsden and Gorman 2001). Castilla (2005) provides the first cred

12、ible evidence that referrals are more productive than nonreferrals, although the advantage disappears in the long run and, moreover, turns into a disadvantage if the referrer quits the firm.By relying on workers social networks, employers economize on hiring costs and share these savings with the ve

13、ry same workers in the form of bonuses for successful referrals; such formal referral programs proliferate and, according to some estimates, deliver nontrivial economic returns (Fernandez et al. 2000). Management textbooks support such practices because referrals “aremore satisfied, productive, and

14、likely to remain” with the firm (Baron and Kreps 1999, p. 342). We learn that by and large, referrals enjoy advantage over nonreferrals because of their propensity to present more appropriate resumes, to apply when market conditions are more favorable, and to rely on the reputation, influence,and su

15、pport of their sponsors (Fernandez and Weinberg 1997, Fernandez et al. 2000). Not surprisingly, access to potential referrers and the ability to mobilize them become major factors in hiring and explain hiring rate differentials among ethnic groups (Petersen et al. 2000).Despite this progress, at lea

16、st one major theoretical and empirical puzzle remains: Although the received theory predicts a referrers performance effectthat is, that a referrals quality and chances of being hired should increase with the job performance of the referrer (Montgomery 1991, Simon and Warner 1992)no empirical eviden

17、ce is available to support this claim despite multiple attempts to find it (e.g., Castilla 2005, Fernandez et al. 2000). On the contrary, Fernandez et al.(2000) find that a referrals likelihood of getting an interview and job offer might even decrease with the tenure and wage of the referrer, which

18、are major indicators of the referrers performance. Explanations of these discrepancies often point to methodological difficulties of measuring a referrers characteristics relevant to performance of either the referrer herself or her referral. Because observable sociodemographic characteristics are n

19、ot reliable predictors of the performance of their carriers, it is hard to expect them to be helpful with referrals either. Moreover, referrals often compete for jobs other than the ones occupied by their referrers, which makes even a perfect measure of referrers performance largely irrelevant to th

20、e performance of the referral.We argue that, methodological considerations aside, there are theoretical 理论上的reasons for the absence of缺失 the referrers performance effect. The effect remains under theorized unless we separate the objective and subjective components of the recruitment process. The inf

21、ormation and social homophily arguments, which are commonly brought to justify the relevance of the referrers performance (Montgomery 1991, Simon and Warner 1992), are valid under objective selection criteria but become problematic when subjective judgments of human resources (HR) personnel guide re

22、cruitment decisions. Indeed, such judgments are often guided by considerations other than performancefor example, by a referrers political clout or the desire to help referrers meet their obligations to family and friendsand as a result, the role of performance in recruitment becomes muted. The lite

23、rature also ignores judgments of job applicants during the recruitment process and instead portrays them as passive during the time between when they submit an application and when they decide whether to accept an offer. However, a job applicant has an obvious opportunity to withdraw at any moment d

24、uring the process, and the decision to do that is a subjective judgment on his or her part.To put the theory on a stronger footing, we analytically decompose the recruitment process into objective selection, subjective selection, and self-selection. For the purpose of this study, we define定义 objecti

25、vity客观地 with regard to referrals as a consistent始终一致的 application of the employers predetermined metrics预定的指标 to all candidates求职者, referrals中介 and nonreferrals无人推荐的求职者.A primary example of objective selection is a test whose outcome is determined by a score calculated according to a fixed algorithm

26、. Subjective selection comprises managerial decisions based on recruiting managers interpretation of all the information about an applicant available at the time. Self-selection is the mirror image of subjective selection; it comprises包括 workers decisions to continue through the recruitment process

27、or quit, based on their interpretation解释 of all the information about the firm available to them at the time a decision is made. This analytical decomposition双重的分析 is productive富有成效的 only if it can be operationalized被落实 for在 an empirical application完全运用经验的申请, which is challenging because typical rec

28、ruitment stages, such as a screening of resumes筛选简历 and face-to-face interviews, lump together混合了 objective and subjective components部分. We benefit from从中收益 the spread of the Internet as a recruitment medium; virtual recruitment requires a more careful delineation轮廓 of recruitment stages and the tas

29、ks that employers and job candidates perform on each stage, making operationalization落实 possible.The typology象征 of selection stagesobjective客观 selection, subjective主观 selection, and self-selectionallows us to refine改善 关于中介作用的推论 the prediction regarding the referrers performance effect. The likelihoo

30、d可能性 of being selected被选中 increases with随 增长 the performance of the referrer at a stage of objective selection and self-selection but remains undetermined未能确定的 at a stage of subjective selection. Our analysis of unique comprehensive data全面的数据 on online recruitment of sales agents销售代理 in a virtual ca

31、ll center (VCC) generally supports these arguments.Personal contacts人际关系 remain a salient突出的 recruitment channel途径, although their effectiveness varies with随着 the type of the recruitment stage and performance of the referrer. When the firm evaluates评估 candidates候选人 by an objective criterion规范, the a

32、dvantage of a referral increases with the performance of his or her referrer; only those referred by relatively有关系的 high-performing workers are significantly明显的 better than the applicants who learned about the job from Internet ads. On a subjective主观 stage, where HR personnel make a judgment about a

33、 candidates qualifications任职资格, the outcome is contingent on视 而定 the intricacies复杂 of the recruitment process. In our case, an applicants chances increase with the performance of his or her referrer because the firm rejects拒绝 the referrals of low-performing workers at a higher rate than it does nonreferrals, though it treats