挑战者号失事案例与决策分析报告.docx

1、挑战者号失事案例与决策分析报告山西财经大学管理决策期末作业Task 1 翻译 Task 2 案例分析 班级： 项目管理二班 小组： 成员： 日期： 2013/12/23翻译Group Decisi on Fiascoes Con ti nue: Space ShuttleChallenger and a Revised GroupthinkFrameworkGregory Moorhead,i Richard Fere nce,i and Chris P . NeckiThis paper reviews the decisi on situati onsurro un1g the decis

2、i on to launch thespace shuttle Challe nger in January 1986 in the light of the groupth ink hypothesis.A revised framework is presented that proposes time and leadership style as moderators of the manner in which group characteristics lead to groupth ink symptoms.KEY WORDS: groupthink; Challenger;de

3、cisi on making; group characteristics.INTRODUCTIONIn 1972, a new dime nsion was added to our understanding of group decisi on mak ing with the proposal of thegroupth inkhypothesisbyJan is(1972).Jalliscoin edthe termgroupthi nk torefer to a mode ofthi nking that people en gage in whe n they are deepl

4、y in volved in a cohesivein-group,whe n the members strivi ng for unani mity override their motivati ontorealistically appraise altemative courses of actio n(Ja nis, 1972, p. 8). Thehypothesis was supported by his hindsight analysis of several political-military fiascoes and successes that are diffe

5、rentiated by theoccurre nee or non-occurre nee ofan tecede nt con diti ons, groupth inksymptoms, and decisi on making defects.In a subseque nt volume,Ja niSfurther explicates the theory and adds an an alysis of the Watergate tran scripts and various published memoirs and acco unts of prin cipals in

6、volved, con cludi ng that the Watergate cover-up decision also was a result of groupthink(Janis, 1983). Both volumes propose prescripti ons for preve nting the occurre nee of groupth ink, many of which have群体决策Fiascoes继续：航天飞机Challenger和经修订的群体思维框架 格雷戈里穆尔黑德，我理查德费伦 斯，我和 Chris P. Necki本文回顾了形势surroun曲1G到

7、发射 挑战者号航天飞机于1986年1月在群 体思维假说的光的决定的决定。修改 后的框架提出了建议时间和领导风格 的方式版主其中群体特征导致群体思 维症状。关键词：群体思维;挑战者；决策;群体 特征。引言1972年，一个新的层面加入群决 策的群体思维假设由贾尼斯 （1972）建议的理解。Jallis创造了 群体思维”一词来指思维的人从事， 当他们的模式深深卷入组，当成员的 争创一致重写他们的动机评估行动课 程“（詹尼斯，1972年，第8页） 一个有凝聚力的。被他事后几个政治 军事fiascoes和成功是由先前的状况 的发生或不发生分化，群体思维症状 和决策的缺陷分析支持。在随后的体积，詹尼斯进一

8、步阐 述理论，并增加了水门事件的成绩单 和各种出版的回忆录，涉及校长的账 目进行分析，得出的结论是水门事件 掩盖决定也为群体思维 （詹尼斯，1983）的结果。两卷提出处方，以防 止群体思维的发生，The catastrophe shocked the n ati on.man ageme nt textbooks. Multipleadvocacy decisi on-mak ing procedureshave bee n adopted at the executive levels in many orga ni zati ons, in cludi ng theexecutive br

9、anch of the gover nment. One would thi nk that by 1986, 13 years after the publicati on of a popular book, that its prescripti ons might be well in gra ined inour management and decision-makingstyles. Unfortun ately, it has not happe ned.On January 28, 1986, the space shuttle Challenger was launched

10、 from crippled the American space program, and is dest ined to be remembered as themost tragic n atio nal event since theassass in atio n of Joh n F. Kenn edy in 1963.The Presidential Commission thatinvestigated the accident pointed to aflawed decision-making process as aprimary con tributory cause.

