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政治经济学系年会论文研究设计摘要.docx

1、政治经济学系年会论文研究设计摘要2012年政治经济学系年会论文/研究设计摘要(如希望阅读全文请直接联系作者)11月30日 中国政治经济分析第一场 主持人:朱天飚,北京大学08:30-09:00Chinas Unique Model of Market Economy作者周强,上海财经大学,zhou.qiang摘要This paper proposes that there exists a unique type of capitalism in China. It describes this Chinese approach to market economy from the aspec

2、ts of capital markets, skill formation, inter-firm relations, state-firm relations, and the patterns of technological innovation. It shows that Chinas contemporary market economy is distinguished by the coexistence of both highly coordinated market and hypercompetitive liberal market models of organ

3、izing economy. Various institutions play critical roles to shape the outcome in each of the fields of the market, in addition, one institutions effectiveness may depend on the existence of other institutions in parallel fields. The hybrid approach to market economy may be due to the fact that China

4、is a very late industrializer under immense security pressure, facing the dual challenges of survival and development. This pattern of how China conducts itself can have profound implications as to whether and how China can overcome the potential problem of middle-income trap.09:00-09:30关于中国经济成长的第三种

5、解释基于熊彼特的创新理论和产品建构理论的分析作者宋磊,北京大学,slei 摘要在将中国经济成长的成长模式的阶段性、微观主体的多样性和企业能力构筑过程的两面性等特征纳入分析视野之后,我们发现,关于中国经济发展的两种主流解释都无法单独说明中国经济成长的所有阶段的发展机制和所有侧面的形成原因。同时,即使将两种主流解释组合在一起,中国经济成长之中仍然存在“解释残差”。基于上述认识,本文通过引入熊彼特的成长理论和创新管理领域的最新进展,提出了关于中国经济成长的第三种解释。本文是关于中国经济成长的政治经济学分析的一个初步铺垫。这里所说的政治经济学即包括马克思主义政治学,也包括关注政企互动的政治经济学。附录

6、是在第一个方向上的后续研究。对于第二个研究方向而言,本文的意义在于通过确认中国经济成长的技术背景为“找回中国的政企关系的技术基础”进行准备。09:30-10:00中国产业政策取向应做重大调整从直接干预市场到增进与扩展市场作者汪飞涛和李晓萍,中国社会科学院,jiangfeitao摘要21 世纪以来,中国产业政策进一步强化了行政性干预措施的运用,体现出强烈的直接干预市场特征。然而,大量研究文献表明,以直接干预市场为特征的选择性产业政策,无论其理论依据还是实施效果都受到广泛的质疑。本文在重新认识市场机制与“市场失灵”的基础上,进一步反思产业政策的理论基础与政策取向。在发展和转型国家存在的所谓“市场失

7、灵”,实则多是“政府失灵”或“制度失灵”,实施直接干预市场型的产业政策只会使问题更为严重。本文在借鉴市场增进论和深入探讨政府与市场关系的基础上,试图构建产业政策新的思考框架,即:产业政策应当以维护市场竞争、增进市场机能与扩展市场范围作为基本取向,并以此促进产业与国民经济的健康发展。10:00-10:30Innovation without Novelty: The Structural and Institutional Roots of Chinas Innovation Patterns in Mobile Phone Handset Industry作者唐莉等,上海财经大学等,tang.

8、li摘要This paper offers an explanation to the puzzle of why Chinese high-tech SMEs survive and thrive by pursing a no-novelty-conducted-here innovation strategy, within a system which appears to be arrayed against them. To do so we utilize the case study of the mobile phone handset industry. We find t

9、hat Chinas innovative capabilities are particularly strong in incremental improvements and a quasi-copying second generation innovation. We argue that capitalizing on the advantages offered by the global fragmentation of production, Chinese SMEs chose this copy-innovation pattern in their search for

10、 competitive advantage as a rational response to a system characterized with high structured uncertainty. The research also suggests that Chinas practice of imitation-innovation-fusion in the mobile manufacturing industry can be partly explained by a silent alliance between firms and localities. Thi

