ted演讲josephnye《21世纪权力的变迁》.docx

1、ted演讲josephnye21世纪权力的变迁Im going to talk to you about power in this 21st century. And basically, what Id like to tell you is that power is changing, and there are two types of changes I want to discuss. One is power transition, which is change of power amongst states. And they are the simple version

2、of the message, is its moving from West to East. The other is power diffusion, the way power is moving from all states, West or East, to non-state actors. Those two things are the huge shifts of power in our century. And I want to tell you about them each separately and then how they interact and wh

3、y, in the end, there may be some good news. 我想讨论的是21世纪的权利。基本上我想告诉大家的是权利的变化，有两种变化是我想探讨的。 一种是权利的转移， 国家和国家之间的权利变化。这是对权利转移的简单解读，即权利正从西方转移到东方。另一种是权利的分散，即权利的转移是从西方和东方的各个国家 到非国家的范围。以上两种情况是本世纪权利的重要转移。我想分别说说这两种情况 和它们之间的相互影响 以及为什么说最终可能是个好消息。When we talk about power transition, we often talk about the rise of

4、Asia. It really should be called the recovery, or return, of Asia. If we looked at the world in 1800, youd find that more than half of the worlds people lived in Asia and they made more than half the worlds product. Now fast forward to 1900: half the worlds people - more than half - still live in As

5、ia, but theyre making only a fifth of the worlds product. What happened The Industrial Revolution, which meant that all of a sudden, Europe and America became the dominant center of the world. What were going to see in the 21st century is Asia gradually returning to being more than half of the world

6、s population and more than half of the worlds product. Thats important, and its an important shift. But let me tell you a little bit about the other shift that Im talking about, which is power diffusion. 说到权利的转移，我们经常会提起亚洲的崛起。确切地说应该称作亚洲的复兴或者亚洲的回归。 回顾19世纪的世界，你会发现世界上一半以上的人口都居住在亚洲 而且他们生产的产品占了世界总量的一半以上。现

7、在我们来看20世纪，世界上一般的人口超过一半仍然在亚洲居住，但是他们的生产总值进占全球的五分之一。 这是为什么呢工业革命， 也就是说突然之间，欧洲和美国成为主导世界的中心。而到了21世纪，我们看到的是亚洲将重新回到占世界一半以上人口和生产总值的位置。这很重要，而且是一次重大的权利转移。 但是接下来我要和你们探讨一下刚才提到的另外一种转移，那就是权利分散。To understand power diffusion put this in your mind: computing and communications costs have fallen a thousandfold between

8、 1970 and the beginning of this century. Now thats a big, abstract number, but to make it more real, if the price of an automobile had fallen as rapidly as the price of computing power, you could buy a car today for five dollars. Now when the price of any technology declines that dramatically, the b

9、arriers to entry go down; anybody can play in the game. So in 1970, if you wanted to communicate from Oxford to Johannesburg to New Delhi to Brasilia and anywhere simultaneously, you could do it, the technology was there. But to be able to do it, you had to be very rich - a government, a multination

10、al corporation, maybe the Catholic Church - but you had to be pretty wealthy. Now, anybody has that capacity, which previously was restricted by price just to a few actors, if they have the price of entry into an internet cafe - the last time I looked, it was something like a pound an hour - and if

11、you have Skype, its free. So capabilities that were once restricted are now available to everyone. 要理解权利分散 就要明白一点：计算和交流的成本已经降到原来的千分之几 从1970年到本世纪初。 这个数字很大，很抽象， 但是具体来说，如果汽车价格的降幅和计算机的降幅一样， 那么今天你只花五美元， 就可以买辆车。 那么如果所有的技术价格 都以这个幅度下跌， 获得这一技术的门槛就会降低；人人都可以享有。 从20世纪70年代开始， 如果你想 从牛津到约翰内斯堡 或到新德里 或到巴西利亚 或是其他任何地方

