合约解释 第六章 语境Word文件下载.docx

1、“If there is one principle more clearly established than another in English law it is surely this: it is for the court to construe a written document. It is irrelevant and improper to ask what the parties, prior to the execution of the instrument, intended or understood. What is the meaning of the l

2、anguage that they have used therein? That is the problem, and the only problem. In saying that, I do not mean to assert that no evidence can be admitted. Indeed, the contrary is clear. If a deed relates to Black Acre, you may have evidence to show what are the parcels. If a document is in a foreign

3、language, you may have an interpreter. If it contains technical terms, an expert may explain them. If, according to the custom of a trade or the usage of the market, a word has acquired a secondary meaning, evidence may be given to prove it. A well-known instance is where in a particular trade 1000

4、rabbits meant 1200. But unless the case can be brought within some or one of these exceptions, it is the duty of the court, which is presumed to understand the English language, to construe the document according to the ordinary grammatical meaning of the words used therein, and without reference to

5、 anything which has previously passed between the parties to it.”。上述的说法可以说是与一个不懂法律人士的思维方式很不一样，后者会马上想到如果去解释一个合约的真正订约意图，最简单的办法就是把订约双方请来，要求他们作出解释。但这其实也不简单，因为他们有了争议就肯定会是南辕北辙地作出自己的解释，变了去接受这种主观的订约意图是只会令整个争议更加复杂与无所适从。这在G Dworkin, OdgersConstruction of Deeds and Statutes （5th edn, 1967） （Odgers）中有提及：“To a l

6、ayman, the easiest way to answer this question might seem to be to call the parties before the court and ask them what they meant. In that case, the parties would not only usurp the function of the court, but would probably hold entirely different opinions as to what was meant by the words used.”。这一

7、来，在这两种截然不同的思维方式中，孰优孰劣，可去探讨一下。不懂法律人士接受在争议中的订约双方提供合约解释的证据，有几方面的大问题。（一）是英国法律一直以来坚持是去客观看待合约中双方约定的文字去解释，去由订约双方提供证据就变了是有危险接受主观的解释了。（二）是这种证据免不了是对证人自己有利，加上可能解决争议与订约的时间相隔较长，真实性有多少很有怀疑，尤其是口头证据。（三）是双方在争议中提供两个不同的版本通常是不会对法官/仲裁员对合约的解释有真正的帮助，反而会带来混乱。（四）是双方在谈判中经常会改变立场，甚至在每一封来往的信函中讨价还价，这种改变只会到了最后订约的一刻或签署合约时才会“认命”，所以

8、去看谈判过程往往也找不出双方的真正订约意图。上述的一些大问题Wilberforce勋爵在Prenn v. Simmonds （1971） W.L.R. 1381中有提到，说：“On principle, the matter is worth pursuing a little, because the present case illustrates very well the disadvantages and danger of departing from established doctrine and the virtue of the latter. There were pro

9、longed negotiations between solicitors, with exchanges of draft clauses, ultimately emerging in clause 2 of the agreement. The reason for not admitting evidence of these exchanges is not a technical one, or even mainly one of convenience （though the attempt to admit it did greatly prolong the case a

10、nd add to its expense）. It is simply that such evidence is unhelpful. By the nature of things, where negotiations are difficult, the parties positions, with each passing letter, are changing and until the final agreement, though converging still divergent. It is only the final documents which record

11、s a consensus. If the previous documents use different expressions, how does construction as an expression, itself a doubtful process, help on the construction of the contractual words? If the same expressions are used, nothing is gained by looking back; indeed, something may be lost since the relev

12、ant surrounding circumstances may be different. And at this stage there is no consensus to the parties to appeal to. It may be said that previous documents may be looked to explain the aims of the parties. In a limited sense this is true: the commercial, or business object, of the transaction, objec

13、tively ascertained, may be a surrounding fact and if it can be shown that one interpretation completely frustrates that object, to the extent of rendering the contract futile, that may be a strong argument for an alternative interpretation, if that can reasonably be found. But beyond that it may be

14、difficult to go: it may be a matter of degree, or of judgment, how far one interpretation, or another, gives effect to a common intention: parties, indeed may be pursuing that intention with differing emphasis and hoping to achieve to an represent a formula which means different things to each side,

15、 yet may be accepted because that is the only way to get agreement and in the hope that disputes will not arise. The only course can then be try to ascertain the natural meaning. Far more common, and indeed, totally dangerous is to admit evidence of one partys objectiveeven if this known to the othe

16、r party.”。1.2 文字表达的不足之处但这一个传统解释合约做法受到批评，原因之一就是文字上的表达可以有好几个不同的解释，甚至也不能简单说它们之间有什么合理与不合理之分。 再去举一个简单的例子（虽然在其他章节已经给了不少例子例如在第五章第5段），以“consideration”一字为例，Webster字典就给了4个十分不同的解释。（一）是考虑（deliberation），（二）是尊重他人或为他人着想（respect for others, thoughtful regard），（三）是一个行动的原因（a motive for action, reason），（四）是报酬/支付（remun

17、eration, payment）。可以说，在一些商业或与法律有关的文件中，只有第四个解释才比较适用，可视为是合约中的约因或对价。所以，转去看Oxford Law Dictionary，对“consideration”一字的解释就只有针对第四个解释，如：“Consideration may be a promise to do or forbear from doing something, or some loss or detriment suffered at the request of the promisor. It is normally a payment, transfer