11、s special type of local support mediates structured uncertainty and encourages specific types of innovation. Policy implications and future directions are discussed in the end.第二场 主持人:宋磊,北京大学10:40-11:10Do Economic Ideas Matter in Economic Policy Making作者王颖曜,耶鲁大学,wangyingyao 摘要The recent scholarly at

12、tention to the role of economic ideas in economic policy making rides the tide of instutionalists revolts against rational choice models widely seen in the field of political science and sociology. This paper attempts to introduce and synthesize the ideational approach and identify its relevance to

13、the study of economic policy making in China. Through defining “economic ideas”, expounding their analytical, cognitive and political functions, delineating the ways in which economic ideas enter into the arena of policy making and numerating the conditions under which economic ideas can be powerful

14、, the paper shows a sound ideational approach does not have to committee to idealism. It should specify the ways in which economic ideas analytical apparatus take effect in its interaction with institutions, social interests, economic conditions and historical events and how the configuration of int

15、eractions affects policy outcomes and structure politics.11:10-11:40Economists and the State: the Rise of a Profession in Contemporary China(研究设计)作者郦菁,纽约大学,julialj718 摘要This research project attempts to examine the historical process of economists rising to be a profession in contemporary China, esp

16、ecially how they expanded (or later retrieve) jurisdiction in four distinct social spheres, i.e., the policy-making arena, academic system, public sphere and the private economic sector. I propose after in-depth empirical investigation (interview, archive study and content analysis) that the structu

17、ral change of the Chinese state turned out to be the primary shaper of the uneven development and the inadvertent ups and downs of Chinese economists in different social spheres. As a result, Neoliberalism, which is supposed to be the pat ideas of the seemingly empowered economists during the thirty

18、-year economic reform, never fully took hold. The state still has the upper hand.11:40-12:10State-Society Dynamics and the Rise of a Labor Export Economy in a State-Designated Poor County in Central China作者杨宏星,上海财经大学,hongxing.yang摘要Drawing upon ethnographic and documentary research, this study inves

19、tigates the opportunistic rise of a labor export economy in a county of Central China. Whereas students of developmental state argues for the leading role of the (central) state in developing countries industrialization process, few studies address the dynamics of central-local state as well as the

20、interactions between society and state in the process of local development. This study contends that while the central state played a brokerage role in providing information and help break institutional obstacles for the local state, and the local state initiated and implemented various developmenta

21、l projects, the developmental pattern and trajectory had been re-shaped by the active participation of the society. Thus this study redresses the developmental state theory in two ways: first, the prosperous economic development could be achieved as an unintended consequence with the participation o

22、f the civil society regardless of a weak and corruptive but development-oriented state; second, the developmental state should be decomposed into different levels and their dynamics had great impact on the local development. The mechanism of “unintended consequence” for Chinas economic development i

23、s also discussed.12:10-12:40贫穷、不平等与再分配民主的政治经济机理作者汪仕凯,华东政法大学,wangsky0615摘要本文致力于探讨贫穷与民主之间的关系。贫穷真的是民主的敌人吗?笔者以此问题意识为引导来重新理解经济因素同民主政治的关系。本文认为贫穷确实存在反对民主政治的可能性,但是贫穷并不必然是民主的敌人,只有当贫穷造成的社会阶层之间的不平等超过一定水平之后,贫穷才会通过不平等这种中介机制来妨害民主政治。经济上不平等的社会阶层依据民主体制下的再分配政策对自身利益的影响来决定自身的政治态度和行动策略,只有当经济不平等的程度能够促使中产阶层和贫穷阶层结盟从而形成温和的再

24、分配政策的时候,民主政治才能作为反映政治上重要的社会阶层之间利益均衡的政治体制而出现。民主政治的此种特性决定了再分配政策在改善经济不平等方面的有限性,民主政治对贫穷和经济不平等的改善有赖于民主政治在促进经济持续发展方面的成效。关键词:民主贫穷不平等再分配第三场 主持人:雷艳红,厦门大学13:50-14:20花钱消灾?中国的公共支出、公共品供给与收入公平感作者任超然,上海财经大学,rchran 摘要解决中国面临的国富与民生的失衡必然要实现向和谐社会的转型,而和谐最根本的要求是公平;财政支出作为政府最重要的政策手段之一,如何实现社会公平?本研究从以促进社会公平为主要目标的社会性支出入手,分析公共支

