科斯企业的性质英文版.docx

1、科斯企业的性质英文版科斯：企业的性质(英文版)The Nature of the Firm (1937)R. H. COASEEconomic theory has suffered in the past from a failure to state clearly its assumption. Economists in building up a theory have often omitted to examine the foundations on which it was erected. This examination is, however, essential no

2、t only to prevent the misunderstanding and needles controversy which arise from a lack of knowledge of the assumptions on which a theory is based, but also because of the extreme importance for economics of good judgment in choosing between rival sets of assumptions. For instance, it is suggested th

3、at the use of the word “ firm ” in economics may be different from the use of the term by the “plain man.” Since there is apparently a trend in economic theory towards starting analysis with the individual firm and not with the industry,2 it is ail the more necessary not only that a clear definition

4、 of the word firm should be given but that its difference from a firm in the real world, if it aists, should be made clear. Mrs. Robinson has said that the two questions to be asked of a set of assumptions in economics are: Are they tractable? and: Do they correspond with the real world?3 Though, as

5、 Mrs. Robinson points out, More often one set will be manageable and the other realistic, yet there may well be branches of theory where assumptions may be both manageable and realistic. It is hoped to show in the following paper that a definition of a firm may be obtained which is not only realisti

6、c in that it corresponds to what is meant by a firm in the real world, but is tractable by two of the most powerful instruments of economic analysis developed by Marshall, the idea of the margin and that of substitution, together giving the idea of substitution at the margin.4 Our definition must, o

7、f course, relate to formal relations which are capable of being conceived exactly.51It is convenient if, in searching for a definition of a firm, we first consider the economic system as it is normally treated by the economist. Let us consider the des cription of the economic system given by Sir Art

8、hur Salter6. “The normal economic system works itself. For its current operation it is under no central control, it needs no central survey. Over the whole range of human activity and human need, supply is adjusted to demand, and production to consumption, by a process that is automatic, elastic and

9、 responsive.” An economist thinks of the economic system as being co-ordinated by the price mechanism and society becomes not an organization but an organism.7 The economic system “works itself. This does not mean that there is no planning by individuals. These exercise foresight and choose between

10、alternatives. This is necessarily so if there is to be order in the system But this theory assumes that the direction of resources is dependent directly on the price The Nature of the Firm (1937) R. H. COASE2mechanism. Indeed, it is often considered to be an objection to economic planning that it me

11、rely tries to do what is already done by the price mechanism.8 Sir Arthur Salters des cription, however, gives a very incomplete picture of our economic system. Within a firm, the des cription does not fit at all. For instance, in economic theory we find that the allocation of factors of production

12、between different uses is determined by the price mechanism. The price of factor A becomes higher in X than in Y. As a result, A moves from Y to X until the difference between the prices in X and Y, except if 50 far as it compensates for other differential advantages, disappears. Yet in the real wor

13、ld, we find that there are many areas where this does not apply. If a workman moves from department Y to department X, he does not go because of a change in relative prices, but because he is ordered to do 50. Those who object to economic planning on the grounds that the problem is solved by price m

14、ovements can be answered by pointing out that there is planning within our economic system which is quite different from the individual planning mentioned above and which is akin to what is normally called economic planning. The example given above is typical of a large sphere in our modem economic

15、system. 0f course, this fact has not been ignored by economists. Marshall introduces organization as a fourth factor of production; J.B. Clark gives the co-ordinating function to the entrepreneur; Professor Knight introduces managers who co-ordinate. As D. H. Robertson points out, we find islands of

16、 conscious power in this ocean of unconscious co-operation like lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of buttermilk. ” 9 But in view of the fact that it is usually argued that co-ordination will be done by the price mechanism, why is such organization necessary? Why are there these islands of consci

17、ous power? Outside the firm, price movements direct production, which is coordinated through a series of exchange transactions on the market. Within a firm, these markets transactions are eliminated and in place of the complicated market structure with exchange transactions is substituted the entrep

18、reneurco-ordinator, who directs production.10 It is clear that these are alternative methods of co-ordinating production. Yet, having regard to the fact that if production is regulated by price movements, production could be carried on without any organization at all, well might we ask, why is there

19、 any organization?0f course, the degree to which the price mechanism is superseded varies greatly. In a department store, the allocation of the different sections to the various locations in the building may be done by the controlling authority or it may be the result of competitive price bidding fo

20、r space. In the Lancashire cotton industry, a weaver can rent power and shop-room and can obtain looms and yarn on credit.11This co-ordination of the various factors of production is, however, normally carried out without the intervention of the price mechanism. As is evident, the amount of “ vertic

21、al ” integration, involving as it does the supersession of the price mechanism, varies greatly The Nature of the Firm (1937) R. H. COASE3 from industry to industry and from firm to firm. It can, I think, be assumed that the distinguishing mark of the firm is the supersession of the price mechanism.

22、It is, of course, as Professor Robbins points out, “ related to an outside network of relative prices and costs,”12 but it is important to discover the exact nature of this relationship. This distinction between the allocation of resources in a firm and the allocation in the economic system has been

23、 very vividly described by Mr. Maurice Dobb when discussing Adam Smiths conception of the capitalist: “ It began to be seen that there was something more important than the relations inside each factory or unit captained by an undertaker; there were the relations of the undertaker with the rest of t

24、he economic world outside his immediate sphere. the undertaker busies himself with the division of labour inside each firm and he plans and organises consciously,” but “ he is related to the much larger economic specialisation, of which he himself is merely one specialised unit. Here, he plays his p

25、art as a single ceIl in a larger organism, mainly unconscious of the wider r?le he fills. ”13In view of the fact that while economists treat the price mechanism as a coordinating instrument, the? also admit the co-ordinating function of the “ entrepreneur,” it is surely important to enquire why co-o

26、rdination is the work of the price mechanism in one case and of the entrepreneur in another. The purpose of this paper is to bridge what appears to be a gap in economic theory between the assumption (made for some purposes) that resources are allocated by means of the price mechanism and the assumpt

27、ion (made for other purposes) that this allocation is dependent on the entrepreneur-co-ordinator. We have to explain the basis on which, in practice, this choice between alternatives is effected.14 IIOur task is to attempt to discover why a firm emerges at ah in a specialized exchange economy. The p

28、rice mechanism (considered purely from the side of the direction of resources) might be superseded if the relationship which replaced it was desired for its own sake. This would be the case, for example, if some people preferred to work under the direction of some other person. Such individuals woul

29、d accept less in order to work under someone, and firms would arise naturally from this. But it would appear that this cannot be a very important reason, for it would rather seem that the opposite tendency is operating if one judges from the stress normally laid on the advantage of “ being ones own

30、master;” 15 0f course, if the desire was not to be controlled but to control, to exercise power over others, then people might be willing to give Up something in order to direct others; that is, they would be willing to pay others more than they could get under the price mechanism in order The Natur

31、e of the Firm (1937) R. H. COASE4 to be able to direct them. But this implies that those who direct pay in order to be able to do this and are not paid to direct, which is clearly not true in the majority of cases.16 Firms might also exist if purchasers preferred commodities which are produced by fi

32、rms to those not 50 produced; but even in spheres where one would expect such preferences (if they exist) to be of negligible importance, firms are to be found in the real world.17 Therefore there must be other elements involved.The main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to

33、be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism. The most obvious cost of “organizing ” production through the price mechanism is that of discovering what the relevant prices are.18 This cost may be reduced but it will not be eliminated by the emergence of specialists who will sell this information. The costs of negotiating and concluding a