转型国家民营银行的发展研究外文翻译.docx

1、转型国家民营银行的发展研究外文翻译中文3716字 大学毕业设计（论文）外文翻译题 目： 转型国家的银行民营化效率 学 院： 经济与管理学院 专 业： 金融学 班 级： 姓 名： 指导教师： 201* 年 6 月Privatization Matters: Bank Efficiency in Transition CountriesAuthor: Bonin, J. P., Hasan, I., & Wachtel, P.c1. Introduction A construct Banking sectors in the transition economies of Central and

2、 Southeastern Europe were restructured dramatically the 1990s.Beginning with a financial organization that, in most cases, was designed to support the central planning apparatus, new governments moved to create modern commercial banking sectors immediately. The first rudimentary step was to divest c

3、ommercial and retail activities from the portfolios of national banks and to set up new joint-stock banks with universal licenses that were fully state-owned initially. Bank privatization was an essential part of the financial reform agendas in these countries. Although much descriptive work exists

4、on these financial sector reforms and bank privatizations, e.g., Bonin, Mizsei, Szkely, and Wachtel (1998), no systematic empirical work was possible until sufficient time had elapsed to make the construction of a meaningful dataset possible. The basic issue to investigate is whether or not privatiz

5、ation improves bank performance. Although the theoretical literature indicates that private firms should outperform government-owned firms, empirical evidence is needed to confirm this theoretical hypothesis for banks in transition countries.The empirical literature provides evidence of the influenc

6、e of ownership on the performance of individual banks and on the effectiveness of the banking sector. In a cross-country study, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) find that the performance of government-owned banks is inferior to that of private banks. Claessens, Demirgc-Kunt and Huizin

7、ga (2001) investigate performance differences between domestic and foreign banks in eighty countries, both developed and developing, over an eight-year period from 1988 to 1995. These authors find that foreign bank entry was followed by a reduction in both the profitability and the overhead expenses

8、 of domestic banks and that foreign banks in developing countries perform better than do domestic banks. For Latin American countries, Crystal, Dages, and Goldberg (2001) argue that foreign bank entry is associated with improved production of financial services and more banking competition; in addit

9、ion, they claim that it facilitates the early waves of privatization ofgovernment-owned domestic banks. Hence, this empirical literature provides evidence that ownership matters; in particular, government ownership of banks is less efficient than private ownership and foreign bank entry has a saluta

10、ry effect on banking sectors.Much of the empirical literature on banking in transition countries addresses the impact of foreign bank entry on banking efficiency. Hasan and Marton (2003), Drakos (2003), and Fries and Taci (2003) demonstrate that the entry of more efficient foreign banks creates an e

11、nvironment that forces the entire banking system to become more efficient, both directly and indirectly, in transition countries. Buch (2000) compares interest rate spreads in the three fast-track transition countries, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, from 1995 to 1999. She finds evidence con

12、firming the hypothesis that foreign banks create a more competitive market environment in transition economies, but only after they have attained sufficient aggregate market share. A few studies examine the effects of ownership on individual bank efficiency. For Poland, Nikiel and Opiela (2002) find

13、 that foreign banks servicing foreign and business customers are more cost-efficient but less profit-efficient than other banks in Poland. Bonin, Hasan, and Wachtel (2003) examine the performance of banks in eleven transition countries and show that majority foreign ownership is associated with impr

14、oved bank efficiency. However, these authors cannot investigate privatization directly because their data do not distinguish among different types of foreign bank ownership. Studies focusing specifically on the effects of bank privatization are less numerous. Verbrugge, Megginson and Owens (2000) do

15、cument marginal performance improvements and increases in equity among privatized banks in OECD countries. For Argentina, Clark and Cull (1999, 2000) study the privatization process and show that the success of the provincial bank privatization depended on the effectiveness of the buyers. These auth

16、ors find evidence that credit allocation and efficiency are higher in privatized banks. The transformation of the Argentine banking system occurred mainly through domestic mergers and acquisitions so that foreign banks played only a relatively minor role. In the transition countries, the prevalence