25、出对于公众公平感的影响。本文将社会性支出分为两类,一是受益无法分割到个人的公共品供给支出,一是可以直接分配到个人的转移性支出。前者通过垫高基础,使得社会起点公平,从而增加人们的公平感受;后者可以通过降低个人生活风险,提升个人风险承受力和社会对收入差距的容忍度,使个人获得更多的公平感受。由于公共支出受益的家户资料难以获得,本研究通过结合宏观统计数据与CGSS(2006)的入户调查数据来对中国公共支出的收入公平效果进行评价,并探讨其发生作用的机制。实证结果显示,社会性支出对居民的收入公平感影响显著,其中基本公共品支出能够提高公民的收入公平感受而转移性支出却无法提高收入公平感受。14:20-14:5

26、0纳税人痛并快乐着税收制度与纳税行为的实验经济研究作者余莎,上海财经大学,yusha-shark 摘要中国的税收实践中,税率偏高、逃税普遍存在是两大重要特征。传统理论(A-S模型)认为降低税率、加大对逃税的稽查和惩罚能够提高纳税遵从。然而发展中国家的税收征管条件差,政府难以全面掌握纳税人的财务信息,很难通过“稽查惩罚”模式提高纳税遵从。那么,为何政府不降低税率以提高纳税遵从?这是否意味较高的税率能够带来更多的税收收入?但又为何如此?对此,作者认为,在信息不对称的前提下,高税率能够促使更多的自愿纳税,使政府实现更多的税收收入。具体而言,在税率较高时,尽管纳税遵从较差,但纳税人却由于少缴税带来的“

27、盈余心理”(文中定义为“纳税者剩余”),而只关注“纳税减少的部分”,不自觉地缴纳更多的税负,结果高税率一方面使得纳税人逃税更多,另一方面,政府却还能征得更多的税收收入。对于上述基于“前景理论”的分析,本文采用实验方法测试纳税人在不同税率档次下的纳税意愿。结果表明,当税率从3%增加至50%时,纳税人申报比例从83%降低至28%;在逃税增加的同时,政府取得的税收收入却呈增长趋势,当税率为40%时,税收收入达到最高。因此,从逃税的盈余心理推定纳税人在高税率时表现出更多的自愿纳税,这可以帮助我们理解发展中国家如何运用“税率”这一政策工具实现既定的财政目标。14:50-15:20县官不如限管?兼论建设财

28、政的成因和公共财政的构建作者庞保庆,上海财经大学,pangbaoqing85 摘要本文关注是什么因素在影响着各省的基本建设支出的比重。本文利用1995年2006年各省的数据,研究发现:省长的晋升激励在影响着各省的基本建设支出的比重,晋升激励越强的省长越会安排更多的基建支出。其他条件不变,省长的晋升激励每提高一个档次,将会使得基建支出的占比增加0.22个百分点。虽然书记是“一把手”,但是书记并未影响基建建设支出,其中的原因或许是由于书记负责全省的路线工作而不直接影响预算支出。15:20-15:50The Lame-Duck Status in Authoritarian Regimes: A N

29、atural Experiment of Mandatory Retirement Age in China作者刘台伟,上海财经大学,derek.twl摘要How does the lame-duck status affect politicians policy actions in nondemocratic systems? Moreover, how does the shadow of the future affect politicians attitudes toward the provision of public and private goods in authori

30、tarian regimes? This paper uses a “natural experiment” to compare Chinese politicians spending priority before and after Beijing introduced mandatory retirement age. I find that the lame-duck status does affect politicians choice on public and private goods provision even in authoritarian systems. B

31、efore the introduction of mandatory retirement age, there is no strong correlation between the age of provincial Party secretaries and their priority of spending. However, after Beijing enforced mandatory retirement age, provincial leaders tend to spend more on private goods when approaching the ret

32、irement age of 65. This way they can connect with local interest groups and secure post-retirement positions. The evidence also indicates that the longer provincial leaders served in the same province, the more likely they increase the provision of private goods. As several officials commented, this is because “the longer you serve in a province, the more you are tied down with

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