III言语行为理论Speech Acts Theory.docx

1、III言语行为理论Speech Acts Theory Pragmatics-Teaching Plan (4)III. Speech Acts Theory 3.1 Philosophical Background3.2 Austins Performative-Constative Dichotomy 3.2.1 Early Development3.2.2 Felicity Conditions for Performatives and Their Inadequacies3.2.3 Austins Grammatical-Lexical Criteria for Performati

2、ves and Their Inadequacies 3.2.3.1 Grammatical Criteria for Performatives3.2.3.2 Lexical Criteria for Performatives3.2.3.3 The Inadequacies of the Grammatical-Lexical Criteria3.3 Austins Trichotomy of Speech Acts3.4 Austins Classification of Illocutionary Acts3.5 Searles Interpretation of the Speech

3、 Acts3.6 Searles Distinction between Propositional Content and Illocutionary Act3.7 Searles Linguistic Criteria for Speech Acts3.8 Searles Felicity Conditions for Performing a Speech Act3.9 Searles Classification of Illocutionary ActsReadings: Levinson, 1983: Chapter 5: Speech Acts Verschueren, 1999

4、: Section 1.1.2 何兆熊, 2000: 第四章 Austin, J. L. How to Do Things with Words M. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962. Searle, J. R. Speech Acts M. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969. Searle, J. R. Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts M. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19

5、79.Jiang Wangqi, 2000: Chapter 6.III. Speech Acts Theory3.1 Philosophical BackgroundSpeech act theory is the first major theory in pragmatics, initially proposed in the 1950s and widely discussed in the 1960s and 1970s. There is an enormous literature on it from both the philosophical and linguistic

6、 point of view. (Jiang Wangqi, p197)In the early 20th century, philosophers realized that many philosophical problems were in fact problems of language, and could be solved through a proper analysis of language. This approach to philosophy came to be known as analytic philosophy or linguistic philos

7、ophy, of which logical positivism (or logical empiricism 逻辑实证哲学) and ordinary language philosophy were two contrastive schools. John Langshaw Austin, the father of the speech act theory, was the representative of the ordinary language philosophers.Logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy

8、disagree in a number of ways:(1) In their attitudes towards ordinary language:Logical positivism: Ordinary language is inadequate and needs to be polished or replaced by an ideal, logical, or artificial language;Ordinary language philosophy: Ordinary language is the best, most needed and desirable o

9、ne.(2) In their theories of meaning: Logical positivism: Unless a sentence can be verified or tested for its truth or falsity, it is meaningless. And logical positivists have developed a theory of meaning on the basis of truth conditions. Ordinary language philosophy: A distinction should be made be

10、tween a sentence and the use of the sentence. A sentence in abstract sense cannot be assigned any truth value; only when a sentence is used in actual situations, will it be possible to say whether it is true or not.Speech act theory grows out of Austins struggle against logical positivism. Austins f

11、irst shot at logical positivism is that there are two types of sentences: performative sentences, which are used to do things, and constative sentences, which are used to describe things. (Jiang Wangqi, p197-198. To be modified with reference to Levinson, p 227) 3.2 Austins Performative-Constative D

12、ichotomy 3.2.1 Early DevelopmentThis performative-constative distinction was first made by Austin in the late 1930s to interpret the speech act of “promising”. According to Austin, by saying “I promise”, one is not just to say something or make an autobiographical assertion about oneself like “I pla

13、y cricket”, but to do it, that is, to make a promise. Austin devoted much effort to this study of the type of utterances which look autobiographical, as if the speaker were saying of himself that he does something, whereas in fact he is doing it. (Jiang Wangqi, p198-199).In 1952, Austin began to giv

14、e a series of lectures entitled “Words and Deeds” in Oxford. In 1955, when he went to the United States to deliver William James lectures, he revised the lecture notes and renamed it How to Do Things with Words. The book of the same title was compiled and published by his student J. O. Urmson in 196

15、2. It contains 12 lectures, in the first 7 of which Austin discussed the performative-constative dichotomy. (Jiang Wangqi, p200).Constative utterancesExamples:(1) I pour some liquid into the tube. (said by a chemistry teacher in a demonstration of an experiment, which describes the teachers action a

