经济学人3.docx

1、经济学人3Reassuringly unfriendly令人放心地不友善Today is more like the 1980s than the 1990s in another way, too: the hostility of the buyers. The dotcom era was nauseatingly cosy, with only 4% of deals struck in 2000 deemed hostile or unsolicited. This year the level is hovering close to 20%. One reason for thi

2、s is the growing influence of shareholders, notably hedge funds, whose patience is short. Given this new breed of owner-agitator, managers of targeted firms are less likely to “dig trenches and stay there,” says Victor Lewkow, a merger lawyer with Cleary Gottlieb. Pension funds and other once-staid

3、institutional shareholders are also becoming more willing to entertain offers as they strive to increase returns.从另一方面，即：买家的敌对程度，来说，今天更像上世纪的80年代，而不是90年代。达康时代平稳发展得让人感觉提不起精神，在2000年所进行的交易中仅有4%被认为是恶意交易或无约束力交易。而在今年，这个百分比快挺进到20%。原因之一是，股东的影响力在不断增加，尤其是对冲基金的影响力，他们的耐心一向不多。面对这种新出现的所有人型煽动者，目标公司的经理不再可能“挖个战壕，躲在那里

4、，” 美国佳利律师事务所的兼并律师维克多卢科（音译，Victor Lewkow）说道。随着养老金基金和其他以前沉稳的机构股东在努力增加收益，他们也都变得更加愿意接受报价。As in the 1980s antitrust authorities seem to have become more relaxed than they were in the 1990s, especially in America. Mr Lewkow thinks some companies are rushing to do attractive but “dicier” deals (from an ant

5、itrust standpoint) in the hope of getting them approved before the change of president, and a possible tightening of enforcement policies. Even so, the likes of Alcoa and Thomson face daunting obstacles. Credit Suisse puts the chances of success for the Reuters takeover at 60%.和在80年代一样，今天反垄断当局的态度似乎要

6、比他们在90年代的时候更加宽松，尤其是在美国。卢科认为，一些公司急着做成有吸引力但风险更大的交易（站在反垄断的立场上），希望在总统换任之前把交易敲定，并且加紧政策的执行。虽然如此，诸如美铝亚洲和汤姆森集团等其它收购企业仍要面对难以克服的障碍。瑞士信贷认为，收购路透集团的成功性仅有60%。But getting a deal past the antitrust police is only half the battle. Research shows that mergers often fail to bring expected benefits: look no further tha

7、n the break-up of DaimlerChrysler after nine unhappy years. M&A advisers dispute this, pointing to studies that show buyers outperform the market, at least in the year after the deal. But the danger of overpaying clearly increases as competition for transactions heats up and stockmarkets scale new h

8、eights. There are signs that this is happening: the average premium being paid, when measured as a percentage of the targets cash flow, is higher that at any time since the bursting of the last bubble.但是，让交易通过反垄断当局的审查只是斗争的一半。研究显示，兼并通常不能带来期望的利益：看看戴姆勒-克莱斯勒在九年不高兴日子后的分手就清楚了。并购方面的顾问却不同意此观点，他们指出，有研究表明买家的表

9、现至少在交易后的一年时间里是要胜过市场的。然而，随着交易竞争愈演愈烈和股市频繁创造新高，过多支付的危险无疑也在增长。有迹象显示，这一切正在发生：若将现在所支付的一般溢价作为目标公司现金流转中的百分比来计量，它是在从最后一个泡沫破碎到今天的这段时间里最高的。Moreover, there are fears that mergers will be used to paper over cracks. Profit growth for companies in the S&P 500 will fall to 7% this year after several years of double

10、-digit expansion, reckons Thomson Financial. Firms may join forces to hide their own deteriorating performance.而且，有人担心兼并会被用作掩盖问题的手段。汤姆森金融公司认为，在几年的两位数增长之后，标准普尔500指数公司的利润增长率会在今年降低到7%。公司也许会联合起来用兼并的方法来掩瞒它们日趋恶化的市场表现。That should worry shareholders. For those who advise on deals, however, the bigger concer

11、n is what might bring the party to an abrupt end. A sharp economic slowdown in America? The collapse of a giant buy-out? A credit crunch with no clear trigger? In private, most bankers say it cannot go on for much longer. In public, they will just keep clinking their glasses.这应该会使股东担心。但对于那些交易顾问来说，更值

