外文翻译港口集群治理Word文件下载.docx

1、当协调的利益分配不均，当（威胁）防止投机行为协调或协调利益不确定时，协调无价不会自发或立即产生，即使协调收益超过成本。因此一般缺少协调无价。更多的无价协调能改善集群治理的质量。2.1信任在集群中信任水平高，（平均）交易成本则相对较低, 因为低成本指定合同和监督成本低。此外,协调成本无价越低，更多的协调无价会因此出现。在一个集群中的信任水平受到声誉效应的影响。如果声誉效应强, 滥用信任会产生负面影响，因此信任文化是持续的。2.2中介机构中介机构存在降低协调成本和扩大协调无价的范围有三个相关的原因。首先, 他们提供了一个“桥梁纽带” 在两个或多个之间否则不能连接交换伙伴（Weevily and Z

2、achery, 1999）。其次，中介机构降低协调成本，因为它们“连接认知”。 企业之间的桥梁中介机构可以认知不同市场环境中运作的差异。而连接认知有特别重要的作用在集群中考虑集群实际的特征是“认知分工” （Belus and Tardigrada, 2000）。2.3领导公司领导公司是“具有卓越协调能力和驾驭能力，改变战略中心” （Lorenz and Baden fuller, 1995）。领导公司的行为影响整个集群的功能，因为领导企业有能力和动力投资于一个有竞争力的整体公司网络。我们确定了三个投资于领导公司的其他公司的积极作用（这些可以被称为“领导公司外部性”）在集群中:国际化、创新、有助

3、于解决集体行动问题（Olson, 1971）。因此, 领导公司能加强合作,甚至可以增加企业的业绩。2.4集群中的集体行动集体行动的“问题”在集群中是相关的 （Olson, 1971）。即使在合作的集体利益中实现集体（目标）超过集体成本，这种合作不（总是）自发发展的。不同的集体行动问题如教育、培训和创新是相互联系的在集群中。对每个集体行动问题会产生相应的管理体制。在这种情形下, 一个管理体制可以被定义为一种“相对稳定的合作协议处理克服集体行动问题的能力。”3、港口当局作为集群管理者虽然有各种行为者参与集群治理，但港务局起着最核心的作用。可以把“集群管理者”描述为港口当局的作用。我们讨论集群管理者

4、的一般作用，港务当局所处的位置、收入来源和投资决策。3.1集群管理者的作用一个“完美”的集群管理者将是一个具有以下四个特点的组织：1、集群管理者激励来投资在产业集群中，因为它的收入与集群绩效有关。一个“完美”的集群管理者将收到一份增值产生的收入在集群中，比如通过“集群税”。2、集群管理者进行投资活动获得集群收益（替代公司特殊收益）。此外, 集群管理者的目标是当投资的“集群收益”超过成本。3、集群管理者的目的是把投资成本分配给那些投资获益的公司。这涉及到一起筹措资金安排于一组特定的受益人公司。4、集群管理者经营达到自给自足：经过一段时间投资等于收入。港务局匹配所有四项标准：它们有动机和资金投资于

5、集群。在港口集群中港口费和租赁向投资提供资金。此外,它们通常自给自足及投资于整个集群的绩效。港口当局投资于一般福利活动，例如港口拓展、安全、疏浚。考虑到制度的关系 ,大多数港口当局没有利润的驱动。港务局拥有并开发港区而获得收益，港口集群是一个具有吸引力的位置，因为它们可以出租更多的土地，并且收取更高的价格。此外,港口当局还征收“港口费”。 因此,船只越多的港口会产生较高的港口费。基于上述两个原因，港口当局有明确鼓励投资于港口集群的性能。3.2港口当局的收入港口当局有各种来源的收入。对存在的各项费用和相对重要性收取不同的费用在不同的港口之间（Asar, 2001）。一般来说,增加港口当局的收入来

6、源有三个: 船东/船舶经营人费用；在港口租借费,包括码头营运人；费用为船方。费用为船东/船舶经营人的被称为“港口费”，大多数情况下与船只大小有关。这些港口费是合理的从事疏浚，安全系统,以及在港内的投资。租赁费用是公司按租约收取的，如码头营运人仓储和生产企业。货主码头费大多数与货物大小或者商品价值有关。一些港口当局没有码头费，因为货主间接也支付其他费用。在这样的情况下, 部分其他费用都可以被看作是“伪码头费”。这意味着港口费用不需要完全正当在基础投资上获益对承租人或船东。投资为货主的利益，如投资于腹地基础设施，接近腹地或仓储设施是合理的，因为货主作为港口使用者支付“最终”的港口费。因此,这些货主

