Corporate Governance.docx

Corporate Governance.docx

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CorporateGovernance

CorporateGovernance:

CourseControloftheQualityofAccountingInformation

ZhangShan

Class2

CorporateGovernance:

CourseControloftheQualityofAccountingInformation

Abstract:

theinferiorqualityofaccountinginformationhasseriouslyhinderedthehealthydevelopmentofcapitalmarkets,itisstillahardworktoimprovethequalityofaccountinginformation.Thispaperresearchedtheproblemofaccountinginformationqualityfromtheperspectiveofcorporategovernance,andanalyzedtherelationshipbetweenthetwo,thinkingthatthequalityofaccountinginformationisaproductofeachside’strengthcontrast,corporategovernanceisacoursecontrolmechanismsofthequalityofaccountinginformation.

Keywords:

corporategovernance,thequalityofaccountinginformation,coursecontrol

I.Introduction

Inrecentyears,corporategovernanceiscontinuousimproved,thequalityofaccountinginformationisalsorising.However,falseaccountinginformationandothereventsisnothingnew,theseeventscontinuetoleadpeopletothinkabouttheproblemofthequalityofaccountinginformation.Onlyprovidetimelyandreliableaccountinginformationforthestakeholderstoprovideabasisfordecisionmaking,therebyimprovingtransparencyandpromotesocialbenefitsorreducetheflowofresourcestoachievethegoalofmaximizingefficiencyofresourceallocation.Fromthemicro-enterpriseenvironment,theaccountinginformationistheoperatoranimportantindicatorofjobperformanceevaluation,thestakeholderswithintheenterprisefoundationofchecksandbalancesincorporategovernancestructureplayanimportantroleinthemediaandlink.Repeatedthequalityaccountinginformationdisruptedthenormalorderofmarket,hinderingthehealthyoperationofcapitalmarketsisnotconducivetostableeconomicgrowth,improvingthequalityofaccountinginformationisanecessaryrequirementforeconomicdevelopment.

Thequalityofaccountinginformationisaprocesswhichaccountinginformationsupplyanddemandsidegameandclosetoeachother,qualityofaccountinginformationintheprocessofbeingaffectedbymanyfactors.ThefamousaccountingexpertProfessorGeJiapengpointedthat:

Inamarketeconomysystem,inordertoensurethequalityofaccountinginformation,theStatemadeacomprehensivesystemofarrangements,commissionedbythegovernmentorindependentagenciesestablishedbygovernmentestablished:

"FinancialAccountingStandards"andthesecuritiesregulatorydepartmentofthe"DisclosureGuidelines"priorspecification（inourcountryisthe"EnterpriseAccountingStandards"and"InformationDisclosureofListedCompanies",etc.）,butalsoanindependentcertifiedpublicaccountantonthefinancialstatementsandnotesforpost-mortemexamination.Atpresent,theseinstitutionalarrangementsaregraduallyimproving,butstillhardtocurbfinancialfraud,earningsmanagement,thequalityofaccountinginformationdistortion.Worthyoffurtherconsiderationis:

whetherthedesignspecificationsoftheaccountingindustryregulatorysystemwillbeabletosolvetheproblemofaccountinginformationquality?

Andevenaperfectsystem,onlygetcarryouttobeeffective,andtheseresultsthattheimplementationofthesystemultimatelydependsonthequalityofaccountinginformationtofunders,managersandothercompanystakeholders,interestsandneeds,thebalanceofpower,etc.,accountinginformationhasfocusedontheirgameresults.Therefore,thequalityofaccountinginformationinthefaceofproblems,notonlyfromwithintheindustryortechnologytosolvethelevel,fullattentionshouldalsobeadeeperreason,thisinformationfromtheaccountingsystemofthevariouseffectsofthecorporateenvironment,economicenvironment,findingsolutionstoproblems,andtheseenvironmentalfactors,thatisthemostdirectcorporategovernance,itgeneratestheequivalentoffinancialaccountinginformation,thedisclosureprocesstocontrolthings.

II.therelatedconcept

a）Thequalityofaccountinginformation.Accordingtotheinternationalstandardsorganizationpromulgatedin1994ISO8402-94"qualitymanagementandqualityassurance-theterm",thequalityofaccountinginformationisacharacteristicsummationoftheabilityofaccountinginformationtomeetexplicitandimplicitneed.

b）CorporateGovernance.Corporategovernanceisanumberofprocesses,customs,policies,laws,andinstitutionswhichhaveimpactonthewayacompanyiscontrolled.Animportantthemeofcorporategovernanceisthenatureandextentofaccountabilityofpeopleinthebusiness,andmechanismsthattrytodecreasetheprincipal–agentproblem.Corporategovernancealsoincludestherelationshipsamongthemanystakeholdersinvolvedandthegoalsforwhichthecorporationisgoverned.Incontemporarybusinesscorporations,themainexternalstakeholdergroupsareshareholders,debtholders,tradecreditors,suppliers,customersandcommunitiesaffectedbythecorporation'sactivities.Internalstakeholdersaretheboardofdirectors,executives,andotheremployees.Itguaranteesthatanenterpriseisdirectedandcontrolledinaresponsible,professional,andtransparentmannerwiththepurposeofsafeguardingitslong-termsuccess.Itisintendedtoincreasetheconfidenceofshareholdersandcapital-marketinvestors.

