11莱维论文的主题经济学转向以理性主义为基础的经济学.docx

1、11莱维论文的主题经济学转向以理性主义为基础的经济学1、（1）莱维论文的主题：经济学转向（以理性主义为基础的经济学工具和理论的引入）对比较政治经济学的影响、贡献与未来发展的可能性。（2）卡岑斯坦论文的论点：2、一门独立的学科必须有独立的研究方法和研究对象，政治经济学要成为一门独立的学科至少也要具备这两个要素。莱维的文章是从经济学对政治学的影响这一角度来分析政治经济学的，虽然她没有强调政治经济学就是用经济学的方法研究政治现象，但在这篇论文中却用了很大的篇幅来说明这一问题。如果这样来理解政治经济学，那么政治经济学无非沦为一个政治学或者经济学的附属学科，在实质上只不过是以经济学方法研究的政治学而已。

2、如果将此推断为理性主义的政治经济学的特征，那么它还是不是政治经济学呢？于是问题是，政治经济学或者比较政治经济学区别于他人的研究方法到底是什么以及是如何被区分的？从研究对象上来看，如果政治经济学只是研究政治对经济的影响或者经济对政治的影响的话，那么政治经济学也只是政治的经济学或者经济的政治学而已，还不能建立自己的独立性。独立的政治经济学应该研究政治与经济的相互关系，这种相互关系应该像政治学或经济学的研究对象一样，具有独立性，也就是说能从社会世界重划分出一片独立的与其他学科的研究对象互相并列的领域来作为政治经济学的研究对象。但是，以这种相互关系为研究对象的政治经济学却往往具有某种结构性的特征，政治

3、经济学的研究范式、问题以及最终呈现的研究成果（如卡岑斯坦的这篇文章所呈现的，甚至是莱维所推崇的那种政治经济学）都会必然具有“结构性”的特点吗？这里的结构性指的是社会世界中的国家、市场与社会之间的相互关系以及各自内部的不同的组成部分之间的相对稳定的关系。政治经济学不同于经济学的一个方面也许在于它不是将社会当作一个由原子化的个人组成的实体，而是一个存在不同组织或集团的、具有相对固定的结构性关系的实体。无论是莱维的文章（关于理性主义政治经济学的）还是卡岑斯坦的文章，它们所描述的以及最终呈现的都是一个关于结构性关系的东西。当然以理念为核心的政治经济学也许不是这样，但也有可能正因为它不是，所以它难以成为

4、主流！？与政治经济学的这种特征相联系的是它的历史性，这种观察实际上来源于卡岑斯坦的论文。卡岑斯坦所给我们展示的不仅是一个带有结构性的关系，也许更为重要的是他为我们展示了一个来自于历史的结构性关系。如果这样来理解比较政治经济学的话，就意味着它必须以结构和历史作为自己的研究核心。无论是在哪些国家之间，以及对那些结构关系进行比较，都必然会具有历史维度。而卡岑斯坦这篇论文的“开山性”是不是正揭示了这一点呢？你提出的问题都很重要，都很值得我们进一步讨论。但是评论的前后部分是是两个问题：前一个是如何为政治经济学确定身份的问题；后一个是政治经济学（尤其是CPE）的研究对象问题。你提出的结构性特征问题虽然很重

5、要，但不能根据一篇CPE经典就确定特征。另外，虽然你的讨论都很好，但还是建议未来的评论集中挖掘一个问题。4.5/5总结: Levis article outlined how economic theories can be used to explain differences in politics in comparative political economy.There are two distinct variants first is framed by Keynesianism and second based on rational choice. The focus is

6、on rationalist comparative political economy. Levi argued thatthe use of rational choice added new methodologies and theories to analyze and understand politics, changing the model of politics to “What makes who do what, when, and why and how does each act in response?” There is increasing convergen

7、ce between the two variants of comparative political economy especially with the decline in acceptance of Keynesianism. Katzensteins paper used six advanced industrial states (grouped into three types) to argue that the divergence in foreign economic policies in the 1970s is due principally to diffe

8、rences in domestic structures.评论:Political economy is the study of the effects of political factors, systems and power on economic factors, systems and power, and vice versa. Comparative political economy, a subset of this study, focuses on the differences in domestic political and economic conditio

9、ns between countries. Levi and Katzenstein each explained one side of the effect between domestic politics and economy. Levi, by using rational choice, demonstrated how microeconomic theories can be applied to understand domestic politics. Rational choice is the assumption of self-interest maximizat

10、ion or of consistency of choice. These choices are ultimately made by individuals be it in individual or institutional context. Applying rational choice to politics therefore reflects to a certain extent the relationship between a state, society and economy choices made by individuals in society, co

11、rporations, government and politicians form the network of state, society and economy. Levi attempted to address how rational choices can lead to irrational outcomes in politics, including factors such as constraints in choices due to institutions or behavioral changes due to collective action.Howev

12、er, it is equally critical to further examine the factors that affect the so-called “rational choice” of people. For instance, politics may actually be the driving force behind the rational choice of the government making certain economic policies. This is exemplified in Katzensteins essay which sho

13、ws how domestic political structure and the historical evolution of domestic structure influence the choice of economic policies by the state. The case of Japan is a clear illustration. The strong centralized bureaucratic regime in Japan with the sole objective of economic development led to a coord

14、inated action by the government and business community to channel resources to build a strong economy. In this context, it will appear that the politics and institutional effects outweigh rational choice effects in explaining the Japanese phenomenon. Therefore, it is not conclusive that rational cho

15、ice can fully explain all political outcomes in different countries. The loop effect between economics and politics means that the source of differences between countries may not be due to the same premise i.e. we cannot use one yardstick like rational choice or different domestic structure alone to

16、 explain differences in domestic economic or political policies.Katzenstein is convincing in illustrating how the historical formations of domestic structures led to differences in foreign economic policies of the six industrial states in 1970s. However with globalization, it is increasingly difficult to distinct domestic factors from international political pressures on foreign economic policies. WTO (World Trade Organization) agreements and intern