人类理智研究 E.docx

1、人类理智研究 EThe Project Gutenberg eBook of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, by David Hume et alCopyright laws are changing all over the world. Be sure to check thecopyright laws for your country before downloading or redistributingthis or any other Project Gutenberg eBook.This header should be

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4、oks Were Prepared By Thousands of Volunteers!*Title: An Enquiry Concerning Human UnderstandingAuthor: David Hume et alRelease Date: January, 2006 EBook #9662This file was first posted on October 14, 2003Most recently updated: October 16, 2007Edition: 10Language: EnglishCharacter set encoding: iso-88

5、59-1* START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING *E-text prepared by Jonathan Ingramand Project Gutenberg Distributed ProofreadersDAVID HUMEAN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.Extracted from:ENQUIRIES CONCERNING THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, AND CONCERNING THE P

6、RINCIPLES OF MORALS, BY DAVID HUME.REPRINTED FROM THE POSTHUMOUS EDITION OF 1777, AND EDITED WITH INTRODUCTION, COMPARATIVE TABLES OF CONTENTS, AND ANALYTICAL INDEX BY L.A. SELBY-BIGGE, M.A., LATE FELLOW OF UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, OXFORD.SECOND EDITION, 1902CONTENTSI. Of the Different Species of Philoso

7、phyII. Of the Origin of IdeasIII. Of the Association of IdeasIV. Sceptical Doubts Concerning the Operations of the UnderstandingV. Sceptical Solution of these DoubtsVI. Of ProbabilityVII. Of the Idea of Necessary ConnexionVIII. Of Liberty and NecessityIX. Of the Reason of AnimalsX. Of MiraclesXI. Of

8、 a Particular Providence and of a Future StateXII. Of the Academical or Sceptical PhilosophyFootnotesIndexSECTION 1.OF THE DIFFERENT SPECIES OF PHILOSOPHY.1. Moral philosophy, or the science of human nature, may be treated after two different manners; each of which has its peculiar merit, and may co

9、ntribute to the entertainment, instruction, and reformation of mankind. The one considers man chiefly as born for action; and as influenced in his measures by taste and sentiment; pursuing one object, and avoiding another, according to the value which these objects seem to possess, and according to

10、the light in which they present themselves. As virtue, of all objects, is allowed to be the most valuable, this species of philosophers paint her in the most amiable colours; borrowing all helps from poetry and eloquence, and treating their subject in an easy and obvious manner, and such as is best

11、fitted to please the imagination, and engage the affections. They select the most striking observations and instances from common life; place opposite characters in a proper contrast; and alluring us into the paths of virtue by the views of glory and happiness, direct our steps in these paths by the

12、 soundest precepts and most illustrious examples. They make us feel the difference between vice and virtue; they excite and regulate our sentiments; and so they can but bend our hearts to the love of probity and true honour, they think, that they have fully attained the end of all their labours.2. T

13、he other species of philosophers consider man in the light of a reasonable rather than an active being, and endeavour to form his understanding more than cultivate his manners. They regard human nature as a subject of speculation; and with a narrow scrutiny examine it, in order to find those princip

14、les, which regulate our understanding, excite our sentiments, and make us approve or blame any particular object, action, or behaviour. They think it a reproach to all literature, that philosophy should not yet have fixed, beyond controversy, the foundation of morals, reasoning, and criticism; and s

15、hould for ever talk of truth and falsehood, vice and virtue, beauty and deformity, without being able to determine the source of these distinctions. While they attempt this arduous task, they are deterred by no difficulties; but proceeding from particular instances to general principles, they still

16、push on their enquiries to principles more general, and rest not satisfied till they arrive at those original principles, by which, in every science, all human curiosity must be bounded. Though their speculations seem abstract, and even unintelligible to common readers, they aim at the approbation o

