基金管理中英文对照外文翻译文献.docx

1、基金管理中英文对照外文翻译文献基金管理中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译) 大量资金的投入真的就好吗？新的证据表明了关于共同基金流量，基金管理者的行为，业绩的持续性三者之间的关系。摘要 在坚持了很长的时间后，共同基金带回了丰厚的利润这就是这篇文章 想要的核心结果.此外，消费者行为和基金经理在解释这些长期持续的伙伴关系上发挥了很大的作用。消费者们用去年赢得的基金去做大量的投资，而这些成功的基金管理者们再投资这些流动股票想着要再创新高，根据今年的排名情况，至少得到2年以后去了。相比之下，失去了基金的管理者们，他们似乎不愿意卖出他们亏损的股票去买那些涨势好的股票，也许是因为错置效应吧。

2、这样一来，涨势好的仍在继续，成功盈利的管理者们和那些亏损的管理者们也在继续拉开离，直至一个比以前研究的还要长的时期。 更令人惊讶的是，基金长期盈利所反映的不是都能用动量来解释，我们找到了强有力的证据表明，与流相关的购买，尤其是成长型基金，推动了股票的价格。特别的是，用赢回的基金拿去购买的响应着持续性流动性的股票已经撼动了他们的大小，市场和一个为期四年的每年百分之二到百分之三的动量基准。根据横截面分析表明，这些异常的回报与资金的流入密切相关，但却不是因为过去段时间资金的表现，因此，对于研究表明的长期坚持的经理人在选择股票上是有才能的。最后，在风格调整后的净收益水平，我们并没有发现他的持久性，与以

3、往的研究结果一致。总的来说，在成功的经理人的带领下的巨富是非常明智的，但是用跟风模仿策略来赢得股票基金与流相关的回报来交易似乎是最明智的策略。 八百零八万人现在在美国持有投资的共同基金，同那些超过百分之九十的这些投资基金的价值被作为活动管理资金。此外，积极管理的股票基金获得了如预算所言的消费者流入量-新资金的净流入量在2000年的时候为309000000000美元，这些资金所持有的能推动资金的总价值在2000年底将近4亿美元。 虽然，大多数的个人投资者是充分相信那些活跃投资者的职业道德的，一般来说，很多人对那些具有投资天赋的人具有偏执的信任，他们更愿意相信，在管理者们的活动领域，更高级的经济管

4、理人的存在能够长时间的占领市场。特别是，晨星和理铂的的激烈竞争正在靠提供定期基金排名来积极争取他们的客户，然而像金钱杂志封面上的共同基金经理人也成为了一种潮流。此外，投资美元的人并没有很快放弃之前亏损的基金转而去疯狂的去追逐那些成功的基金管理人。 这些性质是在浪费他们的金钱和时间还是这些金主们真的很聪明呢？在过去有很多的论文试图解决这些问题，然后产生了各种各样的结果。比如说，Grinblatt and Titman发现部分的基金经理能够始终如一的正常收入和支出，而像他们俩这样的就只能在基金异常的时候出现负收入。Gruber和郑先生坚持从消费者的视角来检查其投资在基金中的资金流向，然后发现这些投

5、资者真的是非常的明智-那就是，资金流的不成比例现象造成了未来的巨大收益。 然而，这些投资效果甚好的钱的来源仍然是一个谜，这些明智的投资基金真的能够胜任那些能干的基金经理吗，还是仅仅只是基金收益的猛烈势头。 最近，Carhar一直在坚持监测着共有基金的投资回报，目的就是为了维持价格的平衡。与之一起的人有Fama and French Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Daniel and Titman (1997), and Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999). 卡哈尔发现了一点，更高级的资金的一直走在他们基准风格的前面，卡尔发现基金的最高回报率

