产业终极版.docx

产业终极版.docx

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产业终极版

Explanationofterms（名词解释）

1.IndustrialOrganization（IO）:

theworkingofmarketsandindustries,inparticularthewayfirmscompetewitheachother.

2.Marketpower:

isdefinedastheabilitytosetpricesabovecost,specificallyaboveincrementalormarginalcost.

3.SCPparadigm:

Structure:

characteristicsofthemarket.

numberoffirms,distributionofmarketshare,degreeofproductdifferentiation,entryconditions,

Conduct:

choicesoffirms.

price,quantity,investments,service,quality.

Performance:

howfirmsdo.

price,consumersurplus,productvariety,technologicalprogress.

4.Specificassets:

Oncethoseinvestmentsaremade,theresultingassetscanbeusedonlyforthespecifictypeforwhichtheywerecreated.

5.Nashequilibrium:

ApairofstrategiesconstitutesaNashequilibriumifnoplayercanunilaterallychangeitsstrategyinawaythatimprovesitspayoff.

6.Dominantstrategies:

Wheneveraplayerhasastrategythatisstrictlybetterthananyotherstrategyregardlessoftheotherplayers’strategychoices,wesaythatthefirstplayerhasadominantstrategy.

7.Elasticityrule:

Amonopolistproducesthelevelofoutputthatmarginalrevenueequalsmarginalcost（profit-maximization）.

8.Oligopoly:

Thesituationinwhichthereareafewcompetitorsisdesignatedbyoligopoly（duopoly双寡头垄断ifthenumberistwo）.

9.Collusion:

Firmsattempttoestablishagreementsbetweenthemselveswithaviewtowardincreasingtheirmarketpower,thenallfirmsarebetteroff（normallyattheexpenseofconsumers）.

10.Two-parttariffs:

afixedpartf,whicheachconsumermustpayregardlessofquantitypurchased,andavariablepartp,proportionaltothequantitypurchased.

11.Minimumefficientscale:

isthelowestoutputlevelatwhichtheminimumaveragecostisattained.

12.Barrierstoentry:

Barrierstoentryareobstaclesthatmakeitdifficulttoenteragivenmarket.Barrierstoentryprotectafirmfromthearrivalofnewcompetitors.

Shortanswerquestions（简答）

1、Whatfactorsdecidesthedegreeofmarketpower?

答：

Thedegreeofmarketpowerdependsonthreefactors:

（1）demandelasticity,

（2）marketconcentration,and（3）collusivebehavior.

2、Whatarereasonsthatmanagementcannotdeviatefromprofitmaximizationtoolarge?

答：

①Managementincentivecontracts;②Labormarketdiscipline;③Productmarketdiscipline④Capitalmarketdiscipline.

3、Duopolyisanintermediatemarketstructure,betweenmonopolyandperfectcompetition.Compareequilibriumpriceandoutputunderduopolywiththoseundermonopolyandperfectcompetition?

答：

Duopolyoutputisgreaterthanmonopolyoutputandlowerthanperfectcompetitionoutput.Likewise,duopolypriceislowerthanmonopolypriceandgreaterthanpriceunderperfectcompetition.

4、Whyisthedegreeofmonopolypowerlimitedbytheelasticityofdemand?

答：

Thedemandelasticitydependsonmanyfactors—somestatic,somedynamic.Thismakesitdifficulttojudgetheextentofmonopolypowerinactualsituations.

5、Whenispredatorypricinglikelytobeasuccessfulstrategy?

答：

Predatorypricingmaybeasuccessfulstrategywhen

（1）thepreyisfinanciallyconstrained,

（2）lowpricessignallowcostsorthepredator’s“toughness,”and（3）capturingaminimummarketshareearlyoniscrucialforlong-termsurvival.Inallthesecases,lowpricingbythepredatorinducesthepreytoexitthemarket.

6、Manyfirmssetapricefortheexportmarketthatislowerthanthepriceforthedomesticmarket.Howcanyouexplainthispolicy?

答：

Third-degree（三级）:

Thesellerdividesbuyersintogroups,settingadifferentpriceforeachgroup.Underthird-degreepricediscrimination,asellershouldchargealowerpriceinthosemarketsegmentswithgreaterpriceelasticity.

7、Anearbypizzaparlorofferspizzasinthreesizes:

small,mediumandlarge.Itscorrespondingpricesare$6,$8,and$10.Dothesedataindicatethatthefirmispricediscriminating?

Whyorwhynot?

答：

Pricediscriminationisthepracticeofsettingdifferentpricesforthesamegood.Pricediscriminationoccurswhenthepricedifferencesisnotjustifiedbythecostdifferences.Wecannotdefinitelysaythatthepizzaparlorispricediscriminatingsincewedon’thaveenoughdataaboutcostorsizeofpizza.

以下[]内容为答案的解释说明，为帮助理解，不必背

[Extra:

Supposemarginalcostofpizzaper100g（or100oz）isthesameregardlessofsize.Andsupposefurtherthanthesizeofmediumpizzais33%greaterthansmallpizzabut25%smallerthanlargepizza.Thensincethemarkupsacrossthesizearethesame,thisisnotthecaseofpricediscriminating.Butwedon’thaveenoughinformation.]

8、Whendoverticalrestraintssuchasreseal-pricemaintenanceorexclusiveterritoriesmayincreaseefficiency?

答：

Verticalrestrainssuchasresalemaintenanceorexclusiveterritoriesmayincreaseefficiencywhen

（1）retailersmakeinvestmentsinsaleseffortthatbenefitseveralretailersorrivalmanufacturers;or

（2）atwo-parttariffsisinsufficienttosimultaneouslyprovideincentivesforretailpricingandsaleseffort.

