创业企业单位融资时如何估值.docx

1、创业企业单位融资时如何估值创业企业融资时如何估值情况决定。比如一个目标公司被很多投资人追捧，有些投资人可能会愿意降低自己的投资回报率期望，以一个高一点的价格拿下这个投资机会。2、期权设置投资人给被投资公司一个投资前估值，那么通常他要求获得股份就是：投资人股份=投资额/投资后估值比如投资后估值500万美元，投资人投100万美元，投资人的股份就是20%，公司投资前的估值理论上应该是400万美元。但通常投资人要求公司拿出10%左右的股份作为期权，相应的价值是50万美元左右，那么投资前的实际估值变成了350万美元了：350万实际估值+$50万期权+100万现金投资=500万投资后估值相应地，企业家的剩

2、余股份只有70%(=80%-10%)了。把期权放在投资前估值中，投资人可以获得三个方面的好处：首先，期权仅仅稀释原始股东。如果期权池是在投资后估值中，将会等比例稀释普通股和优先股股东。比如10%的期权在投资后估值中提供，那么投资人的股份变成18%，企业家的股份变成72%：20%(或80%)(1-10%)=18%(72%)可见，投资人在这里占了企业家2%的便宜。其次，期权池占投资前估值的份额比想象要大。看起来比实际小，是因为它把投资后估值的比例，应用到投资前估值。在上例中，期权是投资后估值的10%，但是占投资前估值的25%：50万期权/400万投资前估值=12.5%第三，如果你在下一轮融资之前出

3、售公司，所有没有发行的和没有授予的期权将会被取消。这种反向稀释让所有股东等比例受益，尽管是原始股东在一开 始买的单。比如有5%的期权没有授予，这些期权将按股份比例分配给股东，所以投资人应该可以拿到1%，原始股东拿到4%。公司的股权结构变成：100%=原始股东84%+投资人21%+团队5%换句话说，企业家的部分投资前价值进入了投资人的口袋。风险投资行业都是要求期权在投资前出，所以企业家唯一能做的是尽量根据公司未来人才引进和激励规划，确定一个小一些的期权池。3、对赌条款很多时候投资人给公司估值用P/E倍数的方法，目前在国内的首轮融资中，投资后估值大致8-10倍左右，这个倍数对不同行业的公司和不同发

4、展阶段的公司不太一样。投资后估值(P)=P/E倍数下一年度预测利润(E)如果采用10倍P/E，预测利润100万美元，投资后估值就是1000万美元。如果投资200万，投资人股份就是20%。如果投资人跟企业家能够在P/E倍数上达成一致，估值的最大的谈判点就在于利润预测了。如果投资人的判断和企业家对财务预测有较大差距(当然是 投资人认为企业家做不到预测利润了)，可能在投资协议里就会出现对赌条款(RatchetTerms)，对公司估值进行调整，按照实际做到的利润对公司价 值和股份比例进行重新计算：投资后估值(P)=P/E倍数下一年度实际利润(E)如果实际利润只有50万美元，投资后估值就只有500万美元

5、，相应的，投资人应该分配的股份应该40%，企业家需要拿出20%的股份出来补偿投资人。200万/500万=40%当然，这种对赌情况是比较彻底的，有些投资人也会相对“友善”一些，给一个保底的公司估值。比如上面例子，假如投资人要求按照公式调整估值，但 是承诺估值不低于800万，那么如果公司的实际利润只有50万美元，公司的估值不是500万美元，而是800万美元，投资人应该获得的股份就是25%：200万/800万=25%对赌协议除了可以用预测利润作为对赌条件外，也可以用其他条件，比如收入、用户数、资源量等等。总结及结论公司估值是投资人和企业家协商的结果，仁者见仁，智者见智，没有一个什么公允值;公司的估值

6、受到众多因素的影响，特别是对于初创公司，所以估值 也要考虑投资人的增值服务能力和投资协议中的其他非价格条款;最重要的一点是，时间和市场不等人，不要因为双方估值分歧而错过投资和被投资机会。VC的估值方法及股份比例计算 历史盈利倍数估值 下年盈利倍数估值 预计上市市值的折扣法 股份比例计算历史盈利倍数估值编辑本段回目录企业股权价值上年审计的盈利双方认同的倍数。例如，610倍。例1：某科技企业上年盈利4000万元，预计2年后上市，双方确定以8倍市盈率计算。企业股权价值40008 32000(万元)例2：某科技公司上年盈利2200万美元，预计半年内在NASDAQ上市。双方确定市盈率倍数为18。企业股权

7、价值22001839600(万美元)下年盈利倍数估值编辑本段回目录同上，用公司年末实际利润乘以双方认同的倍数。预计上市市值的折扣法编辑本段回目录通过同行企业市值/关键指标的数据，找到倍数参考数值。或通过确定融资阶段和企业价值折扣率，确定企业融资阶段的价值。例如：发展阶段公司价值范围（美元）可能的投资者导入期500万以内天使投资人和战略投资者第一轮融资10002000万战略投资者第二轮融资30005000万战略投资者和财务投资者PRE-IPO7000万1亿 财务投资者IPO 210亿 股份比例计算编辑本段回目录参照例1，如果VC从投资到上市这两年需要的回报为10倍，则公司当前股权价值为3200万

8、元（32000/10）。如果VC投资200万美元，按融资后的市值（Post-Money），即3200万美元计算，投资者所占股份为200/（200+3000）=6.25%如果是按融资前的市值（Pre-Money），其投资所占股份比例则应该是200/（200+3200）=5.88%The Myth of a VCs Pre-Money Valuationby Devin ThorpeThere is a widely held belief in the venture capital world that needs a bit of debunking. The myth regards pr

