里格斯诉帕尔默案判决书.docx

1、里格斯诉帕尔默案判决书里格斯诉帕尔默案判决书RIGGS V. PALMER Court of Appeals of New York, 1889里格斯诉帕尔默案，纽约上诉法院，1889年Rights of Legatees-Murder of Testator有关继承人杀害遗嘱人有无继承权的问题 The law of New York relating to the probate of wills and the distributions of estates will not be construed so as to secure the benefit of a will to a

2、legatee who has killed the testator in order to prevent a revocation of the will. GRAY and DANFORTH, JJ., dissenting.纽约州关于公正遗嘱和分割遗产的法律，不能被解释成继承人为阻止遗嘱人撤销遗嘱，可以通过杀害遗嘱人的方式来获得遗嘱利益。格雷和丹佛斯法官有不同的法律意见。 Appeal from supreme court, general term, third department.上诉来自纽约州最高法院，普通审期，第三法庭。 Leslie W Russell, for appe

3、llants. W. M.Hawkins for respondents.莱斯里 W茹塞尔为上诉人辩护；WM豪肯斯为被上诉人辩护。 EARL,J. on the 13th day of August 1880, Francis B. Palmer made his last will and testament, in which he gave small legacies to his two daughters, Mrs. Riggs and Mrs. Preston, the plaintiffs in this action, and the remainder of his est

4、ate to his grandson, the defendant Elmer E. Palmer, subject to the support of Susan Palmer, his mother, with a gift over to the two daughters, subject to the support of Mrs. Palmer in case Elmer should survive him and die under age, unmarried, and without any issue. The testator, at the date of his

5、will, owned a farm, and considerable personal property. He was a widower, and thereafter, in March, 1882, he was married to Mrs. Bresee, with whom, before his marriage, he entered into an antenuptial contract, in which it was agreed that in lieu of dower and all other claims upon his estate in case

6、she survived him she should have her support upon his farm during her life, and such support was expressly charged upon the farm. At the date of the will, and subsequently to the death of the testator, Elmer lived with him as a member of his family, and at his death was 16 years old. He knew of the

7、provisions made in his favor in the will, and, that he might prevent his grandfather from revoking such provisions, which he had manifested some intention to do, and to obtain the speedy enjoyment and immediate possession of his property, he willfully murdered him by poisoning him. He now claims the

8、 property, and the sole question for our determination is, can he have it? 厄尔法官：1880年8月13日，富朗西斯帕尔默立下一份遗嘱，遗嘱约定他的两个女儿里格斯和普瑞斯顿，即该案的原告，只能继承其遗产中很少的一部分；剩余大部分遗产由其子即该案的被告埃尔默帕尔默继承，但假如被告埃尔默 帕尔默先于祖父富朗西斯帕尔默死去且未结婚，又不存在其他问题，被告帕尔默的母亲珊帕尔默必须将遗产转予富朗西斯帕尔默的两位女儿所有。富朗西斯帕尔默在立遗嘱时，拥有一座农场和一笔可观的财产，他是一个鳏夫，在1882年3月与伯瑞斯夫人结婚，婚前签署

9、了一份协议，约定一旦伯瑞斯夫人后于富朗西斯帕尔默去世，则由伯瑞斯夫人照管农场、管理财产直至去世。被告埃尔默自订立遗嘱时起，一直作为家庭中的一员与富朗西斯帕尔默一家生活在一起，直至其去世，时年埃尔默16岁。被告埃尔默知道遗嘱的容，推测祖父有可能改变遗嘱，且有迹象表明祖父也试图改变遗嘱，为了阻止祖父改变遗嘱，尽快获得遗产，埃尔默毒死了祖父。现被告埃尔默主获得遗产，需要我们明确的问题是他能获得遗产吗？The defendants say that the testator is dead; that his will was made in due form, and has been admitt

