Evaluate the Strengths and Limitations of Rational Choice Theory.docx

上传人:b****5 文档编号:7390757 上传时间:2023-01-23 格式:DOCX 页数:6 大小:21KB
下载 相关 举报
Evaluate the Strengths and Limitations of Rational Choice Theory.docx_第1页
第1页 / 共6页
Evaluate the Strengths and Limitations of Rational Choice Theory.docx_第2页
第2页 / 共6页
Evaluate the Strengths and Limitations of Rational Choice Theory.docx_第3页
第3页 / 共6页
Evaluate the Strengths and Limitations of Rational Choice Theory.docx_第4页
第4页 / 共6页
Evaluate the Strengths and Limitations of Rational Choice Theory.docx_第5页
第5页 / 共6页
点击查看更多>>
下载资源
资源描述

Evaluate the Strengths and Limitations of Rational Choice Theory.docx

《Evaluate the Strengths and Limitations of Rational Choice Theory.docx》由会员分享,可在线阅读,更多相关《Evaluate the Strengths and Limitations of Rational Choice Theory.docx(6页珍藏版)》请在冰豆网上搜索。

Evaluate the Strengths and Limitations of Rational Choice Theory.docx

EvaluatetheStrengthsandLimitationsofRationalChoiceTheory

EvaluatetheStrengthsandLimitationsofRationalChoiceTheory

Introduction

Rationalchoicetheoryisatheoreticalframeworkderivedfromeconomicsforanalyzingandoftenformallyconstructingpredictivemodelsofhumanbehaviours.Politicalscientistshaveusedthisapproachtobuildtheoriesthatallhuman’sactionsarefundamentalrationalandthatpeoplecalculatethepotentialbenefitsandcostsofanyactionaccordingtoapredeterminedsetofpreferencesandconstraintsbeforedeterminingwhattodo.Anditisfurtherarguedthat,politicalactionsderivedfromsuchrationalbehaviourwillservetomaximizeindividual’sutility.Rationalchoicetheoreticalframeworkshavebecomeincreasinglytheoreticalincontentconvergingtothecurrenttrendinmain-streamneoclassicalmicroeconomics.Itisnotedthatpoliticaltheoriessuchasthestudyofvotingandcoalitionformation(Down1957&Riker1962)havebeenincreasinglycolonizedbysuchmathematicalmodels.

 

Yet,despitetheprimafacielogicalsoundnessaswellastheassertedscientificnatureofthevariousmodelsbasedonindividual’srationality,andthatthatpeoplebehaverationallyhasbeenrecognizedbymanyeconomists,sociologistsandpoliticalscientists,thispaperarguesthathumanbehavioursarefarmorecomplexwhichcannotbemerelyexplainedbyindividuals’rationality;therearemanyinstancesthatpeoplebehaveaccordingtohabitual,traditional,emotionaloraffectualaction,andmanytypesofvalue-orientedactionsthatcannotbeexplainedsolelyrelyingonrationality.Asaconsequence,itisnotsurprisedtoseethatrationalchoicemodelhavebeensubjectedtoongoingcriticismamongboththeoristsandpractitioners.Indeed,themostoftenheardcriticismofrationalchoicetheoryisthelackofrealismaspeopleoftenactimpulsively,emotionallyandhabitually.Thispaperwillbedividedintothreeparts.Firstly,thetheoreticalfoundationofrationalchoicetheorywillbeexamined;followingthat,wewilladdresstothequestionwhyrationalchoicetheoriesaresoappearingtosomepoliticalscientistsandsociologists;andfinallytheshortcomingsofsuchmodelswillbediscussed.

TheTheoreticalFoundationoftheRationalChoiceTheory

Theanalyticalmethodologyoftherationalchoicetheoryisbasedontheproblematicandcontroversialnotionof“methodologicalindividualism”(Fine2000).Thatistosay,nomattertheformorthestructureofanation’spoliticalinstitution,anation’suniquehistoricalcircumstancesandanation’svalue-orientation,itassumesthatindividualsmustfollowtheirself-interestorgreed.Therefore,neitherboththeinterestsandbehavioursofacommunityornationaresubjectmattersoftherationalchoicetheory,rather,theinteractionanddecisionmakingofrationalindividualsformaximizingtheirutilityandminimizingcostsarethefoundationofpoliticaldecisions.Andthismethodology,inturn,iscloakedwithabstractmathematicalframeworkandbasedonanumberofabstractassumptionsthathavelittleconnectiontothereallife(GoodinandKlingemann1996).Firstly,itisassumedthatindividualspossessasetpreferencesthatareexogenousdeterminedorgiven.Thatistosay,individuals’preferencesarederivedindependentlyfromthesocietyandanyotherexternalcircumstancesthatmaycontributetotheformationofsuchpreferences.

Itisassumedthatindividuals’preferencespossesstwoproperties.Firstly,theyarecompleteinthesensethatallactionscanberankedinorderofpreferenceinthreesituations:

actionAisstrictlypreferredtoactionBandthereforeactionAyieldsmoreutilitythanActionB;actionBisstrictlypreferredtoactionA;andactionAisindifferenttoactionBsotheyareequallydesirable.Secondly,itisassumedthatpreferencesaretransitive;namely,ifactionAispreferredtoActionB,andactionBispreferredtoActionC,thenactionAisalsopreferredtoActionC.Yet,inreality,ifwethinkabitdeeperorjustresorttoourcommonsense,itisnotdifficultforustoseethatindividuals’preferencesarealwayssociallyconstructed.Hereisasimpleexample.Mr.Ahatespepper,butloveschillyandheistryingtocourtMissB.However,pepperisMissB’sfavoritefoodandshedoesnotlikechilly.Therefore,intheeventofMr.AinvitingMiss.Boverfordinner,itisverylikelythatMr.AwouldpurchasepepperandhaveapeppermealwithMiss.Bandrefrainhimselffromhavingchillysoastogetherheart.Hence,thecompletenessaswelltransitivityassumptionsareviolatedsincetheeventualoutcomeispepper>chillyforMr.A.