12、获得即时通讯， 是可行的，因为技术已经发展到了这个阶段。但是要真正做到这一点， 你需要很有钱才行 你要么是政府，要么是跨国公司，也可能是基督教堂 不过你得及其有钱才行。但是几天人人都能享有这些技术， 以前人们受到价格的制约 只有少数人才能享有，如果人们有足够的钱去网吧 我上次查到的价格大概是每小时一磅左右 但是如果你用Skype，是免费的。所以曾经被限制的能力现在人人都可以享有。 And what that means is not that the age of the State is over. The State still matters. But the stage is crow

13、ded. The States not alone. There are many, many actors. Some of thats good. Oxfam, a great non-governmental actor. Some of its bad. Al Qaeda, another non-governmental actor. But think of what it does to how we think in traditional terms and concepts. We think in terms of war and interstate war. And

14、you can think back to 1941, when the government of Japan attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor. Its worth noticing that a non-state actor attacking the United States in 2001 killed more Americans than the government of Japan did in 1941. You might think of that as the privatization of war. So w

15、ere seeing a great change in terms of diffusion of power. 这并不意味着国家的时代结束了。 国家依然很重要。 但是舞台是很拥挤的。 国家不可能单独存在。还有很多很多的角色。 其中有一些是好的角色。 比如牛津饥荒救济委员会（乐施会） 就是一个很重要的非政府角色。其中也有一些是不好的。基地组织，是另一个非政府角色。 但是试想这些对我们 传统的思维方式和观念有哪些改变。 我们过去考虑的是战争 和内战。 大家可以想一想1941年， 日本政府日本政府袭击美国珍珠港。 只得注意的是 在2001年，一个非政府的角色 袭击了美国 在这次袭击中丧生的美国人

16、超过了 1941年日本政府的行为。 你可能会想战争已经不再是国家行为。因此我们看到的是权力分散的一个重大变化。Now the problem is that were not thinking about it in very innovative ways. So let me step back and ask: whats power Power is simple the ability to affect others to get the outcomes you want, and you can do it in three ways. You can do it with t

17、hreats, of coercion - sticks, you can do it with payments - carrots, or you can do it by getting others to want what you want. And that ability to get others to want what you want, to get the outcomes you want, without coercion or payment, is what I call soft power. And that soft power has been much

18、 neglected and much misunderstood. And yet its tremendously important. Indeed, if you can learn to use more soft power, you can save a lot on carrots and sticks. Traditionally, the way people thought about power was primarily in terms of military power. For example, the great Oxford historian who ta

19、ught here at this university, Taylor, defined a great power as a country able to prevail in war. But we need a new narrative if were to understand power in the 21st century. Its not just prevailing at war, though war still persists. Its not whose army wins; its also whose story wins. And we have to

20、think much more in terms of narratives and whose narrative is going to be effective. 可问题是我们对此的看法不够新。所以让我们再退一步重新审视并且想一想：什么是权利 权利其实就是一种能力 能够影响他人 以达到你的目的， 实现权利的方式有三种。 可以威胁他人， 通过强迫棍棒， 可以买通他人 胡萝卜， 或者通过让别人心甘情愿地做你想要达成的结果。而让别人心甘情愿地做逆向要做的，来达到你的目的，而不是通过强迫或买通，就是我所说的软实力。而这种软实力很大程度上被人们所忽视所误解了。然而软实力是极其重要地。 事实上，如果

21、你知道如何运用软实力， 你会节省很多地胡萝卜和棍棒。 按照惯例，人们认为权利基本就是军事力量。例如来自牛津的伟大的历史学家 泰勒 对大国的定义是 能够打赢战争的国家。 但是我们需要一个新的阐述来真正懂得21世纪地权利。 权利不仅仅是赢得战争尽管战争依旧存在。哪一个国家的军队赢了并不重要； 重要的是谁讲的故事能够赢得人心。而且我们需要进一步考虑这个阐释以及谁的阐释更加有效。 Now let me go back to the question of power transition between states and whats happening there. the narratives

22、that we use now tend to be the rise and fall of the great powers. And the current narrative is all about the rise of China and the decline of the United States. Indeed, with the 2008 financial crisis, many people said this was the beginning of the end of American power. The tectonic【筑造的;构造的】plates o