10、ed to probate; and that therefore it must have effect acording to the letter of the law. It is quite true that statutes regulating the making, proof, and effect of wills and the devolution of property, if literally construed, and if their force and effect can in no way and under no circumstances be

11、controlled or modified, give this property to the murderer. The purpose of those statutes was to enable testators to dispose of their estates to the objects of their county at death, and to carry into effect their final wishes legally ex pressed; and in considering and giving effect to them this pur

12、pose must be kept in view. It was the intention of the law-makers that the donees in a will should have the property given to them. But it never could have been their intention that a donee who murdered the testator to make the will operative should have any benefit under it. If such a case had been

13、 present to their minds, and it had been supposed necessary to make some provision of law to meet it, it cannot be doubted that they would have provided for it. It is a familiar canon of construction that a thing which is within the intention of the makers of a statute is as much within the statute

14、as if it were within the letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless it be within the intention of the makers. The writers of laws do not always express their intention perfectly, but either exceed it or fall short of it, so that judges are to colle

15、ct it from probable or rational conjectures only, and this is called rational interpretation; and Rutherford, in his Institutes, (page 420) says: Where we make use of rational interpretation, sometimes we restrain the meaning of the writer so as to take in less, and some times we extend or enlarge h

16、is meaning so as to take in more, than his words express. Such a construction ought to be put upon a statute as will best answer the intention which the makers had in view. Many cases are mentioned where it was held that matters embraced in the general words of statutes nevertheless were not within

17、the statutes, because it could not have been the intention of the law-makers that they should be included. They were taken out of the statutes by an equitable construction; and it is said in Bacon: By an equitable construction a case not within the letter of a statute is sometimes holden to be withi

18、n the meaning, because it is within the mischief for which a remedy is provided. The reason for such construction is that the law-makers could not set down every case in express terms. In order to form a right judgment whether a case be within the equity of a statute, it is a good way to suppose the

19、 law-maker present, and that you have asked him this question: Did you intend to comprehend this case? Then you must give yourself such answer as you imagine he, being an upright and reasonable man, would have given. If this be that he did mean to comprehend it, you may safely hold the case to be wi

20、thin the equity of the statute; for while you do no more than he would have done, you do not act contrary to the statute, hut in conformity thereto. 9 Bac. Abr. 248. In some cases the letter of a legislative act is restrained by an equitable construction; in others, it is enlarged; in others, the co

21、nstruction is contrary to the letter. If the law makers could, as to this case, be consulted, would they say that they intended by their general language that the property of a testator or of an ancestor should pass to one who had taken his life for the express purpose of getting his property? In 1

22、Bl Comm. 91, the learned author, speaking of the construction of statutes, says: If there arise out of them collaterally any absurd consequences manifestly contradictory to common reason, they are with regard to those collateral consequences void. Where some collateral matter arises out of the gener

23、al words, and happens to be unreasonable, there the judges are in decency to conclude that this consequence was not foreseen by the parliament, and therefore they are at liberty to ex pound the statute by equity, and only quoad hoc disregard it; and he gives as an illustration, if an act of parliame

24、nt gives a man power to try all causes that arise within his manor of Dale, yet, if a cause should arise in which he himself is party, the act is construed not to extend to that, because it is unreasonable that any man should determine his own quarrel. There was a statute in Bologna that whoever dre

25、w blood in the streets should be severely punished, and yet it was held not to apply to the case of a barber who opened a vein in the street. It is commanded in the decalogue that no work shall be done upon the Sabbath, and yet giving the command a rational interpretation founded upon its design the

26、 Infallible Judge held that it did not prohibit works of necessity, charity, or benevolence on that day.被上诉人辩称，遗嘱人所立遗嘱形式合法且经过公证，现遗嘱人已经去世，根据法律规定遗嘱应当得到执行。依据文义解释，在没有外力影响和左右的情况下，事态按其自然进程发展，不被控制也没有改变的话，那么根据调整遗嘱订立、证明、效力以及财产转移等遗嘱法的规定，把遗产转给谋杀者，这是千真万确的。制定遗嘱法就是为了让遗嘱人，能够处置其去世时依各州规定可继承的遗产，也是为了让遗嘱人最后合法律表达出的意愿产生实

