从信息的角度分析会计概念结构外文翻译.docx

1、从信息的角度分析会计概念结构外文翻译外文翻译原文：Conceptual frameworks of accounting from an information perspectiveAbstractThis paper analyses the benefits of accounting regulation and a conceptual framework using an information economics approach that allows consideration of uncertainty, multiple agents, demand for infor

2、mation, and multiple information sources. It also allows private information to enter the analysis. The analysis leads to a set of fundamental properties of accounting information. It is argued that the set of qualitative characteristics typically contained in conceptual frameworks does not adequate

3、ly aggregate the information demands of users of accounting information. For example, the IASBs conceptual framework contains no guidelines for the trade-off between relevance and reliability. Furthermore, neutrality might not be part of an optimal regulation. The statistical bias introduced by the

4、stewardship use of accounting information is not necessarily undesirable and will always remain; stewardship is the characteristic of accounting information that provides incentives for management to act in the desired way. Accounting information is inherently late compared to other information sour

5、ces but influences and constrains the content of more timely sources. The accounting system does not exist in a vacuum. Other information sources are present and the purpose of the accounting system cannot be analyzed without considering the existence of other information sources. Finally, financial

6、 statements are audited by an independent auditor. This implies that accounting data are hard to manipulate.IntroductionThe question I have been asked to address is how conceptual frameworks contribute to the quality of corporate reporting regulation. This is by no means an easy task. In the paper I

7、 shall attempt to show that an answer requires identification of the concept of quality of corporate reporting, of the purpose of the conceptual framework, and of the benefits of reporting regulation. In order to understand the concept of the quality of corporate reporting it is important to analyze

8、 the fundamental characteristics of accounting information and its limitations.Previous work has shown that, in a single firm setting, the accounting system has to be finely tuned to the specifics of the organization and its environment, including the economics of the firm, the decision problems at

9、hand, the private information of the-parties involved, the public information, and the moral hazard problems of the organization. Furthermore, the world contains many firms and many decision-makers.It is impossible to construct an income measure that reflects true income as defined by Hicks (1946) w

10、hen markets are not perfect and complete (Beaver and Demski, 1979). Such a measure does not exist. Rather, accounting should be viewed as an information system as acknowledged by both FASB and IASB in their original conceptual frameworks (FASB, 1978; IASC, 1989). Unfortunately, there is no universal

11、 ranking of information systems (Christensen and Demski, 2003). In addition, it is well known that no rational preference relation describes the decision process of society (Arrow, 1951). The accounting system is the result of a delicate balancing of the possibilities imbedded in the accounting syst

12、em and the demands of the users. This balancing is not entirely of a technical nature as it calls for balancing of preferences of the parties involved. Such balancing cannot be achieved by technical rule-making and is inevitably the result of a political decision process.The accounting income number

13、 reports firmspecific financial information to the market and thus reduces the information asymmetry in the market. The paper considers how information is simultaneously used by investors to make decisions and to induce or influence management to behave optimally or to use the entitys resources effi

14、ciently. The decision-influencing role distorts the reporting incentives. Once the accounting information is used for performance evaluation (or for decisions regarding replacement of management), incentives for earnings management arise (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Graham et al., 2005). The reaso

15、n is that the financial statements include reporting of private information by management as part of the accruals. Auditing reduces this problem to some extent. Managers often have an informational advantage over the auditors and this prevents the problem from being completely eliminated.A related q

16、uestion is how the accounting system best complements other information sources. The financial statements will always be published late compared to other information sources. This is due to the nature of financial statements as all transactions must be processed and audited before the statements are released. In contrast, managements forecast might be timely. The prime purpose of financial statements might be to provide incentives for reporting of other types of informatio