1992年 华伦.docx

1、1992年 华伦BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.SHAREHOLDER LETTERS Warren E. BuffettFebruary 28, 1992 Chairman of the BoardCHAIRMANS LETTERS 1992To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: Our per-share book value increased 20.3% during 1992. Over the last 28 years (that is, since present management took over)

2、book value has grown from $19 to $7,745, or at a rate of 23.6% compounded annually. During the year, Berkshires net worth increased by $1.52 billion. More than 98% of this gain came from earnings and appreciation of portfolio securities, with the remainder coming from the issuance of new stock. Thes

3、e shares were issued as a result of our calling our convertible debentures for redemption on January 4, 1993, and of some holders electing to receive common shares rather than the cash that was their alternative. Most holders of the debentures who converted into common waited until January to do it,

4、 but a few made the move in December and therefore received shares in 1992. To sum up what happened to the $476 million of bonds we had outstanding: $25 million were converted into shares before yearend; $46 million were converted in January; and $405 million were redeemed for cash. The conversions

5、were made at $11,719 per share, so altogether we issued 6,106 shares. Berkshire now has 1,152,547 shares outstanding. That compares, you will be interested to know, to 1,137,778 shares outstanding on October 1, 1964, the beginning of the fiscal year during which Buffett Partnership, Ltd. acquired co

6、ntrol of the company. We have a firm policy about issuing shares of Berkshire, doing so only when we receive as much value as we give. Equal value, however, has not been easy to obtain, since we have always valued our shares highly. So be it: We wish to increase Berkshires size only when doing that

7、also increases the wealth of its owners. Those two objectives do not necessarily go hand-in-hand as an amusing but value-destroying experience in our past illustrates. On that occasion, we had a significant investment in a bank whose management was hell-bent on expansion. (Arent they all?) When our

8、bank wooed a smaller bank, its owner demanded a stock swap on a basis that valued the acquirees net worth and earning power at over twice that of the acquirers. Our management - visibly in heat - quickly capitulated. The owner of the acquiree then insisted on one other condition: You must promise me

9、, he said in effect, that once our merger is done and I have become a major shareholder, youll never again make a deal this dumb. You will remember that our goal is to increase our per-share intrinsic value - for which our book value is a conservative, but useful, proxy - at a 15% annual rate. This

10、objective, however, cannot be attained in a smooth manner. Smoothness is particularly elusive because of the accounting rules that apply to the common stocks owned by our insurance companies, whose portfolios represent a high proportion of Berkshires net worth. Since 1979, generally accepted account

11、ing principles (GAAP) have required that these securities be valued at their market prices (less an adjustment for tax on any net unrealized appreciation) rather than at the lower of cost or market. Run-of-the-mill fluctuations in equity prices therefore cause our annual results to gyrate, especiall

12、y in comparison to those of the typical industrial company. To illustrate just how volatile our progress has been - and to indicate the impact that market movements have on short-term results - we show on the facing page our annual change in per-share net worth and compare it with the annual results

13、 (including dividends) of the S&P 500. You should keep at least three points in mind as you evaluate this data. The first point concerns the many businesses we operate whose annual earnings are unaffected by changes in stock market valuations. The impact of these businesses on both our absolute and

14、relative performance has changed over the years. Early on, returns from our textile operation, which then represented a significant portion of our net worth, were a major drag on performance, averaging far less than would have been the case if the money invested in that business had instead been inv

15、ested in the S&P 500. In more recent years, as we assembled our collection of exceptional businesses run by equally exceptional managers, the returns from our operating businesses have been high - usually well in excess of the returns achieved by the S&P. A second important factor to consider - and

16、one that significantly hurts our relative performance - is that both the income and capital gains from our securities are burdened by a substantial corporate tax liability whereas the S&P returns are pre-tax. To comprehend the damage, imagine that Berkshire had owned nothing other than the S&P index

17、 during the 28-year period covered. In that case, the tax bite would have caused our corporate performance to be appreciably below the record shown in the table for the S&P. Under present tax laws, a gain for the S&P of 18% delivers a corporate holder of that index a return well short of 13%. And th

18、is problem would be intensified if corporate tax rates were to rise. This is a structural disadvantage we simply have to live with; there is no antidote for it. The third point incorporates two predictions: Charlie Munger, Berkshires Vice Chairman and my partner, and I are virtually certain that the

19、 return over the next decade from an investment in the S&P index will be far less than that of the past decade, and we are dead certain that the drag exerted by Berkshires expanding capital base will substantially reduce our historical advantage relative to the index. Making the first prediction goe

20、s somewhat against our grain: Weve long felt that the only value of stock forecasters is to make fortune tellers look good. Even now, Charlie and I continue to believe that short-term market forecasts are poison and should be kept locked up in a safe place, away from children and also from grown-ups

21、 who behave in the market like children. However, it is clear that stocks cannot forever overperform their underlying businesses, as they have so dramatically done for some time, and that fact makes us quite confident of our forecast that the rewards from investing in stocks over the next decade wil

22、l be significantly smaller than they were in the last. Our second conclusion - that an increased capital base will act as an anchor on our relative performance - seems incontestable. The only open question is whether we can drag the anchor along at some tolerable, though slowed, pace. We will contin

23、ue to experience considerable volatility in our annual results. Thats assured by the general volatility of the stock market, by the concentration of our equity holdings in just a few companies, and by certain business decisions we have made, most especially our move to commit large resources to supe

24、r-catastrophe insurance. We not only accept this volatility but welcome it: A tolerance for short-term swings improves our long-term prospects. In baseball lingo, our performance yardstick is slugging percentage, not batting average.The Salomon Interlude Last June, I stepped down as Interim Chairman

25、 of Salomon Inc after ten months in the job. You can tell from Berkshires 1991-92 results that the company didnt miss me while I was gone. But the reverse isnt true: I missed Berkshire and am delighted to be back full-time. There is no job in the world that is more fun than running Berkshire and I c

26、ount myself lucky to be where I am. The Salomon post, though far from fun, was interesting and worthwhile: In Fortunes annual survey of Americas Most Admired Corporations, conducted last September, Salomon ranked second among 311 companies in the degree to which it improved its reputation. Additiona

27、lly, Salomon Brothers, the securities subsidiary of Salomon Inc, reported record pre-tax earnings last year - 34% above the previous high. Many people helped in the resolution of Salomons problems and the righting of the firm, but a few clearly deserve special mention. It is no exaggeration to say t

28、hat without the combined efforts of Salomon executives Deryck Maughan, Bob Denham, Don Howard, and John Macfarlane, the firm very probably would not have survived. In their work, these men were tireless, effective, supportive and selfless, and I will forever be grateful to them. Salomons lead lawyer

29、 in its Government matters, Ron Olson of Munger, Tolles & Olson, was also key to our success in getting through this trouble. The firms problems were not only severe, but complex. At least five authorities - the SEC, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the U.S. Treasury, the U.S. Attorney for the

30、Southern District of New York, and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice - had important concerns about Salomon. If we were to resolve our problems in a coordinated and prompt manner, we needed a lawyer with exceptional legal, business and human skills. Ron had them all.Acquisitions Of

31、 all our activities at Berkshire, the most exhilarating for Charlie and me is the acquisition of a business with excellent economic characteristics and a management that we like, trust and admire. Such acquisitions are not easy to make but we look for them constantly. In the search, we adopt the sam

32、e attitude one might find appropriate in looking for a spouse: It pays to be active, interested and open-minded, but it does not pay to be in a hurry. In the past, Ive observed that many acquisition-hungry managers were apparently mesmerized by their childhood reading of the story about the frog-kissing princess. Remembering her succ