17、of foreign strategic owners in formerly state-owned but subsequently privatized banks makes it crucial to distinguish these banks from foreign Greenfield banks when analyzing bank privatization. In this paper, we focus on six relatively advanced transition countries, namely, Bulgaria, the Czech Repu

18、blic, Croatia, Hungary, Poland and Romania. We chose not to include banks in very small transition economies, e.g., the Baltic countries and Slovenia, and those in less advanced transition economies that have only recently restructured the banking system, e.g., the former Soviet Union, Albania and t

19、he other Balkan states. In the next section, we present a brief description of the privatization experiences in these six countries to establish that the strategies and the timing of privatizations are sufficiently different to allow us to use these experiences as the basis for an empirical analysis

20、 of privatization. Section 3 describes our dataset and presents the results of testing for differences in means across bank types for several measures of bank performance and for several bank characteristics. Section 4 characterizes briefly our methodology of deriving profit and cost efficiency meas

21、ures from stochastic frontier estimates that allow for country and year effects directly in a pooled data set. In this section, we relate the bank efficiency scores, as well as a measure of financial performance, to the type of ownership and the method of privatization in second-stage regressions. S

22、ection 5 concludes with a brief summary focusing on policy implications. 2. Bank Privatization in Six Transition Economies Pre-transition banking sectors were designed to meet the needs of a centrally planned economy(CPE).Intermediation between savers and borrowers was internalized within the state

23、banking apparatus basically through a system of directed credits to state-owned enterprises for both investment needs and budget allocations for the working capital necessary to meet the output plan. In most CPEs, large specialty banks performed specific functions. A state savings bank, with an exte

24、nsive branch network, collected virtually all household deposits. A foreign trade bank handled all transactions involving foreign currency. An agricultural bank provided short-term financing to the agricultural sector. on bank funded long-term capital projects and infrastructure development.Hence,ba

25、nking activities were both subservient to the plan and segmented along functional lines in CPEs. In the transition economies (TEs), the first step in banking sector reform involved creating a two-tier system with commercial banking activities carved out of the old central bank. At the beginning of t

26、he decade, the new banking sectors in the former CPEs consisted of the newly created commercial banks and the specialty banks, both types having universal banking licenses, along with a few foreign Greenfield banks and often many relatively undercapitalized Renovo domestic private banks that were bo

27、rn under lax entry requirements.Specialty banks had virtual monopolies in their core activities, e.g., the savings bank was often the only entity with an extensive enough branch network throughout the country to collect primary deposits. Typically, three or four large banks dominated the emerging ba

28、nking sector in a TE. Both the newly created commercial entities and the specialty banks were state-owned initially. Hence, structural segmentation, a proliferation of weak small domestic private banks, and state-ownership of the large banks were the major features of banking sectors in TEs at the b

29、eginning of the 1990s.These legacies affected the banking sectors in all of the countries in our sample with the exception of Croatia, which was part of Yugoslavia. From the 1950s, commercial banks in Croatia as well as the other republics were not state-owned but were owned collectively according t

30、o the Yugoslavian system of self-management. Virtually all foreign exchange deposits collected by the republic-level banks were remitted to the National Bank of Yugoslavia in Belgrade in exchange for credits in dinars. Upon succession in June 1991, the Yugoslavian government froze the foreign exchan

31、ge deposits of Croatian banks. Hence, Croatian banks faced a currency mismatch between assets and liabilities creating large holes in their balance sheets after succession. At the end of 1995, four Croatian banks were selected for government rehabilitation because of the poor quality of their loan p

32、ortfolios. Involvement in this program resulted in these banks being nationalized so that four large state-owned banks were created in Croatia in the middle of the 1990s. The three more advanced TEs, i.e., Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, embarked on significantly different bank privatizations p

33、rograms during the first half of the 1990s. Even before the political change, the Hungarian government had been receptive to foreign bank activity as it allowed three foreign banks to operate in the country from 1985. By the end of 1994, the Hungarian foreign trade bank had been purchased by a foreign owner and foreign investor