23、f world politics were shifting. And president Medvedev of Russia, for example, pronounced in 2008 this was the beginning of the end of United States power. But in fact, this metaphor【暗喻】of decline is often very misleading. If you look at history, in recent history, youll see the cycles of belief in

24、American decline come and go every 10 or 15 years or so. In 1958, after the Soviets put up Sputnik【俄人造卫星】, it was Thats the end of America. In 1973, with the oil embargo【禁运】 and the closing of the gold window, that was the end of America. In the 1980s, as America went through a transition in the Rea

25、gan period, between the rust belt【铁锈地带(指从前工业繁盛今已衰落的发达国家一些地区】economy of the midwest to the Silicon Valley economy of California, that was the end of America. But in fact, what weve seen is none of those were true. Indeed, people were over-enthusiastic in the early 2000s, thinking America could do any

26、thing, which led us into some disastrous foreign policy adventures, and now were back to decline again. 现在我要回到国家之间权利转移的问题讲讲最新的动态。 我们现在用的阐释大多是大国的 崛起和没落。而近来这种阐述全都是中国的崛起和美国的没落。确实，2008年发生的经济危机 会让很多人说这是美国领导力终结的开始。全球政治格局的板块正在发生转变。例如俄罗斯的总统梅德韦杰夫，在2008年曾说过经济危机是美国领导力结束的开端。 然而事实上， 这种衰落的比喻非常误导人。如果回顾历史，近代历史你会发现这

27、种认为美国衰落的说法 每隔10年到20年左右就会出现。 1958年，苏联发射人造卫星以后 人们就说“美国要衰落了。” 1973年的石油禁运和黄金窗口的关闭，又有人说美国要衰落了。20世纪80年代，在里根就职期间，美国经历了一次 从美国中西部老工业基地到加州的硅谷经济的转变， 又有人在说美国要衰落了。 但事实上，我们发现 所有这些谣言都不是真的。 事实上，正是人们在21世纪初过分乐观， 认为美国无所不能， 导致了我们作出了一些灾难性的外交政策，现在又出现了美国衰落的声音。 The moral of this story is all these narratives about rise and

28、 fall and decline tell us a lot more about psychology than they do about reality. If we try to focus on the reality, then what we need to focus on is whats really happening in terms of China and the United States. Goldman Sachs has projected that China, the Chinese economy, will surpass that of the

29、. by 2027. So weve got, what, 17 more years to go or so before Chinas bigger. Now someday, with a billion point three people getting richer, they are going to be bigger than the United States. But be very careful of these projections such as the Goldman Sachs projection as though that gives you an a

30、ccurate picture of power transition in this century. Let me mention three reasons why its too simple. First of all, its a linear projection. You know, everything says, heres the growth rate of China, heres the growth rate of the ., here it goes - straight line. History is not linear. There are often

31、 bumps along the road, accidents along the way. The second thing is that the Chinese economy passes the . economy in, lets say, 2030, which it may it【就算事实真的如此】, that will be a measure of total economic size, but not of per capita income - wont tell you about the composition of the economy. China sti

32、ll has large areas of underdevelopment. And per capita income is a better measure of the sophistication of the economy. And that the Chinese wont catch up or pass the Americans until somewhere in the latter part, after 2050, of this century. 总之 所有这些关于崛起，倒退和衰落的阐述 讲的更多的是一种心理 而不是事实。 现在让我们只关注事实， 那么我们就需要关注 当下在中国和美国 正在发生的事情。 高盛预言 中国，中国经济 将会在2027年 超过美国。 所以我们只剩下在中国超过美国之前 我们只剩下17年左右。也许未来等到这亿人口富起来的时候，他们将超过美国。但是不要轻易接受 高盛这些公司做出的预测。 尽管这些预测能给你本世纪潜力转移的精确画面。 让我来给出为什么这些预测过于简单的原因。 第一，它是线性的预测。种种迹象 这是中国的增长率，这是美国的增长率， 请看直线 然而历史不是一条直线。历史进程经常出现曲折和突发事件。 第二 中国经济 如果说在2030年超过了美国经济，就算事实真的如此， 也是按经济总量来衡量的， 并非人均收入 并不能说