What Washington Means by Policy Reform.docx

1、What Washington Means by Policy ReformWhat Washington Means by Policy Reformby John Williamson, Peterson Institute for International Economics Chapter 2 from Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?Edited by John Williamson. Published April 1990.November 2002 Peterson Institute for Internat

2、ional EconomicsNo statement about how to deal with the debt crisis in Latin America would be complete without a call for the debtors to fulfill their part of the proposed bargain by setting their houses in order, undertaking policy reforms, or submitting to strong conditionality. The question posed

3、in this paper is what such phrases mean, and especially what they are generally interpreted as meaning in Washington. Thus the paper aims to set out what would be regarded in Washington as constituting a desirable set of economic policy reforms. An important purpose in doing this is to establish a b

4、aseline against which to measure the extent to which various countries have implemented the reforms being urged on them.The paper identifies and discusses 10 policy instruments about whose proper deployment Washington can muster a reasonable degree of consensus. In each case an attempt is made to su

5、ggest the breadth of the consensus, and in some cases I suggest ways in which I would wish to see the consensus view modified. The paper is intended to elicit comment on both the extent to which the views identified do indeed command a consensus and on whether they deserve to command it. It is hoped

6、 that the country studies to be guided by this background paper will comment on the extent to which the Washington consensus is shared in the country in question, as well as on the extent to which that consensus has been implemented and the results of its implementation (or nonimplementation).The Wa

7、shington of this paper is both the political Washington of Congress and senior members of the administration and the technocratic Washington of the international financial institutions, the economic agencies of the US government, the Federal Reserve Board, and the think tanks. The Institute for Inte

8、rnational Economics made a contribution to codifying and propagating several aspects of the Washington consensus in its publication Toward Renewed Economic Growth in Latin America (Balassa et al. 1986). Washington does not, of course, always practice what it preaches to foreigners.The 10 topics arou

9、nd which the paper is organized deal with policy instruments rather than objectives or outcomes. They are economic policy instruments that I perceive Washington to think important, as well as on which some consensus exists. It is generally assumed, at least in technocratic Washington, that the stand

10、ard economic objectives of growth, low inflation, a viable balance of payments, and an equitable income distribution should determine the disposition of such policy instruments.There is at least some awareness of the need to take into account the impact that some of the policy instruments in questio

11、n can have on the extent of corruption. Corruption is perceived to be pervasive in Latin America and a major cause of the regions poor performance in terms of both low growth and inegalitarian income distribution. These implications will be mentioned below where they seem to be important.Washington

12、certainly has a number of other concerns in its relationship with its Latin neighbors (and, for that matter, with other countries) besides furthering their economic well-being. These include the promotion of democracy and human rights, suppression of the drug trade, preservation of the environment,

13、and control of population growth. For better or worse, however, these broader objectives play little role in determining Washingtons attitude toward the economic policies it urges on Latin America. Limited sums of money may be offered to countries in return for specific acts to combat drugs, to save

14、 tropical forests, or (at least prior to the Reagan administration) to promote birth control, and sanctions may occasionally be imposed in support of democracy or human rights, but there is little perception that the policies discussed below have important implications for any of those objectives. P

15、olitical Washington is also, of course, concerned about the strategic and commercial interests of the United States, but the general belief is that these are best furthered by prosperity in the Latin countries. The most obvious possible exception to this perceived harmony of interests concerns the U

16、S national interest in continued receipt of debt service from Latin America. Some (but not all) believe this consideration to have been important in motivating Washingtons support for policies of austerity in Latin America during the 1980s.Fiscal DeficitsWashington believes in fiscal discipline. Con

17、gress enacted Gramm-Rudman-Hollings with a view to restoring a balanced budget by 1993. Presidential candidates deplore budget deficits before and after being elected. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has long made the restoration of fiscal discipline a central element of the high-conditionalit

18、y programs it negotiates with its members that wish to borrow. Among right-wing think tanks there may be a few believers in Ricardian equivalencethe notion that individuals adjust their saving behavior to anticipate future taxation, so that whether public expenditure is financed by taxation or bonds

19、 has no impact on aggregate demandwho are prepared to deny the danger of large fiscal deficits, but they clearly stand outside the Washington consensus. Left-wing believers in Keynesian stimulation via large budget deficits are almost an extinct species.Differences of view exist, however, as to whet

20、her fiscal discipline need necessarily imply a balanced budget. One view is that a deficit is acceptable as long as it does not result in the debt-GNP ratio rising. An even more relaxed criterion would net off that part of the increased debt that has a counterpart in productive public capital format

21、ion and simply seek to prevent an increase in the net liabilities of the public sector relative to GNP. Another modification, which I find persuasive although much of Washington regards it as too Keynesian to endorse explicitly, argues that a balanced budget (or at least a nonincreasing debt-GNP rat

22、io) should be a minimal medium-run norm, but that short-run deficits and surpluses around that norm should be welcomed insofar as they contribute to macroeconomic stabilization. (Note that Gramm-Rudman-Hollings is automatically suspended if the US economy goes into recession.) A variant of that view

23、, held in some quarters where Keynesian is regarded as a term of abuse, is that progress toward the medium-term goal of a balanced budget should be sufficiently cautious to avoid the risk of precipitating a recession.The budget deficit has traditionally been measured in nominal terms, as the excess

24、of government expenditures over receipts. In 1982 Brazil argued with the IMF that this way of measuring the deficit is seriously misleading in a high-inflation country, where most of the nominal interest payments on government debt are really accelerated amortization of principal. The IMF has accept

25、ed this argument (Tanzi 1989), if initially with some reluctance, and hence it sometimes now pays attention to the operational deficit, which includes in expenditure only the real component of interest paid on government debt. (Political Washington has not yet discovered this sensible innovation, wh

26、ich thus remains to be exploited as a means of relaxing the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings constraints when these threaten to bite.) Indeed, Tanzi (1989) also indicates that in formulating programs the Fund has increasingly been using the primary deficit, which excludes all interest payments from the deficit

27、, on the ground that this includes only items that are in principle directly controllable by the authorities. (That goes too far for my taste, since real interest payments certainly have implications for aggregate demand and the evolution of the real debt of the public sector.)The exaggeration of bu

28、dget deficits by inclusion of the inflationary component of interest on government debt is not the only inadequacy of public-sector accounting. Most of the other questionable practices seem to involve understatement of the true deficit: Contingent expenditures, such as the guarantees given to saving

29、s and loan institutions in the United States, are rarely included in reported budget outlays. Interest subsidies and some other expenditures are sometimes provided by the central bank rather than from the budget. Privatization proceeds are sometimes recorded as revenues rather than as a means of fin

30、ancing a fiscal deficit. The buildup of future liabilities of the social security system is not included in budget outlays.Despite the significant differences in the interpretation of fiscal discipline, I would maintain that there is very broad agreement in Washington that large and sustained fiscal

31、 deficits are a primary source of macroeconomic dislocation in the forms of inflation, payments deficits, and capital flight. They result not from any rational calculation of expected economic benefits, but from a lack of the political courage or honesty to match public expenditures and the resource

32、s available to finance them. Unless the excess is being used to finance productive infrastructure investment, an operational budget deficit in excess of around 1 to 2 percent of GNP1 is prima facie evidence of policy failure. Moreover, a smaller deficit, or even a surplus, is not necessarily evidenc

33、e of fiscal discipline: its adequacy needs to be examined in the light of the strength of demand and the availability of private savings.Public Expenditure PrioritiesWhen a fiscal deficit needs to be cut, a choice arises as to whether this should be accomplished by increasing revenues or by reducing expenditures. On