银行信用卡：非理性消费和市场力量外文翻译Word格式文档下载.docx

1、外文翻译#原文#Bank Credit Cards:#Consumer Irrationality versus Market Forces#Materia Source：#Winter#Author:#Thomas F. Cargill, Jeanne Wendell#The credit card industry evolved from relatively small beginnings following World War I1 to the current position where credit cards represent a major financial serv

2、ice used by the majority of households across all income classes （Table 1）. （See Canner and Luckett （1992） and Kennickell and Shack-Marquez （1992） for more detail.） This growth accelerated in the 1970s and 1980s as part of the dramatic increase in the variety of financial assets and services that ac

3、companied deregulation （Cargill and Garcia 1985）. The rigidity of explicit bankcard interest rates, in the face of variations in other interest rates, raises controversial policy issues. The rate rigidity suggests to some observers significant noncompetitive elements in the credit card industry, req

4、uiring enhanced regulatory oversight and constraints on the bankcard industry. In 1985 and again in 1991,Congress considered legislation to impose a national ceiling on credit card interest rates and/or require credit card interest rates to vary in response to a specific index such as the cost of fu

5、nds to banks or an open market interest rate such as the Treasury bill rate. These legislative proposals did not receive sufficient support to be enacted. At least five factors can be identified that influenced the decision not to impose interest rate constraints on bank credit cards.#First, as fina

6、ncial deregulation led to dramatic increases in competition throughout the financial system, it was difficult to accept the hypothesis that the credit card industry was characterized by noncompetitive pricing. Second, the structural characteristics of the industry, with almost 6,000 depository insti

7、tutions issuing cards, suggest that price fixing would be difficult at best. Third, economic theory and some empirical work on the characteristics of the industry provide market-based explanations for much, if not all, of the credit card interest rate rigidity. Fourth, the disruptive effects of usur

8、y limits and Regulation Q during the 1970s were still fresh in the minds of policy makers.# Fifth, credit card interest rates started to decline in late 1992 and the credit card industry became noticeably more competitive （Canner and Luckett 1992, 665-666）.#The policy debate over bankcard regulation

9、 has not ended for two reasons. First, the spread between credit card interest rates and the cost of funds will likely remain larger than the spread observed for other forms of bank credit. Second, the debate is likely to expand from sticky interest rates and high spreads to issues of discrimination

10、, judged by other discrimination-related concerns in the banking industry in recent years.#Further, the controversy over the need for government intervention in the credit card industry reflects two opposing views in the academic literature regarding the strength of market forces in the industry. Th

11、e inefficient-market view is detailed in a recent contribution by Ausubel （1991）, while the efficient-market view is explained by Canner and Luckett （1992） and Pozdena （1991）.#Life-Style Analysis of Major Bank Credit Card Users#The use of commercial bank credit cards is rising tremendously and is be

12、coming a #way of life# with many American consumers. In 1970, the two major bank credit cards, Master Charge and Visa, were reported to be issued by well over 6,000 banks. Moreover, each of the major card institutions claimed slightly more than 20 million cardholders, with both predicting major incr

13、eases by the 1980s. With the trend toward increased credit card purchasing, banks and retailing institutions must become increasingly concerned with identifying the credit card user segment of the market.#Perhaps the first attempts to segment the credit market were made by Slocum and Mathews in the

14、late 1960s and early 1970s. Specifically, they examined the relationship between social class and income as an indicator of credit card usage. In both studies, credit card holders demonstrated different shopping behavior/credit card usage patterns with respect to social class membership. For example

15、, members of the lower social classes were more likely to use their cards for installment purposes while upper classes used their cards more often for convenience. These differences were observed to be related to social class values, which may be applicable in segmenting the credit card market.#Ausu

16、bel （1991, 71） argues that the bankcard market does not operate as a competitive spot market because credit card holders are irrational. They do not search for low credit card interest rates because they expect to use the cards only for transaction convenience, not as a source of credit. In doing so, according to this theory, they substantially underestimate the probability they will accrue outstanding balances and pay unnecessarily high rates of interest on these unanticipat