波士顿关于制造业回流美国的问题英文.docx

1、波士顿关于制造业回流美国的问题英文Made in America, AgainWhy Manufacturing Will Return to the U.S.AUGUST 25, 2011byHarold L. Sirkin,Michael Zinser, andDouglas HohnerFor more than a decade, deciding where to build a manufacturing plant to supply the world was simple for many companies. With its seemingly limitless sup

2、ply of low-cost labor and an enormous, rapidly developing domestic market, an artificially low currency, and significant government incentives to attract foreign investment, China was the clear choice.Now, however, a combination of economic forces is fast eroding Chinas cost advantage as an export p

3、latform for the North American market. Meanwhile, the U.S., with an increasingly flexible workforce and a resilient corporate sector, is becoming more attractive as a place to manufacture many goods consumed on this continent. An analysis by The Boston Consulting Group concludes that, by sometime ar

4、ound 2015for many goods destined for North American consumersmanufacturing in some parts of the U.S. will be just as economical as manufacturing in China. The key reasons for this shift include the following: Wage and benefit increases of 15 to 20 percent per year at the average Chinese factory will

5、 slash Chinas labor-cost advantage over low-cost states in the U.S., from 55 percent today to 39 percent in 2015, when adjusted for the higher productivity of U.S. workers. Because labor accounts for a small portion of a products manufacturing costs, the savings gained from outsourcing to China will

6、 drop to single digits for many products. For many goods, when transportation, duties, supply chain risks, industrial real estate, and other costs are fully accounted for, the cost savings of manufacturing in China rather than in some U.S. states will become minimal within the next five years. Autom

7、ation and other measures to improve productivity in China wont be enough to preserve the countrys cost advantage. Indeed, they will undercut the primary attraction of outsourcing to Chinaaccess to low-cost labor. Given rising income levels in China and the rest of developing Asia, demand for goods i

8、n the region will increase rapidly. Multinational companies are likely to devote more of their capacity in China to serving the domestic Chinese as well as the larger Asian market, and to bring some production work for the North American market back to the U.S. Manufacturing of some goods will shift

9、 from China to nations with lower labor costs, such as Vietnam, Indonesia, and Mexico. But these nations ability to absorb the higher-end manufacturing that would otherwise go to China will be limited by inadequate infrastructure, skilled workers, scale, and domestic supply networks, as well as by p

10、olitical and intellectual-property risks. Low worker productivity, corruption, and the risk to personal safety are added concerns in some countries.This reallocation of global manufacturing is in its very early phases. It will vary dramatically from industry to industry, depending on labor content,

11、transportation costs, Chinas competitive strengths, and the strategic needs of individual companies. But we believe that it will become more pronounced over the next five years, especially as companies face decisions about where to add future capacity. While China will remain an important manufactur

12、ing platform for Asia and Europe, the U.S. will become increasingly attractive for the production of many goods sold to consumers in North America.This report, the first in a series, examines the economic trends that point to a U.S. manufacturing renaissance. It also explores the strategic implicati

13、ons of the shifting cost equation for companies engaged in global sourcing. The U.S. “Decline” and Renaissance in Perspective The death of American manufacturing has been foretold many times in the past four decades. As the only major industrialized nation not leveled by World War II, the U.S. accou

14、nted for around 40 percent of the worlds manufactured goods in the early 1950s. But then, fueled by a relentless wave of imports from a reconstructed Europe and eventually from Japan, the U.S. experienced a dramatic loss of market share in industries such as color TVs, steel, cars, and computer chip

15、s. In the 1970s and 1980s, fears of the loss of U.S. industrial competitiveness were particularly acute, prompting a widespread debate over whether the nation should adopt a “Japan Inc.”-style industrial policy and teach its schoolchildren to speak Japanese. Then came the rise of such East Asian Tig

16、ers as South Korea and Taiwan, which led to a massive transfer of production of labor-intensive goods, including apparel, shoes, and toys, and then of much of the U.S. computer and consumer-electronics manufacturing industry. The U.S. suffered through many painful adjustments to these challenges. Un

17、like most nations, however, it quickly ripped off the Band-Aid and allowed industry to adapt. Factories closed, companies failed, banks wrote off losses, and workers had to learn new skills. But U.S. industry and the economy responded with surprising flexibility and speed to reemerge more competitiv