6、在一年当中的最低收入也达到了总基金量的百分之3.5.在接下来的一年当中，几乎所有的整个年所记录的的动量效应由Sapp and Tiwari发现，在净收益的水平上，金钱效应是由基金动量来显示的而不是由于基金管理者的才能实现。因此，Teo和Woo发现了一个“傻钱效应”，那就是在很多年当中，高流入资金的的运作比低资金的运作要差。这样一来，Carhart就认为钱多并不是很明智。 而且最近的一些报道也是说找到了比卡尔更有说服力的结果。 Chen, Jegadeesh,and Wermers 也发现了，那些被基金积极购买的股票打击到了那些每年卖掉百分之二的活跃分子，而Bollen和Busse也发现了关于基

7、金季度性的持久性表现证据。Is Money Really “Smart”?New Evidence on the Relation Between Mutual Fund Flows,Manager Behavior, and Performance Persistence.Russ Wermers*Department of FinanceRobert H. Smith School of BusinessUniversity of MarylandCollege Park, MD 20742-1815(301) 405-0572November 2003*Abstract Mutual f

8、und returns strongly persist over multi-year periodsthat is the central finding of this paper. Further, consumer and fund manager behavior both play a large role in explaining these long-term continuation patternsconsumers invest Heavily in last-years winning funds, and managers of these winners inv

9、est these inflows in momentum stocks to continue to outperform other funds for at least two years following the ranking year. By contrast, managers of losing funds appear reluctant to sell their losing stocks to finance the purchase of new momentum stocks, perhaps due to a disposition effect. Thus,

10、momentum continues to separate winning from losing managers for a much longer period than indicated by prior studies. Even more surprising is that persistence in winning fund returns is not entirely explained by momentumwe find strong evidence that flow-related buying, especially among growth-orient

11、ed funds, pushes up stock prices. Specifically, stocks that winning funds purchase in response to persistent flows have returns that beat their size, book-to-market, and momentum benchmarks by two to three percent per year over a four-year period. Cross-sectional regressions indicate that these abno

12、rmal returns are strongly related to fund inflows, but not to the past performance of the fundsthus, casting some doubt on prior findings of persistent manager talent in picking stocks. Finally, at the style-adjusted net returns level, we find no persistence, consistent with the results of prior stu

13、dies. On balance, we confirm that money is smart in chasing winning managers, but that a “copycat” strategy of mimicking winning fund stock trades to take advantage of flow-related returns appears to be the smartest strategy. Eighty-eight million individuals now hold investments in U.S. mutual funds

14、, with over 90 percent of the value of these investments being held in actively managed funds. Further, actively managed equity funds gain the lions share of consumer inflowsflows of net new money to equity funds (inflows minus outflows) totalled $309 billion in 2000, pushing the aggregate value of

15、investments held by these funds to almost $4 trillion at year-end 2000. While the majority of individual investors apparently believe in the virtues of active managementin general, many appear to hold even stronger beliefs concerning the talents of subgroups of fund managersthey appear to believe th

16、at, among the field of active managers, superior managers exist that can “beat the market” for long periods of time. In particular, Morningstar and Lipper compete vigorously for the attention of these true believers by providing regular fund performance rankings, while popular publications such as M

17、oney Magazine routinely profile “star” mutual fund managers. In addition, investor dollars, while not very quick to abandon past losing funds, aggressively chase past winners (see, for example, Sirri and Tufano (1998). Are these “performance-chasers” wasting their money and time, or is money “smart”

18、? Several past papers have attempted to tackle this issue, with somewhat differing results. For example, Grinblatt and Titman (1989a, 1993) find that some mutual fund managers are able to consistentlyearn positive abnormal returns before fees and expenses, while Brown and Goetzmann (1995; BG) attrib

19、ute persistence to inferior funds consistently earning negative abnormal returns. Gruber (1996) and Zheng (1999) examine persistence from the viewpoint of consumer money flows to funds, and find that money is “smart”that is, money flows disproportionately to funds exhibiting superior future returns.