Thesecondassumptionoftherationalchoicetheoryisthat,individualshavefullorperfectinformationaboutwhatoutcomesarethebestforthemaswellastheparticularoutcomesthatoccurunderaparticularaction(MarshandStoker2002).Therefore,underthisassumption,rationalindividualswillchoosethebestactionswhichgivethemthehighestlevelofutility.Yet,inreality,itisoftenthecasethatinformationisalwaysimperfect.Rather,individualsactaccordingtotheirexpectationoftheoutcomeofaparticularaction.Althoughithasbeenarguedthatexpectationmaybecalculatedbyprobabilitytheories,giventhefactthatinrealitytheoutcomeofaparticularactionmaybeinfluencedbyamultiplicityofuncertaintiesandsuchuncertaintiesaresometimesreinforcingeachother,itishardlyconvincedthatexpectationcanbecalculatedatanydegreeofprecision.Thethirdassumption,whichisequallydubiousasothers,oftherationalchoicetheoryisthatindividualshavethecognitivecapabilityaswellastimetocompareandweighteverychoiceofactionagainsteveryotherpossiblechoice.Togiveasimpleexampletothisquestion,letusimaginethesituationofMr.Awhoisshoppinginasuppermarketthathasonethousanddifferenttypesofgoods.IfMr.Aneed1secondtoweightonegoodagainstanotherone,thenitwouldrequire1,000multiplesby1,000secondstoevaluateallthegoodsinthesupermarket,or277hours;nottomentionthatfactthattherearenormallytensofthousandsgoodsinalargesupermarketsandmyriadsinthewholeworld.Therefore,itisnotdifficulttoseethatthisassumptionistotallyinfeasible.

HerbertSimonrevisestheassumptionofperfectrationalitybyintroducingthenotionofboundedrationality.Simon(1996)arguesthatmostindividualsareatbestpartlyrational,andtheyinfactpossessemotionalorirrationalattributesintheremainingpartsoftheiractions.Hestatedthat“boundedlyrationalagentsexperiencelimitsinformulatingandsolvingcomplexproblemsandinprocessing(receiving,storing,retrieving,transmittinginformation”(citedinWillamson1981:

553).Furthermore,Simonmadeanumberofrestrictionstothetheoryofperfectnationalitysoitcanbemademorerealistic.Yet,theapproacheshetookstillremainwithinthelimitofrigorousformalization.Undertheboundedrationalitytheory,utilityfunctionsaresomewhatmorelimitedtoindividualscircumstances;thecostsofgatheringaswellasprocessinginformationandhencetheexistenceofimperfectinformationarenowrecognized;andmoreover,utilityfunctionsarenownolongerunique;itisnowpossiblefortheexistenceofmulti-valuedutilityfunctions(Simon1957).Itisadmittedthat,undertheboundedrationalitytheory,therationalchoicetheoryisnowsomewhatmorerealistic.Yet,itisarguedthatpoliticalinteractionbetweenindividuals,communitiesandcountriesisaneverintricateprocessinfluencedbyanumberofspecificfactorsthatcannotbemathematicallydeterminedandmeasured.Althoughbycoveringsuchrationalchoicetheorywithnaturalscienceelementslikeabstractmathematicalframeworkmayappeartobemorescientific,inordertomaketheunderlyingmathematicstractable,realismofthemodelhasbesacrificedbymakinganumbersimplifiedassumptions.

Moreover,althoughrationalchoicetheoryseeksviewindividualandsocietaloutcomesastheresultsofutilityorvaluemaximisation,rationalchoicehasbeensilentontheoriginalandthenatureofindividualvalues.Indeed,becauseofthedifficultyifnotimpossibilityinmeasuringhuman’sinternalstates,therationalchoicetheoriststendtoimposevaluesonsocialactorsbasedonsomepriorassumptions(Hechter1994).

TheApplicationofRationalChoiceTheory

Theorisingonthebasisofrationalchoicetheoryhasalongtraditionwithinsociology.

Overthepastfewdecades,rationalchoicetheorieshavebeenappliedtoanalyseawiderangeofpoliticalandsocialcircumstancesincludingtheformationoffamilyanddemography(Sen1983;Colman1993),religionformationandchoice(Starketal.1996),genderdistinctionandbehaviour(FerberandNelson1993),crimeanddeviance(Gibbs1975),andsoon.Inexplainingthesesocialphenomenon,sociologistsandpoliticalscientistsseektoconstructmodelsofindividualactionandsocialcontext.

Proponentsofrationalchoicetheoryhavearguedthat“rationalchoicetheoryprovidestheonlyscientificbasisforsocialtheory”(Ricker1995:

23).Proponentsofrationalchoicetheorybelievethatthegoalofscienceistocreateaccurateempiricalgeneralizationsaboutnaturebysimplifyinghumanbehavioursandwhichinturnwouldallowforusefulprediction.Moreover,theybelievedthatscienceisaimedatexplanationasmuchasatprediction.Ifageneralizationcanbeexplainedthenitisequivalentofgivingthegeneralizationtheoreticalcontentandfromwhichthenecessaryandsufficientconditionsforsuchgeneralizationtobehappenedcanbededuced.Therefore,ifanempiricalgeneralizationcanbeembeddedinatheor

展开阅读全文
相关资源
猜你喜欢
相关搜索

当前位置:首页 > 党团工作 > 党团建设

copyright@ 2008-2022 冰豆网网站版权所有

经营许可证编号:鄂ICP备2022015515号-1