专业外文文献翻译Word文档格式.doc

1、附 录1：#英文原文#The Renminbis Dollar Peg at The Crossroads#In the face of huge balance of payments surpluses and internal inflationary pressures, China has been in a classic conflict between internal and external balance under its dollar currency-basket peg. Over the longer term, Chinas large, modernizin

2、g, and diverse economy will need exchange rate flexibility and, eventually, convertibility with open capital markets. A feasible and attractive exit strategy from the essentially fixed RMB exchange rate would be a two-stage approach, consistent with the steps already taken since July 2005, but going

3、 beyond them. First, establish a limited trading band for the RMB relative to a basket of major trading partner currencies. Set the band so that it allows some initial revaluation of the RMB against the dollar, manage the basket rate within the band if necessary, and widen the band over time as dome

4、stic foreign exchange markets develop. Second, put on hold ad hoc measures of financial account liberalization. They will be less helpful for relieving exchange rate pressures once the RMB basket rate is allowed to move flexibly within a band, and they are best postponed until domestic foreign excha

5、nge markets develop further, the exchange rate is fully flexible, and the domestic financial system has been strengthened and placed on a market-oriented basis.# From 1997 until July 21, 2005, the Chinese authorities pegged the renminbi（RMB） price of the United States dollar within a narrow range. O

6、n July 21, 2005, Chinas authorities moved to an adjustable basket peg against the dollar, with a revaluation of the central RMB/$ rate of 2.1 percent relative to the prior central rate of RMB 8.28 per dollar. # Very notably in view of the claims that Chinas exchange rate policy is dictated by the im

7、perative of maintaining an undervalued currency, the authorities resisted substantial devaluation pressures, at the cost of some deflation, during the Asian crisis period starting in 1997. For some time now the situation has been reversed, with strong revaluation pressures, speculative capital inflo

8、ws, and gathering inflationary momentum in the economy. The ability to resist speculative pressures comes from the maintenance of restrictions on private capital flows, especially inflows, as well as from administrative controls useful in restraining inflation.# Nonetheless, “hot money” inflows have

9、 helped swell Chinas foreign reserves immensely in recent years. Prior to July 21, 2005, most observers, and indeed the Chinese government itself, acknowledged that Chinas exchange-rate arrangements were unsustainable and undesirable as a long-term foundation for responding, without disruptive episo

10、des of inflation or deflation, to inevitable real-side shocks, as well as to secular changes in the economy such as real appreciation due to Balassa-Samuelson effects. At the time of unification, the parallel rate already stood at a depreciated level relative to the official rate. Revaluation-cum-“f

11、lexation” is a response to the situation, including the external trade pressures it had generated, but leaves questions about how flexibility will be exploited in the future. # So far, even the #0.3 percent margins of RMB/$ flexibility that exist have not been utilized fully. Furthermore, capital ma

12、rkets that are open to the world seem a prerequisite for a modern high-income economy such as China seeks eventually to become. The issues concern the transition. how might China best move toward a genuinely more flexible exchange-rate regime. And how might it best dismantle capital controls. And ho

13、w might it optimally sequence these two conceptually distinct liberalization initiatives.# In the following pages I have four goals. First, to provide a brief overview of developments in Chinas real exchange rate, external accounts, and inflation, thereby filling in some concomitants of the nominal

14、exchange rate trajectory in Figure. Second, to draw parallels with the experience of Germany （still the worlds premier exporter）during the Bretton Woods era. Third, to discuss the rather successful experiences of Chile and Israel in transiting from pegged exchange rates with capital controls to floa

15、ting rates with financial opening. Fourth and finally, to sketch a blueprint for gradually flexing the RMBs exchange rate in advance of capital-account liberalization. A feature of the basket system is that intervention in support of the basket rate could still be carried out entirely in the RMB/$ m

16、arket. The reason is that the basket can be implemented entirely through a variable RMB/$ exchange rate target. As a technical matter, the band could be redefined each morning using the exchange dollar rates prevailing earlier that day in the Tokyo markets. Or it could be updated more frequently. The decision to peg to a basket is also separable in principle from the decision on the denomination of foreign-currency reserves. Diversification of official reserves in line with