9、e-money valuation.First, let me review the venture capital definition of pre-money valuation: the value of the enterprise before the investment. Hence, if the investment is $4 million and the investor received shares equal to 40% of the fully diluted shares of the company, the business is said to ha

10、ve had a $6 million pre-money valuation. Mathematically, this makes perfect sense. Here, however, are the flaws in the logic:1. The venture capitalist will, traditionally, receive preferred shares with a host of rights that common shares held by founders dont have with the net result that common sha

11、res are worth much less than the preferred.2. Options, counted in the pre-money valuation, are subject to a variety of factors that make them worth much less than common stock3. Many of the shares used to calculate pre-money valuation arent even outstanding at the time of the VCs investment-and may

12、never be!So lets consider our mathematical example above. The venture capitalist receives preferred shares that entitle her fund to receive the first $4 million in a liquidation, hence, those shares are worth at least what was paid for them.The pre-money value is associated with a combination of com

13、mon shares and options typically held by founders, angel investors and employees. In addition, a reserve pool of options for future grants are also included.The pre-money portion of value is associated with claims that are secondary to the preferred shares, have fewer corporate governance rights and

14、 are customarily subject to other agreements with the investors that limit voting and transfer rights.Venture capitalists are well aware of this dichotomy. The IRS now appears ready to require third-party valuations of common stock prior to granting options. VCs have traditionally used a ratio of te

15、n percent to estimate the value of common stock in an early stage deal relative to the value of the preferred stock. Third-party valuations fall roughly in line with this tradition.So, in our example, the VC might have paid a dollar per share for 4 million shares, but the six million common shares a

16、re really only worth $0.10 each or $600,000. But wait! Half of those shares are in the form of options that require the purchase of the shares for $0.10. An option on a share worth $0.10 with a strike price of $0.10 is worth only a few cents, lets say $0.03 per share. Finally, half of the options ha

17、vent been granted, yet.So in our example, we have 3 million common shares worth $300,000, 1.5 million options worth a total of $45,000 and a reserve of 1.5 million options not granted and that therefore have no value at the time of the VC funding. So, the pre-money value of this company may be as li

18、ttle as $345,000.Frankly, the value of these shares at the time of the venture investment is not very important. The important question is the value of the shares and options atexit! In a typical VC deal, the VC will be required to convert to common in a successful exit, with the result that the val

19、ue per share for the VCs shares and the founders share will be the same. So alls fair!If your business cant succeed without venture capital, dont sweat the terms. Sweat growing your business to succeed. If your business doesnt need venture capital, give some consideration to whether or not you reall

20、y want it!VC估值的死亡谷VC valuation valley of deathby Healy JonesVenture capitalists valuing startup companies have a particularly difficult challenge these days, as public company comparable values have plummeted. This makes it even harder for the startup entrepreneur seeking venture capital know what t

21、heirstartup is worth. Id like to highlight a particular phenomena that may come into play when VCs are valuing startups. This phenomena usually happens sometime after the Series A round, most likely at a Series B or Series C round. I call this the venture capital valuation valley of death. (I tried

22、to come up with word for death that started with the letter v, but Im a financier not a poet and alliteration is not my strong point.)There is a point when a startup ceases to be valued only as a technology/idea and becomes valued a real business. Or, maybe this is more of a hope - after all, ventur

23、e capital investors often recite the mantra, we invest to build real businesses, not to do quick flips. Quick flips are valued off of hype, technology IP and momentum. Real businesses are supposed to be valued off of silly metrics like cash flow multiples. OK, ok, revenue multiples. (Please dont men

24、tion DCFs. I just dont care.)Anyways, sometimes a really interesting technology/idea attracts interest from larger players - strategics. If this company is truly game changing or strategic to several potential acquirers then one or more of these larger companies may reach the conclusion that they ne

25、ed to own that technology and will pay a large price for it before the startup has begun creating revenues. Usually the strategics are thinking that they could easily finish the technology development and push the solution through their existing channels to their existing customers and reap signific

26、ant value.At this point, the startup may be more valuable to the strategic acquirers than typical financial valuation metrics would suggest. The technology/hype has run ahead of the traditional financial valuation. Now the entrepreneurs and venture capitalists have to make a decision - a) do they se

27、ll the startup now based on the promise or b) do they soldier on and try to create a real business. If b), the startup enters the valuation valley of death.The startups value may flat-line or even decrease at this point. Before the startup has significant market traction (and Im talking about tracti

28、on in the form of real revenues) it is still going to be valued by strategics based the startups technology/promise/hype. Sure, a few customers indicate market adoption, but tiny revenues likely will not motivate buyers to bump their view of the companys value.The startups value doesnt have to decli

29、ne in the valley - it may just flat-line. A decline is possible as potential acquirers may decide to build the technology in-house instead of buying, and as potential bidders drop out the price the startup can get may slide. Also, the hype may wear off as potential buyers realize that there are othe

30、r companies working on similar technology who they can purchase.Then, as the company starts to get real customers and generate real revenues a funny thing happens - it starts to grow into its hype-based valuation. If the strategic players want to acquire the startup once the startup has a meaningful

31、 income statement then the financial nerds try to take over and do a valuation analysis. $XYZ million revenues times ABC revenue multiple indicates a valuation of so-and-so million dollars. If this is less than the hype-based valuation then the financial nerd has to face off against the person at th

32、e strategic who wants to buy the startup at the hype-based valuation. I cant say who will win, but it is a fair guess to say that the business traction created by the startup likely hasnt created a significant valuation improvement.Only once the financial valuation grows beyond the strategic/hype-based valuation do