12、得关注的事情是，什么会使这个狂欢戛然而止。会是美国经济发展的突然减速？会是一次巨型收购的失败？还会是在无明显诱因下发生的信用崩溃？在私底下，大部分的银行家表示，兼并热不可能持续太长。然而，在公众场合，他们仅会继续互相碰着酒杯。Lost in translation 在折算中迷失If China sharply revalued the yuan, as American politicians are demanding, it could actually hurt the United States and help China 如果中国如美国政客们苛求的那样对急剧升值人民币，事实上中国会

13、得到好处，美国则会受到创伤。CHINA is being cast as the villain once again. By holding its exchange rate artificially low, it is stealing jobs and causing the United States to run a huge trade deficit. Beijing must therefore be forced to revalue the yuan. These are the arguments behind an increasingly protectionis

14、t mood in Washington. Yet they are largely flawed. A stronger Chinese currency would not much reduce Americas trade deficit. Indeed, the irony is that China, not America, has more to gain from setting the yuan free. Without a more flexible exchange rate, there is a growing risk that Chinas sizzling

15、economy will boil over.中国正再次扮演反派人物。通过人为保持低汇率,它窃取就业机会，并且致使美国承担了巨额贸易逆差。因此，北京必须被迫升值人民币。这些就是华盛顿越来越多的贸易保护主义情绪背后的论调。然而他们大错特错了。更加坚挺的人民币对于减少美国贸易赤字收效甚微。实际上，具有讽刺意味的是，中国（而不是美国）从放开人民币管制当中获益更多。如果没有更加灵活的汇率，滋滋响的中国经济会面临沸腾的危险。Although by themselves these actions are trivial, together they point to an increasing appe

16、tite for tougher action against China. The Bush administration is under increasing pressure, particularly from Congress.尽管就自身来讲这都是一些小动作，但是联合起来就表明了对于采取更强硬措施反对中国的越来越大的胃口。布什政府顶着（特别是来自国会的）越来越多的压力。Congressmen complain that the so-called China-US Strategic Economic Dialogue (a series of high-level talks b

17、etween the two countries launched last year by Hank Paulson, the treasury secretary) has so far failed to produce results. The recent deterioration in trade relations does not bode well for the next meeting, which begins on May 22nd. Many commentators now reckon that Congress will inevitably pass so

18、me kind of China-bashing legislation later this year. A sharp economic slowdown in America as a result of the collapsing housing market would make this even more likely. 国会议员们抱怨，所谓中美战略经济对话（财政部长汉克.鲍尔森去年创立的两国间的一系列高层对话）迄今为止没有发挥作用近来的贸易摩擦可不是五月二十二日开始的下一次会议的吉兆。现在许多评论员预计国会将在今年晚些时候通过某种痛击中国的法案。房地产市场的崩溃导致的美国经济

19、的急速衰退使其更加可能发生。The biggest risk comes from measures linked to Chinas supposed exchange-rate misalignment. The infamous Schumer-Graham bill, which proposed a 27.5% tariff on all Chinese goods to offset the yuans alleged undervaluation, was withdrawn last year. But the two senators behind it are workin

20、g with others on a new WTO-compatible version that could soon appear. Although the new bill is unlikely to include across-the-board tariffs, it could have sharp teeth. 最大的风险来自测量假定的中国汇率失调的标准。声名狼藉的舒默-格雷厄姆法案建议对所有中国商品征收27.5%关税以抵消人民币所谓的低估在去年被撤销。而作为始作俑者的两名参议员以及其他人正在为即将浮出水面的世贸组织的匹配版本而辛勤工作。尽管新法案不太可能包含全面关税,但

21、还是会有尖牙利齿。Meanwhile, the target of all this hostility looms ever larger: Chinas trade surplus with America increased to $233 billion last year, accounting for almost 30% of Americas total deficit. Chinas total current-account surplus reached an estimated $250 billion, or 9% of GDP, up from only 1% in

22、 2001. Worse still, in the first four months of 2007, its trade surplus jumped by 88% compared with the same period in 2006. 同时,所有敌对行动的对象之大前所未有：去年中国对美国的贸易顺差增加到2330亿美元，几乎占美国全部贸易逆差的30%。中国的经常项目3帐户盈余总额估计达到2500亿美元，或者国内生产总值的9%，而2001年这一比例仅为1%。更糟的是,2007年前四个月，其贸易顺差与2006年同期相比跃升了88%。The making of myths 谬论的产生Ch