18、e and productive than ever. By the late 1990s, American companies dominated the world in high-value industries such as microprocessors, aerospace, networking equipment, software, and pharmaceuticals. Manufacturing investment, output, and employment surged. It may not be obvious yet, but the U.S. man

19、ufacturing sector is today in the midst of a similar process of readjustment in response to perhaps its greatest competitive threat everthe rise of China. Since opening its doors to foreign investment and trade, China has offered a virtually unbeatable combination of seemingly limitless cheap labor

20、(less than $1 per hour), a growing pool of engineers, a fixed currency, and local governments willing to offer inexpensive land, free infrastructure, and generous financial incentives. In the decade since it entered the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, China has essentially become the default

21、 option for companies wishing to outsource production in order to lower costs. From 2000 to 2009, Chinas exports leapt nearly fivefold, to $1.2 trillion, and its share of global exports rose from 3.9 percent to 9.7 percent, according to United Nations Conference on Trade and Development data. These

22、developments occurred in a remarkable breadth of industries, from labor-intensive assembly work to heavy industry and high-tech. Chinas portion of global apparel exports increased from 17.4 percent to 32.1 percent, for example. Its share of the world export market for furniture soared from 7.5 perce

23、nt to 25.9 percent, for ships from 4.1 percent to 19.6 percent, for telecom equipment from 6.5 percent to 27.8 percent, and for office machines and computer equipment from 4.9 percent to 32.6 percent. In the U.S., meanwhile, the loss of some 6 million manufacturing jobs and the closure of tens of th

24、ousands of factories over the past decade has fanned frequent warnings of a manufacturing crisis.The Tide Is TurningOnce again, however, predictions of the demise of American manufacturing are likely to prove wrong. The U.S. manufacturing sector remains robust. Output is almost two and a half times

25、its 1972 level in constant dollars, even though employment has dropped by 33 percent. Despite the recent wave of outsourcing to China, the value of U.S. manufacturing outputincreasedby one-third, to $1.65 trillion, from 1997 to 2008before the onset of the recessionthanks to the strongest productivit

26、y growth in the industrial world. Although China accounted for 19.8 percent of global manufacturing value added in 2010, the U.S. still accounted for 19.4 percenta share that has declined only slightly over the past three decades.The conditions are coalescing for another U.S. resurgence. Rising wage

27、s, shipping costs, and land pricescombined with a strengthening renminbiare rapidly eroding Chinas cost advantages. The U.S., meanwhile, is becoming a lower-cost country. Wages have declined or are rising only moderately. The dollar is weakening. The workforce is becoming increasingly flexible. Prod

28、uctivity growth continues.Our analysis concludes that, within five years, the total cost of production for many products will be only about 10 to 15 percent less in Chinese coastal cities than in some parts of the U.S. where factories are likely to be built. Factor in shipping, inventory costs, and

29、other considerations, andfor many goods destined for the North American marketthe cost gap between sourcing in China and manufacturing in the U.S. will be minimal. In some cases, companies will move work to inland China to find lower wages. But this will not be an attractive option in many industrie

30、s. Chinese cities in the interior provinces lack the abundance of skilled workers, supply networks, and efficient transportation infrastructure of those along the coast, offsetting much of the savings afforded by slightly lower labor costs.When all costs are taken into account, certain U.S. states,

31、such as South Carolina, Alabama, and Tennessee, will turn out to be among the least expensive production sites in the industrialized world. As a result, we expect companies to begin building more capacity in the U.S. to supply North America. The early evidence of such a shift is mounting. NCR moved

32、production of its ATMs to a plant in Columbus, Georgia, that will employ 870 people by 2014. The Coleman Company is moving production of its 16-quart wheeled plastic cooler from China to Wichita, Kansas, owing to rising Chinese manufacturing and shipping costs. Ford Motor Company is bringing up to 2,000 jobs back to the U.S. in the wake of a favorable agreement with the United Auto Workers that allows the company to hire new workers at $14 per hour. Sleek Audio has moved production of its high-end headphones from Chinese suppliers to its plant in Manatee County, Florida. Peerless Industr