18、of goods, doing of services or surrender of another legal claim. It cannot be anything which the promisee is already under an obligation to do. It must be of some value, but not necessarily value equivalent or adequate to the promise.”。这表示了去解释合约文字，除了看字典的一般性与传统解释（conventional meaning），还要去看看合约的本质（cont

19、ext）才能作出准确的解释。另要去看是双方在订约时的背景（background）才能更加准确地掌握双方所用文字是应该代表什么解释，也就是该文字的语境（factual matrix）。这些背景往往就是在双方的谈判过程中，其中会显示了双方对合约的某一条文/文字的共同理解，等。而这样做重要的地方倒不是合理与否的问题，而是这才代表了双方订约时用某一些文字的真正意图。1.3 目前解释看来是双方接受的完整文书合约条文/文字要考虑的三个方面所以现在有关解释合约条文/文字的法律地位应该是要考虑三个方面。（一）是合约本身，包括其他所有的条文以作出全面、完整与协调的解释；（二）是合约的本质，例如是涉及保险、货物买

20、卖、航运或建筑的本质；（三）是订约时的背景/语境。只去在无数先例中（部分已经在本书其他章节有介绍）先举一个去显示根据合约本质或语境作出的解释，它是The “Zeus V” （1999） 1 Lloyds Rep. 703先例，其中保单的保证是一个对受保游艇的检验（survey）的先决条件。但明示条文并没有去详尽说明这检验是要包括些什么。本来，“检验”只是非常一般性与通用的一字，对游艇随便看看可以是一个检验，对游艇全面去在干坞检查花上好几天时间也可以是一个检验，所以在该先例是应该给这个文字什么解释呢？对要求赔付的游艇船东，他当然是希望检验的解释是尽量宽松，因为他的确是进行了一个简单的检验说是满意

21、，而且这检验也不包括要把检验的结果在风险产生前去交出给保险商。但不想赔付的保险商自然是希望“检验”一字有一个严格的解释，包括像针对适航，乘客的安全，船舶要进干坞（表示对船底也要检验），要打开主机，进行海上试航（sea trial），船舶重心测验，等。同时这个检验不可以有不同的检验师去进行与任何不妥之处全部要修复，等等。在这些对“检验”一字有好几个不同的解释，Colman大法官就是根据订约时的语境（factual matrix）与保险合约的本质（context）判这检验是通常投保这种风险的保险商所需要的范围，这也要靠专家证人的意见证据了。而判决的结果是认为该简单检验不足去满足一个合理的保险商要求

22、，所以不必作出赔付。Colman大法官是这样判：“ a condition survey should have been satisfactory in the sense that it gave rise to no defects or recommendations in respect of seaworthiness or passenger safety; and whereas it was not a precondition of the continuance of the cover that underwriters would be provided with a

23、 report and that they should approve it, nevertheless the assured would have to provide such report for the purpose of evidencing compliance with the subject condition;The subject condition was not to be construed as necessarily imposing on the assured a requirement that there should be an out of th

24、e water survey or the opening up of machinery or sea trials or stability tests after completion of the refit and before the commencement of the in commission period; the nature of the survey required, on the proper construction of the condition was one which was to be no more stringent than in all t

25、he circumstances would reasonably be necessary to satisfy the underwriters of the vessels seaworthiness and safety; only if it were inadequate for this purpose would the underwriter be entitled to treat themselves as off risk once the period of commission had started;The subject condition required a

26、ny condition survey and valuation to be entirely conducted and the results recorded by the same independent qualified surveyor and not partly by an anonymous governmental surveyor in respect of some aspects of the vessel and partly by another surveyor engaged by the assured in respect of other aspec

27、ts of the vessel; the fact that the SVL report referred to what was stated to be the results of the MMM inspections ashore and afloat did not amount to a survey report in respect of those results; the survey conducted by SVL was insufficiently comprehensive to satisfy the reasonable requirement of a

28、n underwriter for the purpose of the subject condition; it followed that the condition was not complied with and the underwriters were not at risk at the time of the loss;”。再举一个通俗一点的例子让读者更容易明白，中国人简单的一句话“要你好看”如果当时的环境是在吵架，显然就有威胁与敌意的味道。但如果当时的环境是一位化妆师与她的顾客讲了同一句话，这就完全是不同味道了。所以，在最近的30年，英国法律有了许多重要案例去强调在解释合

29、约必须先去考虑订约时的背景（background）才能理解文字或条文的本质，这背景可被称为“语境”（factual matrix）。虽然早在River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson （1877） 2 App Cas 743, HL中Blackburn勋爵就已经提到这一方面说：“But, from the imperfection of language, it is impossible to know what that intention is without inquiring farther, and seeing what the circumstanc

30、es were with reference to which the words were used, and what was the object, appearing from those circumstances, which the person using them had in view, for the meaning of words varies according to the circumstances with respect to which they were used.”。但以前的传统解释合约做法，即基本上避免去考虑语境，也不去接受一些需要去证明语境的文书合

31、约以外的外来证据（extrinsic evidence），有很大不同。“语境”也发展到以往是遇上合约中有含糊（ambiguity）或不肯定（uncertainty）之处才去考虑至目前是即使合约中清楚明确的表达也会考虑语境。目前的地位可节录上诉庭在Static Control Components （Europe） Ltd v. Egan （2004） 2 Lloyds Rep. 429所说的：“ in principle, all contracts had to be construed in the light of their factual background, that background being ascertained on an objective basis; accordingly, the fact that a document appeared to have a clear meaning on its face did not prevent, or indeed excuse the Court from looking at the background; the judge had b