9、BrieflyexplainDorfman-Steinerformula.

答：

Whereηisthedemandelasticitywithrespecttoadvertisingexpendituresandεthepriceelasticityofdemand.Theadvertising-to-salesratioisgreatertheadvertisingelasticityofdemandandthelowerthepriceelasticityofdemand（orthegreatertheprice-costmargin）.

Graph（作图）

1、Comparethelong-runequilibriumofmonopolisticallycompetitiveandpurelycompetitiveindustries.Showthisonthegraph.

（图的内容一样，只是文字解释部分不同，注重看解释）

2、Thereisamonopolymanufacturerandamonopolyretailer.Demandfortheretailproductisp=9−Q.Marginalcostofthemanufacturerisconstantandequaltoc=3.Themanufacturerchargestheretailerauniformwholesalepricer.

-Retailer’sdemandforthemanufacturer’sproductr（Q）;

-Profit-maximizingquantityforthemanufacturerQ∗;

-Wholesalepricer∗;

-Retailpricep∗;

-Ifretailerandmanufacturerweremaximizingtheirjointprofits,theychoosetoproduceQM.

（以上答案仅为画图部分，文字分析说明自己总结，参见ppt60-62）

Problems（答案部分无，自己多看看老师给的PPT）

1.TheBattleoftheSexesisatwo-playercoordinationgameusedingametheory.Imagineacouplethatagreedtomeetthisevening,butcannotrecalliftheywillbeattendingtheoperaorafootballmatch.Thehusbandwouldmostofallliketogotothefootballgame.Thewifewouldliketogototheopera.Bothwouldprefertogotothesameplaceratherthandifferentones.

ThepayoffmatrixbelowisanexampleofBattleoftheSexes,wherethewifechoosesarowandthehusbandchoosesacolumn.

-Doeseitherplayerhaveadominantstrategy?

Whyorwhynot?

-Doeseitherplayerhaveadominatedstrategy?

Whyorwhynot?

-Determineallequilibriumoutcomes.VerifythattheequilibriumoutcomesareNashequilibriaofthegame（UsingthedefinitionofNashequilibrium）

2.Supposetwofirmsplaythegrimstrategy.YouareaskedtocalculatetheminimaldiscountfactorunderwhichthegrimstrategiesformaNashEquilibriumandcollusioncanbesustainedineveryperiod.答案是第41张ppt内容

3.AlgebraicderivationofCournotequilibriumpricesandoutputs

Inversedemand:

P（Q）=a-bQ,

Cost:

C（q）=cq,whereqisthefirm’soutput

totaloutput:

Q=q1+q2

Monopolyequilibrium:

Perfectcompetitionequilibrium:

p=c

答案是35，3,3张PPT

答：

（1）ppt上给出的题目条件应为Demandfunction:

q=a−bp（注意是需求函数）,costfunctionC（q）=cq.

此时Monopolyequilibrium

（注意这里是对价格求导，而非产量）

（2）如果题目条件是P（Q）=a-bQ（逆需求函数）Cost:

C（q）=cq,

此时Monopolyequilibrium

（注意这里是对产量求导）

同理，依据上述方法，可分别计算出完全垄断，完全竞争和古诺双寡头垄断三种市场结构条件下的均衡产量和价格如下表：

产量

价格

垄断

完全竞争

c

古诺双头模型

4Amonopolistservestwomarkets,1and2.

Thedemandcurveinmarket1isgivenbyq1=1–p1;thedemandcurveinmarket2isq2=2–p2.Nomarginalandtransportationcosts.Supposethatathirddegreepricediscriminationisallowed.

Whataretheequilibriumpricesandquantitiesineachmarket?

Supposenowthatpricediscriminationisnotallowed.Computetheequilibriumpriceandquantitiesinthetwomarkets.

答：

（1）Underthethridtype-pricediscrmination,themonopolistchargesdifferentpricestodifferent–althoughclearlyidentifiable-groupsofconsumers.Inparticolar,inmarket1,itsolvesthefollowingmaximizationproblem:

Theyyieldtheequilibriumpriceandquantityinmarket1,underthethirdtype-pricediscrimination:

Throughanalogousreasoning,inmarket2,wefind:

（2）Ifpricediscriminationisnotallowed,andbothmarketsareserved,auniformpriceissetinbothregions.Themonopolistsolvesthefollowingmaximizationproblem:

Fromwhich,wefind:

5Anicecreammakerhastodecidewhattypesoficecreamtosellandatwhatprices.Thecustomerswhobuyicecreamhavedifferenttastesxforfatcontent,withxrangingfrom1/4to5/4.Foreachx,thereisanequalnumberofcustomerswithtastex.Ifxisthecustomer’smostpreferredfatcontent,andtheicecreamhasfatcontentz,thencustomerxiswillingtopay

2−0.8|x−z|

forthisicecream.Themarginalcostofproducinganicecreamwithanyfatcontentisc=0.4.Assumethatthemanufactureralwaysservesthewholemarket.

Ifthemanufacturerisfreetoofferanytwotypesoficecream,whatwillbetheiroptimal"locations"intermsoffatcontentandwhatwillbetheprofitmaximizingprices?

Supposethatduetoafashionforlowfatfoods,customertastes（"addresses"）unexpectedlyshiftfromtheinterval[1/4,5/4]totheinterval[0,1].Forthesenewtastes,determinetheprofit-maximizingpricesfortheproductlinethatyoufoundinpart（a）.Continuetoassumethatthemanufacturerservesallthemarket.

IfitcostsF=5perproducttoadapttheproducttothechangeintastes（i.e.