20、 However, the exact source of the smart money effect remains a puzzledoes smart money capture manager talent or, perhaps, simply momentum in stock returns? More recently, Carhart (1997) examines the persistence in net returns of U.S. mutual funds, controlling for the continuation attributable to pri

21、ced equity styles (see, for example, Fama andFrench (1992, 1993, 1996), Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Daniel and Titman (1997), and Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999). Carhart finds little evidence of superior funds that consistently outperform their style benchmarksspecifically, Carhart finds that funds

22、 in the highest net return decile (of the CRSP mutual fund database) during one year beat funds in the lowest decile by about 3.5 percent during the following year, almost all due to the one-year momentum effect documented 1Sapp and Tiwari (2002) find evidence that, at the net return level, the smar

23、t-money effect can be explained by momentum and not by manager talent, while Teo and Woo (2001) find evidence of a “dumb money” effectthat is,high inflow funds underperform low inflow funds over multi-year time periods.1 by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and to the unexplained poor performance of funds

24、 in the lowest prior-year return decile.Thus, Carhart (1997) suggests that money is not very smart. Recent studies find somewhat more promising results than Carhart (1997). Chen, Jegadeesh,and Wermers (1999) find that stocks most actively purchased by funds beat those most actively sold by over two

25、percent per year, while Bollen and Busse (2002) find evidence of persistence inquarterly fund performance.Bibliography1 Badrinath, S. G., and Sunil Wahal, 2002, “Momentum Trading by Institutions,” Journal of Finance, 57, pp. 2449-2477.2 Berk, Jonathan B., and Richard C. Green, “Mutual Fund Flows and

26、 Performance in Rational Markets,” Working Paper.3 Bollen, Nicolas and Jeffrey Busse, 2002, “Short-Term Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance,”Working Paper.4 Brown, Stephen J. and William N. Goetzmann, 1995, “Performance Persistence,” Journal of Finance, 50, pp. 679-698.5 Brown, Stephen J., Willia

27、m N. Goetzmann, Roger G. Ibbotson, and Stephen A. Ross, 1992,“Survivorship Bias in Performance Studies,” Review of Financial Studies, 5, pp. 553-580.6 Carhart, Mark, 1997, “On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance,” Journal of Finance, 52,pp. 57-82.7 Chen, Hsiu-Lang, Narasimhan Jegadeesh, and Russ

28、Wermers, 1999, “The Value of Active Mutual Fund Management: An Examination of the Stockholdings and Trades of Fund Managers,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, forthcoming.8 Clements, Jonathan, 2001, “Resisting the Lure of Managed Funds,” Wall Street Journal, February 27, page C1.9 Coh

29、en, Randolph B. and Christopher K. Polk, 1998, “The Impact of Industry Factors in Asset-Pricing Tests,” Working Paper.10 Daniel, Kent, Mark Grinblatt, Sheridan Titman, and Russ Wermers, 1997, “Measuring Mutual Fund Performance with Characteristic-Based Benchmarks,” Journal of Finance, 52, pp. 1035-1

30、058.11 Daniel, Kent and Sheridan Titman, 1997, “Evidence on the Characteristics of Cross-Sectional Variation in Common Stock Returns,” Journal of Finance, 52, pp. 1-33.12 Edelen, Roger, 1999, “Investor Flows and the Assessed Performance of Open-End Mutual Funds,” Journal of Financial Economics, 53,

31、pp. 439-466.13 Fama, Eugene F. and Kenneth R. French, 1992, “The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns,” Journal of Finance, 47, pp. 427-465.14 Fama, Eugene F. and Kenneth R. French, 1993, “Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks And Bonds,” Journal of Financial Economics, 33, pp. 3-56.15 Fam

32、a, Eugene F. and Kenneth R. French, 1996, “Multifactor Explanations of Asset Pricing Anomalies,” Journal of Finance, 51, pp. 55-84.16 Fama, Eugene F. and James D. MacBeth, 1973, “Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests,” Journal of Political Economy, 81, pp. 607-636.17 Ferson, Wayne E. and Kenneth Khang, 2000, “Conditional Performance Measurement Using Portfolio Weights: Evidence for Pension Funds,” Working Paper.18 Ferson, Wayne E. and Rudi W. Schadt, 1996, “Measuring Fund Strategy And Performance