7、的投资收益是正当的，即使港口费用只能由居住者和运输公司支付。3.3港口当局的投资决策港口费用是合理的由港口当局投资。“投资评估”是根据港口当局投资的一些准则作出的投资。我们主张以下简单的规则为港口集群管理者投资评价的标准：集群的投资效益应该超过集群成本。集群的好处是集聚企业利益的总和，集群的成本是集聚企业的投资成本。在大多数情况下,成本会损失，因为港口费用需要集群投资。因为成本等于收入，高投资水平需要高的港口费用。4、鹿特丹港的集群治理在本节中，我们提出一个对鹿特丹港的实证案例研究。我们采访了43个港口专家在鹿特丹市的港口。首先,我们处理集群治理的重要性为了集聚的绩效。在接下来的四个段落里，我

8、们讨论了四个变量影响集群治理质量的实证结果。第六，我们也简要的讨论港口当局在鹿特丹市的作用并最后得出结论。4.1集群治理的重要性在鹿特丹港口群这些研究结果表明一般来说集群治理是同样的重要与集群结构和经济发展，但更重要的是国际和国内政策。专家们也要求它们的排名表明集群治理四个变量的相对重要性。4.2信任在鹿特丹港口群几乎所有集群专家们都同意信任是很重要的对集群治理质量这一观点，如上所述，认为信任是最重要的治理变量。集群专家评估关于信任的存在在鹿特丹港和它的主要竞争对手安特卫普和汉堡。4.3领导公司在鹿特丹的港口群几乎所有集群专家也同意领导公司的存在是集群治理质量的重要因素。专家评估三个竞争港口如

9、下：鹿特丹安特卫普汉堡领导公司存在2.02.3b1.5b明显优于最坏港口安特卫普被评为最积极的、汉堡得分最低。总的来说,专家表明这三个港口是评分方面相对较好的领导企业。4.4中介机构在鹿特丹的港口群关于中介机构,有相当多数专家同意假定中介机构对集群治理有积极作用，但43个专家中有9个不同意。4.5解决集体行动问题在鹿特丹港口群最后我们讨论了集体行动问题解决方案的质量。提出了五个集体行动问题建议在港口中，集群专家判断四个相关：问题集体行动问题相关不相关培训和教育38a3市场和推广37 a4腹地进入创新29 a12国际化1328 aa相当多数4.6港口当局的作用在鹿特丹市鹿特丹市港口当局（RMPM

10、）是一个公共的地主港。该组织是一个正式的为鹿特丹港市的一部分，但是很大一部分有经营自主权。目前, 修改体制结构，港口当局授予更多的自主权，改变监测和控制功能，从市议会到独立董事会的讨论。然而,即使当建议新构架被批准后，市政当局仍然是主要的主导者。5、结论在本文中,我们认为港口集群治理分析增加了我们了解港口竞争, 港口发展和港口的功能。我们已经提供了一份分析框架用于分析（港口）集群治理。集群治理的质量取决于在一个集群中的交易费用和“协调无价的范围”。而四个变量同时影响治理质量：领导公司的存在，中介机构的存在，信任水平和解决集体行动问题的能力。集群治理的评估可以通过分析这四个变量。在这种方法中,

11、港口当局不再是中心位置，他们在集群治理中仍起着重要作用，但他们的作用是与私营企业的活动，协会及公私机构相互联系的。港口当局的活动范围从而被分析在更广泛的框架中。外文翻译Governance In Seaport Clusters Peter W. de Erlangen 1. IntroductionApart from well-known physical factors such as the location, maritime accessibility and hinterland infrastructure, the governance of seaports is an i

12、mportant determinant of their performance.An analysis of the governance of seaports has mostly been limited to the role of the port authority. Notwithstanding the central role of port authorities in ports, we argue that an analysis of governance in seaports requires attention for the role of （privat

13、e） firms. Institutional economic literature offers a useful framework for ana lysing advantages and disadvantages of alternative governance mechanisms and provides a basis for ana lysing the roles of port authorities. In this paper we deal with the issue of cluster governance in seaports and illustr