16、t the time of speaking)The utterance of this sentence is not the performance of the action of pouring some liquid. The teacher cannot pour any liquid into a tube by simply uttering these words. He must accompany his words with the actual pouring of some liquid into the tube. Otherwise one can accuse

17、 him of making a false statement.(2) We went down to Como. (This sentence can be evaluated along the dimension of truth / falsity, too)Performative utterances Examples:(1) I do. (as uttered in the wedding ceremony)(2) I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth. (as uttered for a ship-launching ceremony)(3

18、) I give and bequeath my watch to my brother. (as occurring in ones will)(4) I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow. (as uttered for betting) (Austin, 1962: 5)(5) I promise to finish it in time. (as in promise-makng)(6) I apologize.(7) I declare the meeting open.(8) I warn you that the bull will c

19、harge.The common features of performative utterances are as follows:(A) They do not “describe” or “report” or constate anything at all, are not “true” or “false”; (B)The uttering of the sentence is, or is a part of, the doing of an action, which again would not normally be described as, or as “just”

20、, saying something. (Austin, 1975 1962: 5)(C) They cannot be said to be true or false, but can be evaluated along a dimension of “felicity”(恰当性). For example, “I promise to go to Como” is not felicitous unless I intend to go to Como and commit myself to doing so; “I name this ship the Queen Elizabet

21、h” requires my being authorized to perform the naming of this ship. An illustration: Example (2), said by the Queen of England at a ship-launching ceremony, is not a description of what was doing at the time of speaking; to utter this sentence is to perform the very action of naming this ship; one c

22、annot say the Queen made a false statement, even though she did not accompany her words with the action of actually writing Queen Elizabeth on the ship. 3.2.2 Felicity Conditions for Performatives and Their InadequaciesAlthough performatives cannot be evaluated as true or false, there are still ways

23、 in which they will go wrong, be unhappy / infelicitous. In other words, there are conditions to be met to produce an appropriate performative. The following are the three felicity conditions suggested by Austin (1962: 14-15) and rewritten by Levinson (1983: 229):A.(i) There must exist an accepted c

24、onventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances.For illustration, in Muslin cultures, a man may achieve a divorce by saying to his wife “I hereby divorce you” three times in succession. Th

25、e uttering of these words constitutes the performance of divorce. As a British citizen, however, he cannot divorce his wife in this way. There is no such a conventional procedure in British society.A.(ii) The particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate, as specified in h

26、e procedure.For illustration, according to the Muslin tradition, only the man has the right to divorce his wife in the way mentioned above, and he has to address it to his wife; otherwise, the divorce procedure will still be infelicitous.B. The procedure must be executed by all participants (i) corr

27、ectly and (ii) completely.For illustration, in the above mentioned divorce ceremony, the Muslin man must use the correct sentence. If he does not, then it will not have the expected effect. And he must say it three times in succession. Once or twice is not enough to bring it off.C.(i) Often the pers

28、ons must have the requisite thoughts, feelings and intentions, as specified in the procedure.That is to say, the speaker must mean what he says. When promising, for example, he must be prepared to fulfill it.C. (ii) If consequent conduct is specified, then the relevant parties must so do.For example

29、, having promised, the speaker must do so accordingly.Problems in the three felicity conditions:In the discussion of these conditions, however, Austin gradually realized that they are not really useful for distinguishing performatives from constatives.Supporting arguments: It is true that with some

30、performatives, there will be a conventional procedure and the procedure must be executed correctly and completely indeed. So at the wedding ceremony in Britain, when the priest asks the bridegroom, “Wilt thou have this woman to thy wedded wifeand, forsaking all other, keep thee only unto her, so lon

31、g as ye both shall live?”, the bridegroom could only answer “Yes, I will”. He cannot use other expressions, even if they are synonymous.Counter-arguments:(1) It is also true that with some performatives, there may not be such a strict restriction on wording:(A) At a ship-launching ceremony, the name

32、r may either use name or christen;(B) To make a promise, one either say I promise or I give my word;(2) On the other hand, the so-called constatives may also be infelicitous in above ways:(A) The constative The present king of France is bald is infelicitous in the same ways as the performative I bequeath you my Benz said by someone who does not have a Benz. They both presuppose the existence of something nonexistent. (B) The person who makes a statement must also have the requisite thoughts, fee