Road from Serfdom 20.docx

1、Road from Serfdom 20The Road from Agricultureby Thorvaldur Gylfason* and Gylfi Zoega*The great economist Arthur Lewis emphasized the distinction between traditional agriculture and urban industries. In his view, savings and investment originate solely in the latter, while vast pools of underutilized

2、 labor can be found in the traditional sector (Lewis, 1954). In this paper we aim at filling a gap in his analysis by constructing a model of rational behavior in the traditional sector. We want to think of farmers as rational agents and so explain economic backwardness not in terms of history or me

3、ntality but rather in terms of a model with maximizing behavior. Our aim is to show that the level of technology in agriculture in each country will not, in general, coincide with the “frontier” technology of the most advanced economy. In particular, each country has an optimal “technology gap” that

4、 separates it from the frontier. In our analysis, the size of this gap turns out to depend on factors that are exogenous to most economic models and seldom subject to change, such as farm size reflecting geography, the fertility of the land, the ability of farmers to digest and take on new technolog

5、ies and the rate of time preference. Most surprisingly, perhaps, the distance from the technology frontier turns out to depend on the position of the frontier itself; the more advanced is frontier technology, the larger is the optimal distance that maximizes the value of land from the frontier. We w

6、ill bring cliometric evidence from our native Iceland to bear on this issue. Further, we attempt to quantify the relationship between structural change and growth by considering the change in the share of agriculture in value added and of migration to cities as independent determinants of economic g

7、rowth within a cross-country growth regression framework. The share of agriculture in employment and value added has fallen relentlessly around the world over the past one hundred years. Until the end of the 19th century, an overwhelming part of the work force was engaged in agriculture everywhere.

8、In 1960, almost half the labor force in low-income countries was still employed in agriculture, but this ratio continues to fall: today almost a fourth of the labor force in low-income countries works on the land, less than ten percent in middle-income countries, and less than two percent in high-in

9、come countries. To illustrate the relationship that motivates this study, we show in Figure 1 data from 86 countries, some rich and some poor, in the period from 1965 to 1998. The figure shows the relationship between per capita economic growth along the vertical axis and structural change as measur

10、ed from right to left along the horizontal axis by the decrease in the share of agriculture in value added from 1965 to 1998. Each country is represented by a single dot in the figure: the average growth rate over the sample period and the structural change from the beginning to the end of the perio

11、d. The figure shows that a decrease in the share of agriculture by thirteen percentage points from one country to another is associated with an increase in annual per capita growth by one percentage point.Figure 1. Structural Change and Growth 1965-1998In a recent study, Temin (1999) argues that a r

12、elationship similar to that in Figure 1 can account for the growth performance of fifteen European countries over the period 1955-1995. In particular, he argues that the migration of labor from rural to urban areas helps explain the post-war “Golden Age” of European economic growth, including the di

13、fferences in growth rates during this period and the end of the high-growth era in the early 1970s. Not all countries have handled this dramatic transformation of their economic structure as well. In extreme cases, the development was actively resisted, as witnessed originally by the institution of

14、slavery that in some places continued well into the second half of the 19th century. The resistance to change took other, milder forms as well: for example, farm workers in Iceland were throughout the 19th century prevented by law from leaving their employers, a form of serfdom that significantly de

15、layed the transformation of the Icelandic economy from agriculture to industry.This paper adds to an expanding literature on the long-run sectoral implications of economic growth. While we emphasize endogenous technological adoption at the farm level, other contributions have emphasized human capita

16、l accumulation. Galor and Moav (2003) model the transition from a rural agricultural society to an urban industrial society by showing how the complementarity of human and physical capital in industry generates an incentive for industrialists to support educational reforms. Human capital accumulatio

17、n also plays an important part in the transition in Tamura (2002). In Galor and Weil (2000), skill-biased technical progress raises the rate of return on human capital, which causes human capital to grow, hence creating steady-state growth. Jones (1999), in contrast, argues that increasing returns t

18、o the accumulation of technology and labor sustains growth. We do not dispute the importance of human capital for the transition but, instead, want to describe some of the determinants of endogenous technological adoption in agriculture. We argue that the extent of the transition from an agrarian to

19、 an industrial economy depends not only on the access of industrial producers to unlimited supplies of rural labor (Lewis, 1954) and on productivity developments and availability of work in urban areas (Kaldor, 1966; Harris and Todaro, 1970), but also on farm size reflecting geography, the fertility

20、 of land and the ability of farmers to adopt new technology. In this we are perhaps in part motivated by the experience of Iceland, an island in the far North Atlantic where agriculture was the main economic activity for centuries, supporting a population that lived on the margins of subsistence. Ha

21、rsh climate, unfertile soil, small disparate plots of arable land and a population not familiar with foreign cultures or languages hampered economic development for almost a thousand years. It is difficult to conceive of any form of institution building that could have helped inject dynamism into th

22、e agricultural economy. I. Efficiency gains in agriculture and growthIn this section we describe the behavior of farmers with regard to the adoption of new technology. Our aim is to endogenize the extent of allocative as well as organizational efficiency gains, both of which are important sources of

23、 economic growth. We model the economy as consisting of two sectors, a rural agricultural sector and an urban manufacturing sector. Unlike Lewis, we assume that farmers engage in maximizing behavior. We are interested in decisions about the adoption of new labor saving technology as well as in the i

24、mplications of those decisions for economic growth in a two-sector world. SectorsAgricultural output is produced with land and labor. Land is a fixed factor that limits the maximum feasible production. The land is split up into different farms that differ in size and fertility. The distribution of s

25、ize and fertility is exogenous to our model and assumed to depend solely on geography and climate. In contrast, urban industrial output is not constrained by any fixed factor. Instead, output is produced with labor using a constant-returns technology. Individuals in our model are either farmers (tha

26、t is, owners of land), farm workers or urban dwellers. An individual may move between these three states; higher farm profits induce workers to become farmers, higher rural wages create an incentive for becoming a farm worker and for people to move from urban to rural areas, while higher urban wages

27、 pull workers to the cities. MarketsThere is perfect competition in the market for industrial goods, agricultural goods and labor in the two sectors. Individuals differ in their preferences for rural versus urban labor. When relative wages in urban areas rise, more people decide to migrate from the

28、farms to the cities but not everyone will move. It follows that expected wages in the two sectors do not have to be equal. Cultural differences as well as education, peer pressure and family considerations may also create an attachment to either rural or urban living. As in Harris and Todaro (1970),

29、 the relative price of agricultural output in terms of manufacturing goods is a decreasing function of agricultural output and an increasing function of manufacturing output:, with p 0. This assumption captures the demand side of our model; we do not model consumption choices. Utility Preferences ar

30、e separable in the utility of income, on the one hand, and the utility from living in rural/urban areas, on the other hand. Utility of income is homogenous and linear in income while workers are heterogeneous in terms of the utility of residence. Farmers maximize the present discounted value of futu

31、re utility using an exogenous and fixed rate of time preference r. For simplicity, we assume infinite horizons. At the same time they compare this value to the present discounted value of working on other farms and switch between owning land and working for others when the latter gives higher future

32、 utility. The production technology We assume a Leontief production function in agriculture and a linear production function in urban industry: (1) (2) YA denotes the level of output of agricultural produce and YM is modern urban output, A denotes the level of labor-augmenting technology in agricult

33、ure and B, technology in manufacturing. NA is the number of workers in agriculture and NM, in manufacturing. L is arable land and F denotes the fertility of the soil. It follows that if the number of effective labor units ANA is up to the task, sustainable farm output is FL. There are constant returns to scale in industry but sha