11、 The decisi on was made the ni ght before the launch inthe LevelI FlightReadi nessReviewmeeti ng.Due tothe workof thePreside ntialCommissi on ,i nformatio nconcerning that meeting is available forKenn edy Space Cen ter. The temperature analysis as a group decision possiblythat morning was in the mid

12、-20s,well susceptible to groupth ink.below the previous low temperatures atwhich the shuttle engines had bee n tested. Seve nty-three sec onds afterlaun ch, the Challe nger exploded,killi ng all seven astronauts aboard, and becoming the worst disaster in space flight history.In this paper, we report

13、 the results of our an alysis of the Level Flight Readi ness Review meeti ng as adecisi on-mak ing situatio n that displaysevidenee of groupthink. We review the an tecede nt con diti ons, the groupth inksymptoms, and the possible decisi on-mak ing defects, as suggested by Jan is (1983). In additio n

14、, we take the next and more importa nt step of goingbey ond the developme nt of ano therexample of groupth ink to 其中许多已经出现在大众媒体，在对行政 决策的书籍，并在管理的教科书。多 宣传决策程序，已经通过在许多组 织，包括政府的行政部门的行政级 别。有人会认为，至V 1986年，一本 畅销书，其处方可能还有根深蒂固在 我们的管理和决策风格公布13年后。 不幸的是，它并没有发生。1986年1月28 日，挑战者号航 天飞机从肯尼迪航天中心发射升空 。温度那天早上是在中间20年代，远

15、低 于前低的温度在该班车引擎已经过测 试。发射后七三秒钟，挑战者爆炸， 七名宇航员全部遇难船上，并成为最 大的灾难的空间飞行的历史。灾难震 惊全国，削弱了美国的太空计划，并 注定要被记住作为自约翰 F肯尼迪 1963年遇刺最悲惨的全国性活动。总统委员会认为调查事故指着一 个有缺陷的决策过程中作为主要促成 因素。推出的I级飞行准备审查会议 前的决定是在晚上。由于总统委员会 的工作，是有关该会议的信息可用于 分析群体决策可能容易受到群体思 维。在本文中，我们报告我们的水平 飞行准备评审会议，会显示群体思维 的证据的决策情况的分析结果。我们 回顾了先前的条件下 ，群体思维症 状，可能的决策缺陷，所建

16、议的贾尼 斯（1983）。此外，我们采取的超 越群体思维的另一个例子的发展做出 的重新调查小组决策过程的建议下一 个更重要的步骤。recomme ndati ons for ren ewed inquiryinto group decisi on-mak ing processes.THEORY AND EVIDENCEThe groupthi nk hypothesis hasbeen presented in detail in numerouspublicati onsother tha n Janis books(Flowers,1977;Courtright,1978;Leana,1

17、985; Moorhead, 1982; Moorhead & Mo ntan ari, 1986) and will n ot be repeated here. The major categories w01 be used as a framework for organizing the evidenee from the meeting. Within each category the key elements will be prese nted along with meet ing details that perta in to each.The meet in g(s)

18、 took placethroughout the day and evening from12:36 pm (EST), Jan uary 27, 1986followi ng the decisi on to not launch theChalle nger due to high crossw inds at thelau nchsite.Discussi onscon ti nuedthroughabout12:00mid ni ght(EST) viatelec onferencingandTelefaxsystemsconnecting the Kenn edy Space Ce

19、n ter in Florida, Morto n Thiokol(MTI) in Utah, Johnson Space Center in Houston, andthe Marshall Space Flight Cen ter. The Level I Flight Readiness Review is the highest level of review prior to laun ch. It comprises the highest level of man ageme nt at the three space cen ters and at MTI, the priva

20、te supplier of the solid rocket booster engin es.To briefly state the situation, the MTI engin eers recomme nded not tolaunch if temperatures of the O-ring seals on the rocket were below 53 degrees Fahre nheit, which was the lowesttemperature of any previous flight.Laure nee B. Mulloy, man ager of t

21、he SolidRocket Booster Project at Marshall SpaceFlight Cen ter, states:.The bottom line of that, though, initially was that Thiokol engineering, Bob Lund, who is the Vice President and Director of Engineering, who is here today, recommended that 51-L the Challenger not be launched if the O-ring temp

22、eratures predicted at launch time would be lower than any previous理论与证实该群体思维假说已经提出了详细的比 Janis的书 （花， 1977;Courtright ， 1978; Leana ， 1985;穆尔黑德，1982;穆尔黑德和蒙塔 纳，1986）等众多的出版物，也不 会在这里重复。大类W01被用作从会 议主办证据的框架。在每个类别中的 关键要素将随着会议的细节，涉及到 每个人都可以提出。从下午12:36 （美国东部时间），以下为不启动挑战者由于高侧 风在发射场的决定的会议上 （次）发生在白天和晚上，1986年1月27