23、ina officially abandoned its decade-long policy of pegging the yuan to the dollar in July 2005. Since then it has risen by only 8% against the greenback. Because the dollar itself has weakened, the yuans trade-weighted exchange rate has barely budged. In real trade-weighted terms it is about 10% che

24、aper than at the dollars peak in 2002. As a result, it is not just the usual protectionist suspects that demand action, but many mainstream American economists are now calling on China to revalue by 20% or more. Yet the standard arguments for a revaluation are based partly on a series of myths.2005年

25、7月，中国正式放弃实行十年之久的人民币盯住美元政策。从那以后，人民币对美钞已经升值8%。因为美元自身的疲软，人民币的贸易加权汇率4几乎没有变动。在实际贸易加权范围内，它比美元出现最高值的2002年还要便宜10%。结果,不仅仅是贸易保护主义者嫌疑犯请求采取措施，现在就连美国主流经济学家也呼吁人民币升值20%或者更多。然而关于升值的标准论调部分地基于种种谬论。The first myth is that there is overwhelming evidence that the yuan is grossly undervalued. Chinas large bilateral trade

26、surplus with America proves nothing. It largely reflects Asias changing supply chain. Much of what America buys from China today once came from Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. China now imports components from these countries, assembles them and exports the finished goods to America. Knock out these

27、and Americas bilateral deficit with China shrinks by more than half. Even so, Chinas overall current-account surplus is also huge. The surge in its foreign-exchange reserves, to over $1.2 trillion, also suggests that the yuan is undervalued: without those massive purchases of dollars, the currency w

28、ould have risen. 谬论一：是人民币币值被严重低估铁证如山。中国对美国的巨额双边贸易顺差证明不了什么。这基本上反映了亚洲供应链的变化。今天美国从中国购买的商品从前大部分来自日本,韩国和台湾。现在中国从这些国家和地区进口零部件，组装为成品后出口给美国。排除掉这些因素之后，美国对中国的贸易逆差将缩水一大半。虽然如此，中国的经常项目帐户盈余总额还是庞大的。超过一万二千亿美元的外汇储备的涌入，也暗示着人民币被低估了；如果没有如此巨额的美元买进，货币本该升值的。However, not all economists agree that the yuan needs to be sharp

29、ly revalued. At one extreme is Morris Goldstein, of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, who argues that the yuan is undervalued by 40% or more against the dollar and should immediately be revalued by 10-15%. In the other corner many highly respected economists, including Robert Munde

30、ll, an economics Nobel prize-winner, and Ronald McKinnon, of Stanford University, strongly argue against a big appreciation of the yuan. 然而,并非所有的经济学家都同意人民币需要急速升值这一说法。一个极端是彼得森国际经济研究所的莫里斯.戈尔德施泰因，他主张人民币对美元被低估了40%或者更多，并应立刻升值10-15%。另一个极端是许多德高望重的经济学家，他们（包括诺贝尔经济学奖得主罗伯特.蒙代尔5，以及斯坦福大学的罗纳德.麦金农6）强烈反对人民币的大幅升值。Th

31、e devil to measure 流氓度量法Economists find it devilishly hard to define the “correct value” for a currency. On purchasing-power parity (PPP), the yuan is clearly undervalued against the dollar. Perhaps by as much as 50%. But PPP is not useful for determining the optimal exchange rate between two countr

32、ies of such different levels of income. It is natural for average prices to be lower in poorer countries because wages are lower. As countries get richer and their productivity rises, their real exchange rates appreciate. And although the depreciation in the yuans real trade-weighted value since 2002 looks perverse, this follows a real appreciation of 50% between 1994 and 2001 (see chart 1).经济学家发现给货币定义“正确的价值”难于上青天。就购买力平价7来讲，人民币对美元显然被低估了。大概50%那么多。然而购买力平价对确定不同收入水平的两国间的最优汇率没有作用。穷国因为工资较低所以自然而然地平均价格也比较低。随着国家变得富裕，生产力水平提高，实际汇率也会水涨船高。而尽管自从2002年以来，人民币的实际贸易加权值一直降低，这看起来是故意作对，但是这是因袭1994至2001年的实际上50%的增值。