17、f the learned and the wise; and think themselves sufficiently compensated for the labour of their whole lives, if they can discover some hidden truths, which may contribute to the instruction of posterity.3. It is certain that the easy and obvious philosophy will always, with the generality of manki

18、nd, have the preference above the accurate and abstruse; and by many will be recommended, not only as more agreeable, but more useful than the other. It enters more into common life; moulds the heart and affections; and, by touching those principles which actuate men, reforms their conduct, and brin

19、gs them nearer to that model of perfection which it describes. On the contrary, the abstruse philosophy, being founded on a turn of mind, which cannot enter into business and action, vanishes when the philosopher leaves the shade, and comes into open day; nor can its principles easily retain any inf

20、luence over our conduct and behaviour. The feelings of our heart, the agitation of our passions, the vehemence of our affections, dissipate all its conclusions, and reduce the profound philosopher to a mere plebeian.4. This also must be confessed, that the most durable, as well as justest fame, has

21、been acquired by the easy philosophy, and that abstract reasoners seem hitherto to have enjoyed only a momentary reputation, from the caprice or ignorance of their own age, but have not been able to support their renown with more equitable posterity. It is easy for a profound philosopher to commit a

22、 mistake in his subtile reasonings; and one mistake is the necessary parent of another, while he pushes on his consequences, and is not deterred from embracing any conclusion, by its unusual appearance, or its contradiction to popular opinion. But a philosopher, who purposes only to represent the co

23、mmon sense of mankind in more beautiful and more engaging colours, if by accident he falls into error, goes no farther; but renewing his appeal to common sense, and the natural sentiments of the mind, returns into the right path, and secures himself from any dangerous illusions. The fame of Cicero f

24、lourishes at present; but that of Aristotle is utterly decayed. La Bruyere passes the seas, and still maintains his reputation: But the glory of Malebranche is confined to his own nation, and to his own age. And Addison, perhaps, will be read with pleasure, when Locke shall be entirely forgotten.The

25、 mere philosopher is a character, which is commonly but little acceptable in the world, as being supposed to contribute nothing either to the advantage or pleasure of society; while he lives remote from communication with mankind, and is wrapped up in principles and notions equally remote from their

26、 comprehension. On the other hand, the mere ignorant is still more despised; nor is any thing deemed a surer sign of an illiberal genius in an age and nation where the sciences flourish, than to be entirely destitute of all relish for those noble entertainments. The most perfect character is suppose

27、d to lie between those extremes; retaining an equal ability and taste for books, company, and business; preserving in conversation that discernment and delicacy which arise from polite letters; and in business, that probity and accuracy which are the natural result of a just philosophy. In order to

28、diffuse and cultivate so accomplished a character, nothing can be more useful than compositions of the easy style and manner, which draw not too much from life, require no deep application or retreat to be comprehended, and send back the student among mankind full of noble sentiments and wise precep

29、ts, applicable to every exigence of human life. By means of such compositions, virtue becomes amiable, science agreeable, company instructive, and retirement entertaining.Man is a reasonable being; and as such, receives from science his proper food and nourishment: But so narrow are the bounds of hu

30、man understanding, that little satisfaction can be hoped for in this particular, either from the extent of security or his acquisitions. Man is a sociable, no less than a reasonable being: But neither can he always enjoy company agreeable and amusing, or preserve the proper relish for them. Man is a

31、lso an active being; and from that disposition, as well as from the various necessities of human life, must submit to business and occupation: But the mind requires some relaxation, and cannot always support its bent to care and industry. It seems, then, that nature has pointed out a mixed kind of l

32、ife as most suitable to the human race, and secretly admonished them to allow none of these biasses to draw too much, so as to incapacitate them for other occupations and entertainments. Indulge your passion for science, says she, but let your science be human, and such as may have a direct reference to action and society. Abstruse thought and profound researches I prohibit, and will severely punish, by the pensive melancholy which they introduce, by the endless uncertainty in which they involve you, and by the cold reception which