27、际效果，在考虑和判定遗嘱效力时，这些立法目的必须被考量。立法者的目的就是让遗嘱受赠人获得其应该继承的遗产。但受赠人为使遗嘱生效而谋杀遗嘱人，从中获取遗嘱利益，这决不会是立法者的目的。立法者如果能想到这种情况，并认为有必要制定相应的法律规定，那么立法者会毫不犹豫地作出规定。一般说来，立法者的目的就是法律条文字面所表达出的目的；但法律条文所能表达出的目的却不限于法律条文本身，除非严格限定立法者的目的于法律条文之，这是人们所熟知的一个解释原则。立法者并不总能精确地表达他们的目的，而是有时会超出，有时又受到限制，为此，就需要法官从可能或合理的推断中修正立法者的目的，这被称为“合理性解释”。卢瑟福在其法

28、学著作中曾说（420页），“当我们运用合理性解释时，我们有时会为限制作者的意义表达而对文本作限缩解释，有时会为扩展或增加作者的意义表达而对文本作扩解释。”所以对制定法的解释应致力于有根据地探寻立法者的目的很多这样的案例被提及，即虽然事项被包括在法律字面的通常意义之，但由于不可能是立法者的目的，从而被衡平解释拒之制定法之外。正如培根所言，“通过衡平解释，一个不包括在制定法字面含义之的情形有时可能被认定包括在制定法之，比如为损害提供救济就在制定法之。这种解释的根据在于，立法者不可能用明确的语言为每个案件立法。为了正确判定当下案件是否在制定法规定之，你可以假定立法者在场，并向他提出如下问题：你打算怎

29、样理解这一案件？然后站在正直的、理性人的角度给出你自己的答案，这是一个好的方法。如果你感到立法者会包括在，你就可以确信该案包括在制定法之，因为你所作的也就是立法者所作的，你没有违反制定法，而是遵循了制定法。根据衡平解释，制定法的字面含义在某些案件中会受到限制；在另外一些案件中可能会扩，甚至作出相反地解释就该案而言，如果咨询立法者，根据语言的通常意义，他们能说遗嘱人或被继承人的财产应该转移给为获得遗产而杀害遗嘱人或被继承人的人的手中吗？布莱克斯通在讲到制定法解释时说，“如果制定法解释产生了与普通理性相悖的荒谬结论，我们必须考虑这些结论的无效性。如果有些结论溢出语言的通常意义，且是不合理的，那么，

30、法官可以合情理地得出该结论不是议会所预见的，因此，法官享有事后衡平解释制定法的自由，甚至就此而言，法官可以无视制定法”。布莱克斯通举例作了说明：如果议会法案授予法官可以审理发生在其管辖围的所有案件，但其中一个案件法官就是案件一方当事人的话，那么法案就不能对法案作扩解释，因为任何人都不能作自己案件的法官。还有波罗格纳有一部法案，任何人在大街上流血都将受到严惩，但法案不适用于理发师在大街上割破血管。圣经十戒规定安息日不能工作，但万能的法官给出了合理的解释，坚持认为这一天，那些必需的、乐善好施的工作不在禁止之列。What could be more unreasonable than to supp

31、ose that it was the legislative intention in the general laws passed for the orderly peaceable, and just devolution of property that they should have operation in favor of one Who murdered his ancestor that he might speedily come into the possession of his estate? Such an intention is inconceivable.

32、 We need not, therefore, be much troubled by the general language contained in the laws. Besides, all laws, as well as all contracts, may be controlled in their operation and effect by general fundamental maxims of the common law. No one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take adva

33、ntage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime. These maxims are dictated by public policy, have their foundation in universal law administered in all civilized countries, and have nowhere been superseded by statutes. They were applied in the decision of the