14、ate our approach with an analysis of the port of Rotterdam.First, we briefly discuss the theoretical foundations of the cluster governance concept. Second, we discuss the role of port authorities in the governance of seaports. Third, we present empirical results of a survey among 43 cluster experts

15、in Rotterdam on the governance of Rotterdams port cluster. We feminality the paper with conclusions.2.The Quality Of Cluster Governance We define cluster governance as the mix of and relations between various mechanisms of coordination used in a cluster. The quality of the governance differs between

16、 clusters. The quality depends on the level of coordination costs and the scope of coordination beyond price. Low coordination costs and much coordination beyond price improve the quality of governance.When the benefits of coordination are distributed unequally, when （the threat of） opportunistic be

17、haviour prevents coordination or when benefits of coordination are uncertain, coordination beyond price does not arise spontaneously or instantaneously, even when benefits of coordination exceed costs. Therefore there is in general a shortage of coordination beyond price. More coordination beyond pr

18、ice improves the quality of the governance of clusters.2.1Trust In clusters where the level of trust is high, （average） transaction costs are relatively low, because of low costs to specify contracts and low monitoring costs. Furthermore, costs of coordination beyond price are lower and as a consequ

19、ence, more coordination beyond price will arise. The level of trust in a cluster is influenced by the importance of reputation effects in a cluster. If reputation effects are strong, abusing trust has negative effects and therefore a culture of trust is sustained.2.2 IntermediariesThe presence of in

20、termediaries lowers coordination costs and expands the scope of coordination beyond price, for three related reasons. First, they provide a bridging tie （Weevily and Zachery, 1999） between two or more otherwise not connected exchange partners. Second, intermediaries reduce coordination costs because

21、 they connect cognitions. Intermediaries can bridge cognitive differences between firms that operate in different market environments. This role of connecting cognitions is especially important in clusters given the fact that clusters are characterism by a cognitive division of Limbourg （Belus and T

22、ardigrada, 2000）. 2.3Leader firmsLeader firms are strategic Centre with superior coordination skills and the ability to steer change （Lorenz and Baden fuller, 1995）. The behaviour of leader firms influences the performance of the cluster as a whole, because leader firms have both the ability and inc

23、entive to invest in the competitiveness of a whole network of firms. We identify three investments of leader firms with positive effects （these can be termed leader firm externalities） on other firms in the cluster: Internationalism; innovation; contributing to solving collective action problems （Ol

24、son, 1971）Thus, leader firms can enable or even enforce cooperation and for that reason add to the performance of clusters. 2.4Collective action in clustersThe problem of collective action （Olson, 1971） is relevant in clusters. Even when collective benefits of co-operation to achieve collective goal

25、s exceed （collective） costs, such co-operation does not （always） develop spontaneously. Different CAPs （Collective Action Problems）, such as education and training and innovation are relevant in clusters. For each CAP a governance regime arises. In this context, a regime can be defined as a relative

26、ly stable collaborative agreement that provides actors with the capacity to overcome collective action problems.3.Port authorities as cluster managersEven though a variety of actors play a role in the governance of a seaport cluster, the port authority is the most central actor. The term cluster man

27、ager can be used to describe the role of the port authority. We discuss the role of a cluster manager in general, the institutional position of port authorities and sources of revenue and investment decisions of port authorities. 3.1 The role of a cluster managerA perfect cluster manager would be an

28、 galvanization with the following four characteristics.1. A cluster manager has incentives to invest in the cluster, because its revenues are related to the performance of the cluster. The perfect cluster manager would receive a share of the value added generated in the cluster as revenue, for insta

29、nce through a cluster tax.2. A cluster manager invests in activities with cluster benefits （instead of firm specific benefits）. Furthermore, the cluster manager aims to invest when cluster benefits exceed costs.3. A cluster manager aims to distribute investment costs for investments to those firms t

30、hat benefit. This involves co-finance arrangements with a specific group of beneficiary firms.4. A cluster manager operates self-sustaining: over time investments equal revenues.The port authority matches all four criteria: they have incentives and resources to invest in the cluster. The port dues and lease revenues are resources to invest in the port cluster. Furthermore, they generally are self-sustaining and invest in the performance of the cluster as a whole. Port authorities invest in activities with general benefits, such as port expansion, s