III.therelationshipbetweenthequalityofaccountinginformationandcorporategovernance

Corporategovernanceandaccountinginformationasaproductorserviceonthesupplyside,theenterprisethroughthemarketintocontactwithotheractors,itis"analternativepricingmechanismofresourceallocation"（Coase,1937）.Contracttheorythat“businessisaseriesofcontractualrelationship"（JensenandMeckling,1976）,theownerofitsownfinancialcapital,financialcapital,managementofhumancapitalforitsowncontracting,resultingthecompaniesreflectedanon-humancapitalandhumancapitalcontractsconcluded（ZhouQiren,1996）.Ownersoffinancialcapitalandhumancapitalownersinvesttheirowncapital,anecessaryrequirementtoshareownershipofenterprises,residualclaimandresidualcontrol.However,businessiscontractualelementsofthetransaction（themarketistradingcontract）,fromthecontractualpointofview,thedifferencebetweenenterpriseandmarketenterpriserelativelylowlevelofcompletenessofthiscontract,reflectedinanincompletecontract（StevenCheung,1983）.Astheincompletenessofcontractsforunforeseenmattersinadvance,wemustberesolvedthroughinternalmanagement,namelysolveresidualclaimsandremainingcontroloverthedistribution,inordertomakebothmatcheachother.

Corporategovernanceplaysarole,fromthenarrowpointofview,corporategovernance（thisreferstonarrowcorporategovernance）isthecompany'sboardofdirectorsofthefunction,structure,shareholdersofthepowersystemandotheraspectsofcontractorarrangement.Becauseofasymmetricinformation,theclientcan’tdirectlyobserveormonitortheagent'sbehavior,beforesigningthecontractwillgenerateadverseselectionandmoralhazardaftersigningthecontract,thepartiesthroughappropriatecontractualarrangementsinthecompanyoftherighttoestablishakindsofgoodcorporategovernancestructure,onecanavoidtheuseofinformationsuperioritytomaketheseacts,sothatresidualcontrolrightsandresidualclaimtomatch.Therelativescarcityoffinancialcapitalandhumancapitaloftheweakcollateralwillleadtofinancialcapitalriskinvestmentcompanieswhoarethemainbearer.Astheincompletenessofcontracts,inordertoreducethecontractofnon-humancapitalabuselevelofhumancapital,financialcapitalinvestmentnecessarytoimplementahumancapitalinvestmentoversight.Becauseofasymmetricinformation,aswellascosts,benefits,constraints,neitherwillfinancecapitalinvestmentnormaysupervisetheproductionandoperationtime.Therefore,weneedaccountinginformationdisclosuremechanismtosolvetheproblemoffinancialcapitalinvestment.Accountinginformationreflectsthefinancialposition,operatingresults,cashflow,reflectsmanagement'seffortandtheefficiencyofcapitaluse,etc.,soitbecomeanalternativeoutputvariable,whichreflectsthesystemofcorporategovernancearrangementsofthecontractorresult,thesystemisalsothebasisofcontract.

Corporategovernanceandcorporateaccountinginformationoriginatedinthesamepreparationofincompletecontracts,ownershipofenterpriseswiththesolutionstoshareinformationisnotknown,theagencyproblemmeans,hasanaturalinherent.Theessenceofcorporategovernanceistoprotecttheinterestsofinvestors,andaccountinginformationisalsoresponsiblereflectthetruepositionandthedutiesoffiduciarydutyoperators,bothhavetoimprovecorporatetransparencyfunction.Accountingis"thelanguageoftoday'scorporategovernancestructure"（JeolSeligman,1993）,embodiesthecorporategovernancemechanismsandeffects.Ontheonehand,theaccountinginformationisaninformation,thedisclosureofwhichreducesthedegreeofinformationasymmetry,itisavaluableresource,soisboundtoberesidualcontrolrightsandallocationofresidualclaimsthatcorporategovernancearrangementsimpact,inevitablymarkedwiththestigmaofcorporategovernance;theotherhand,accountinginformationhasexternalities,willbringsomeeconomicconsequences,itisalsoaffectingtheresidualcontrolrightsandresidualclaimsofthedistribution,isthefoundationofcorporategovernance.Accountinginformationisinthisinteractionasanalternativeenterpriseoutputvariablestomeasureandreflecttheefficiencyofcorporategovernance,corporatego