社会保险外文翻译重新引入代际均衡波兰养老保险制度节选其他专业.docx

1、社会保险外文翻译重新引入代际均衡波兰养老保险制度节选其他专业附录一 原文Reintroducing Intergenerational Equilibrium: Key Conceptsbehind the New Polish Pension SystemAbstractPoland adopted a new pension system in 1999. This new pension system allowsPoland to reduce pension expenditure (as a percent of GDP), instead of increasing itas i

2、s projected for the majority of other OECD countries. This paper presents theconceptual background of the new system design. The new systems long-termbjective is to ensure intergenerational equilibrium irrespective of the demographicsituation. This requires stabilisation of the share of GDP allocate

3、d to the entire retiredgeneration. Traditional pension systems aim, instead, at stabilisation of the share ofGDP per retiree. The change in demographic structure observed over the past for acouple of decades and this historic attempt to stabilise the share of GDP per retiree ledto severe fiscal prob

4、lems and negative externalities for growth, as observed innumerous countries. Many countries have tried to reform their pension systems indifferent ways to try to resolve the issue of these ever-increasing costs. Although thePolish reform uses a number of techniques applied elsewhere, its design dif

5、fers fromthe typical approaches and the lessons and results are promising for all OECDcountries. This paper presents the theoretical and practical application of thisalternative approach and as such, the key features of the new Polish pension systemdesign.IntroductionDemographic transition together

6、with myopic policies has caused severe problems inthe area of pensions in many countries around the world. Elements of traditionalpension systems design include a weak link of benefits to contributions and the lackof control over costs of the system. Inclusion of these elements in the pension system

7、design led to the explosion of costs, caused negative externalities for growth andcontributed to persistently high unemployment. As such, the quest for pension reformis now on the top of policy agendas around the world, and especially in Europe.However, very few countries have been able to introduce

8、 fundamental reforms in thearea of pensions to this time. In this case, the definition of reform is crucial. For thepurposes of this paper, “reform” means changing the system in order to removetructural inefficiencies and not just playing at the margins with contribution rates and retirement ages to

9、 adjust the systems parameters for short-term fiscal andpolitical reasons.Traditional pension systems have proven to be inefficient in providing societies withsocial security. At the same time attempts to cure these systems are hampered by alack of consensus on what could replace the traditional sys

10、tem. Discussions on thisissue involve confusion stemming from the ideological context of the discussionparticipants, as well as from overuse of such concepts as “pay-as-you-go” versus“funding”, or “public” versus “private”, while at the same time ignoring a number ofimportant economic issues.Further

11、more, economists have traditionally ignored pensions. Designing and runningpension systems was left to non-economists, who were not extensively concernedwith how to finance pensions in the long-term or with how to counteract these pensionsystems negative externalities. The new Polish pension system

12、belongs to very smallnumber of successful attempts to apply modern thinking in the area of pensions. Thisdoes not mean as some may assume giving up social security goals. Rather, thekey idea was to give up the inefficient methods of delivering social security in orderto save its goals and principles

13、.This paper consists of two parts. The first focuses on a discussion of general issuesthat need to be addressed when designing a pension system. These issues arepresented in a way that goes beyond the traditional way of thinking on pensions.In regards to this second part of the paper, it is importan

14、t to point out that mostcountries in the current EU member states and candidate countries have pensionsystems that are essentially the same at the basic policy level. As such, the solutionsin one member state or candidate country can be expected to be the same.Like European states such as France, Ge

15、rmany, Italy, the CzechRepublic, Hungaryand other European states, Poland and Sweden over the past decades and until the late1990s developed inefficient, costly pension systems. As such, in part two of thepaper we shall examine how Poland has now successfully implemented the approachpresented in the

16、 first part of the paper, and created a fundamentally strong and neutralpension system.Selected general issuesPension system design has to take into account a number of issues. Their fullpresentation and discussion goes beyond the scope of this paperThis paper presentsonly a list of the issues for c

