会计学院入选分论坛文章学术论文.docx

1、会计学院入选分论坛文章 学术论文会计学分论坛目录Evolutionary Game Analysis of Monitoring Activity of the Loss of Scientific Research Funds Based on Duplicative Dynamic 3基于会计核算软件数据接口国家标准的数据转换研究 10基于新农村财务审计环境对审计模式的思考 14上市公司年报披露时滞影响因素的实证分析来自中国沪市A股上市公司的经验数据 21实施政府采购信用担保 完善中小企业的风险控制 28高丽四介松都治簿法会计册比较研究 32政府绩效审计评价体系构建思路 43科技财政经费监

2、管合谋的博弈分析及瓦解机制设计 51Evolutionary Game Analysis of Monitoring Activity of the Loss of Scientific Research Funds Based on Duplicative Dynamic Lili JIU, Bing ZENG(Chongqing University of Technology, College of Accounting, Chongqing，400054)Abstract: Analyzing the strategieschoice on the interaction betwee

3、n the government regulators and groups of researchers with the evolutionary game theory，a model of asymmetric game between them is set up and the steady state of the monitoring activity under this condition is analysed. At the same time, the decisions between the government regulators and groups of

4、researchers are discussed and some suggestions about scientific research funds supervision are given.Keywords: scientific research funds; evolutionary game; duplicative dynamic; supervision mechanism 基于复制动态的科研经费流失监管演化博弈分析酒莉莉，曾冰（重庆理工大学会计学院，重庆，400054）摘 要：利用演化博弈论的方法对政府监管部门和科研人员群体之间相互作用时的策略进行了分析，建立了监管部门

5、与科研人员之间的非对称博弈模型，并对该条件下科研经费流失的稳定状态进行分析，讨论政府监管方与科研人员在相互作用的过程中决策的选择，并提出关于科研经费的保障建议。关键词：科研经费监管；演化博弈；复制动态；监管机制1 IntroductionAs Chinese governments enhance investments in science and technology, the project funds scientific research institutions ask for have been on the increase continually, which makes s

6、ources of funds diverse and multi-layered. Nevertheless, multitudes of research funds tend not to be transferred into productive forces and examples like that a multi-million research project only produces several poor papers are extremely numerous. It is noteworthy that there exists many problems,

7、such as lacking of openness, serious abuse, not enough supervision , in our use mechanism of scientific research funds. A large number of living examples have brought us a wake-up call, and blocking the black hole of research funds loss is such a pressing thing that we can not wait.This paper analys

8、es the loss and supervision behaviours of research funds, and set up a model of evolutionary game analysis between government regulators and groups of researchers with the evolutionary game theory. Meanwhile, the steady state under the condition of both sides interconnecting and binding each other t

9、o make the fair use of the funds is analysed.2 Evolutionary Game Analysis2.1 Asymmetric Game ModelEvolutionary game dynamics is the application of population dynamical methods to game theory. It has been introduced by evolutionary biologists, anticipated in part by classical game theorists(Josef Hof

10、bauer; Karl Sigmund,2003).The parties (the government regulators and researchers) both have two kinds of strategies: the government regulators can take strict or minor supervision strategy, while researchers choose abidance or fraud tactics to the regulation. As neither of them do selection simultan

11、eously，nor their strategic choice and profit are asymmetric, there comes to a asymmetric game. On the basis of non-cooperative repeated game, Table 1 shows the relevant payoff matrixStrategy Governmental Regulators Strict supervision(x)Minor supervision(1-x)ResearchersAbidance(y)D-B, -AD-B, 0Fraud(1

12、-y)-E, E-A0, -GTable 1 Asymmetric game model between government regulators and researchers Table 1 shows the monitoring cost of government regulators is A. Regulators cant take a effective supervision for the cost limit, while check the performance at a certain probability x; Meanwhile, if the resea

13、rchers have a good sense of academic ethics and legal literacy, they choose abidance tactics no matter the regulators check them or not, which gives rise to loss of some illegal income B and acquisition of reputation benefits D, we define its probability as y; If researchers engage in going after il

14、legal benefits and wealth , we regard the huge fine along with loss of social image as E once they were discovered by regulators; In addition, if regulators make supervision become a mere formality, yet researchers neglect the risk of liability arising from irregularities as well , all these bring a

15、bout social cost as C and negative returns for regulators as G.Scientific researchers in contemporary society are universally short of moral consciousness and academic self-restraint, also, government administrators do not implement severe punishment to this behaviour of research personnels improper

16、 use of funds and ignore the loss of reputation deriving from their irresponsible manner that make G smaller. In such circumstances, there always exists GAA-E. Through this method, regulators will be promoted to increase monitoring efforts and constraint researchers illegal proceeds behaviour with v

17、arious means. The asymmetric game model between both sides is depicted in the following table:Strategy Governmental RegulatorsStrict supervision(x)Minor supervision(1-x)ResearchersAbidance(y)D-B, -AD-B, 0Fraud(1-y)-E, E-A0, -C-GTable 2 Payoff matrix between regulators and researchers under a asymmet

18、ric game model2.2 Evolutionary Analysis of Behaviour Choices between the Regulators and Researchers Most people always take actions by intuition or imitating other success stories under the bounded rationality condition when theyre confronted with complicated problems, which is a continuous process

19、of seeking and studying for the initial strategy may not be the best one. In the process, the proportion of high-profit strategy groups keeps arising until it comes to ESS.Table 2 shows the expected revenue of researchers as follows:abidance strategy: +; fraud tactic:; the average expected revenue o

20、f researchers: (1)While, the expected revenue of regulators should be:strict strategy:; minor strategy:;then the average expected revenue of regulators is:(2)Consequently, the researchers replicated dynamic equation for the action of misuse funds is (3)Make dy/dt=0, we get In accordance with the sta

21、bility theorem of differential equation and nature of ESS, when there is F(y*)0, y* is the evolutionary stable strategy. The following chart respectively shows different dynamic tendency in different situations. Chart 1 Replicated dynamic phase diagram of researchers in asymmetric game modelWhen x*

22、comes to, F(y) gets to be 0 consistently and we can consider it as this: as soon as regulators supervision arrives at x*, the initial proportion of the attitudes( proper use or improper use funds) of researchers is stable.When xx*, there always exists F(y)0 in section (0 , 1) and replicated dynamic

23、equation (3) gets two balance points:, which leads to F(0)0. That means when there is xx*, F(y)0 in section (0 , 1) and replicated dynamic equation (3) still gets two balance points:, contemporaneously F(0)0,F(1)x*, is the only evolutionary stable strategy(ESS) overall situation. We see it as this:

24、the regulators interact well with researchers and researcher enhance the legal use of scientific funds, which attains Pareto Optimality gradually.Then lets deliberate the government side and their replicated dynamic equation gets to be: (4)Make, we get Still, in line with the stability theorem of di

25、fferential equation and nature of ESS, when there is G(x*)y*, G(x)0 in section (0 , 1), which arouses equation (4) to get balance points of, simultaneously G(0)0, G(1)y*, gets to be the ESS. It is said that regulators will play a great role in supervision under such situation of both parties carrying on perfectly, which definitely achieves Pareto Optimality gradually.When yx*, it is a best choice for researchers to abide, which generates y*0; Last but not least, in the event of E