23、 日。讨论通过连接肯尼迪航天中心在 佛罗里达州，莫顿聚硫橡胶（MTI）在犹他，约翰逊航天中心 在休斯敦和马歇尔太 空飞行中心电话会议和电传系统继续通过大约午夜 12:00 （美国东部时间）。I级飞行 考前复习是在发射前审查的最高水 平。它包括三个空间中心和在MTI ， 固体火箭的私人供应商管理的最高级 别 增压发动机。简要地说明情况，MTI工程师建 议不要启动，如果气温在火箭的0型 圈密封件均低于53华氏度，这是以往 任何飞行的最低温度。劳伦斯B.马洛 伊，固体火箭助推器项目于马歇尔太空飞行中心的经理，说:and in sulatio n of the group from qualified

24、 outside opinions. These con diti ons existed in this situatio n.O 。,那底线，虽然，最初是 聚硫橡胶工程，鲍勃隆德，谁是副总 裁兼工程总监，今天谁在这里，建议 51 -L 挑战者无法启动，如果0型圈 温度在启动时预测会比以往任何发射 低，那是53度。launch, and that was 53 degrees . . . (Report ofthe Presidential Commission on the SpaceShuttle Accident, 1986, p. 91-92).This recomme ndati

25、on was made at8:45 pm,.Ja nuary 27, 1986 (Report of thePreside ntial Commissi on on the Space Shuttle Accide nt, 1986). Through the ensuing discussi ons the decisi on to launch was made.An tecede nt Con diti onsThe three primary an tecede ntcon diti ons for the developme nt ofgroupth ink are: a high

26、ly cohesive group, leader preferenee for a certain decision.Cohesive Group. The people who made the decisi on to launch had worked together for many years. They were familiar with each other and had grow n through the ranks of the space program. A high degree of esprit de corps existed betwee n the

27、members.Leader Preferenee. Two top level man agers actively promoted their pro-la unch opinions in the face ofoppositi on. The commissi on report states that several managers at space centers and MTI pushed for laun ch, regardless of the low temperatures.In sulati on from Experts. MTIengineers made

28、their recommendations relatively early in the evening. The top level decisi on-mak ing group knew oftheir object ions but did not meet with them directly to review their data and concerns. As Roger Boisjoly, a Thiokol engineer, states in his remarks to the Preside ntial Commissi on:I was not even as

29、ked to participate ingiving any input to the frnal decision charts(Report of the Presidential Commission onthe Space Shuttle Accident, 1986, p. 91-92).This testimonial indicates that thetop decisi on-mak ing team was in sulated from the engineers who possessed the expertise regard ing the fun cti on

30、ing of the维的发展是：一个高度凝聚力的群 体，领导者偏好某种决定，本集团向 合格的外部意见的绝缘。这些条件存 在这种情况。凝聚力的群体。谁做的决定，推 出的人已经工作多年在一起。他们熟 悉彼此，并通过太空计划的行列中长 大。的袍泽高度存在的成员之间。equipme nt.Groupth ink Symptoms（总统委员会对航天飞机事故，1986 年，第91-92报告）。这个建议是20时45分。1986 年1月27日（总统委员会对航天飞机 事故，1986报告）。通过随后的讨 论中，推出决定做出。先行条件这三个主要的前提条件，群体思领导者优先。两个顶级经理积极 推动他们的亲发射意见反对

31、面前。该 委员会报告指出，不同的基金经理在 空间中心和MTI被推为发射，不管低绝缘从专家。MTI公司的工程师 在晚上比较早的提出自己的建议 。顶层决策组知道他们的反对意见，但他 们并没有直接见面，检讨自己的数据 和关注。正如罗杰Boisjoly ， 一个聚 硫橡胶工程师，在他的言论指出，以 总统委员会：我什至没有要求参加giving任何 输入到frnal决定图表(总统委员会对 航天飞机事故，1986年，第91-92 报告)。这证明表明最高决策层团队从谁 拥有有关设备的运作的专业知识的工 程师绝缘。群体思维症状Janis identified eight symptomsof groupthink. They are presented herealong with evide nee from the Report of the Preside ntial Commissi on on the Space Shuttle Aeeide nt (1986).Invuln erability. When groupth inkoccurs, most or all of the members of the deeisi on-mak ing group have an illusi on of invuln erability that r