17、onsideration and the most important observations.The pension system: externalities versus neutralityThe description of a pension system depends strongly on both the aggregated andindividual viewpoint.From the aggregated perspective, the pension system is a way of dividing currentGDP between a part k

18、ept by the working generation and a part allocatedto the retired generation.From the individual perspective, the pension system is a way of income allocationover a persons life cycle.The above holds irrespective to the technical method applied or the ideologicalviewpoint. The pension system as defin

19、ed above is not necessarily pay-as-you-goor funded. Such features stem from technical elements additionally applied on the topof the pension system, rather than from the system itself. If the pension system designassumes anonymous participation and a substantial scale of redistribution then weusuall

20、y call this system pay-as-you-go. If the pension system design uses financialmarkets, then we usually call it funded.However, these two typically used concepts do not exhaust all possible combinationsof anonymous versus individualised participation and financial versus non-financialpension system de

21、sign techniques used. The dualistic pay-as-you-go versus fundedapproach leaves aside the combination of individual participation in a system thatdoes not use financial markets. This approach also neglects the fact that usingfinancial markets means investment (pension portfolio consists of private eq

22、uities) ordeferring taxes (pension portfolio consists of government bonds), which is obviouslynot the same.Adding redistribution or financial markets to the pension system generatesexternalities. These externalities can be positive and negative. Redistribution withinthe pension system can generate p

23、ositive externalities if the system is inexpensive,namely the part of GDP allocated to the retired generation is not large. If theredistribution is large, then it generates negative externalities, such as contributing topersistently high unemployment and weak growth. Using financial markets causespo

24、sitive externalities for growth if the pension system spends contribution money oninvestment. If the contributions are spent on government debt they may lead tonegative externalities similar to those of large redistributive system, namely more taxdistortions. This can happen if the rate of return on

25、 government debt is persistentlyabove the rate of GDP growth.There exists yet another option, namely to bring the pension system as close toeconomic neutrality as possible. This option requires, among other things, combiningindividual participation in the system with dividing GDP between generations

26、 basedon real economy developments, such as has been done in Poland and Sweden.Demographic structure: consequences of the change .Irrespective of the pension system design technique used, the pension systemexchanges a right of the retired generation for a part of the product of the workinggeneration

27、. The exchange can be organised in various ways and also the rights can beexpressed in various ways. In particular, the rights can be either traded in the financialmarkets, or defined in relation to some economic variables, or just based on politicalpromise. In all of these cases there is a kind of

28、market for pension rights. The workinggeneration finances contributions in order to purchase the rights; the retiredgeneration sells the rights in order to get a part of the product of the workinggeneration. The various types of pension systems create an institutional framework forthis market.Key fe

29、atures of the new Polish pension systemThe new Polish pension system design is a good example of applying the abovedescribed way of thinking in practice. The system named “Security throughDiversity” started on 1 January 1999. It entirely replaced previous regulations on oldagepensions for majority o

30、f working population. Designing the new system fromscratch provided the unique opportunity to avoid complicating the system. Instead, thenew system design is simple and transparent. The main goal was to design a systemthat can be neutral or at least close to neutrality for economic growth irrespecti

31、ve ofpopulation ageing.The design of the new system does not copy any other pension system existingelsewhere. Strong similarity can be found only to the new Swedish pension systembased on similar principles and started on the same day.16 At the same time, withinthis general framework the new Polish

32、system uses a number of technical conceptsdeveloped in other countries. This brief presentation of the new Polish pension systemfocuses on the general economic design of the system, while leaving aside mosttechnical details.The following bullets help in grasping the essence of the concept of the new

33、 Polishsystem design.􀂾Focusing on the universal part of the pension system;􀂾Separation of the old-age part of social security from the non-old-age parts ofsocial security ; and segmenting the flows of revenue;􀂾Termination of the part of the previous system;􀂾Creation of a new pension system, entirely based on individual accounts;􀂾Accru