非审计服务对审计费用的影响外文翻译.docx

非审计服务对审计费用的影响外文翻译.docx

《非审计服务对审计费用的影响外文翻译.docx》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《非审计服务对审计费用的影响外文翻译.docx（11页珍藏版）》请在冰豆网上搜索。

非审计服务对审计费用的影响外文翻译

外文文献翻译译文

一、外文原文

原文：

Theeffectofnon-auditservicesonthepricingof

auditservice：

FurtherEvidence

1.Introduction

Simunic[1984]examinedtheeffectoftotalmanagementadvisoryservices（MAS）feesonauditfeesandfound,"theauditfeesofclientswhoalsopurchaseMASfromtheirauditorsaresignificantlyhigherthanauditfeesofclientswhodonotdoso"[1984,p.681].SimunicinterpretedthisresultasconsistentwiththebeneficialeffectsfromjointsupplyofauditandMAS,asfollows:

"...theobservedrelationshipwouldariseiftheproductionofauditinggeneratesknowledgeusefulinMASproductionand/ortheproductionofMASreducesthemarginalcostofauditingandauditdemandisrelativelyelastic"[1984,p.698].Butheemphasizedboththepreliminarynatureofthisresultandtheneedforfurtherevidence.

Inthispaper,Ireporttheresultsofasimilarstudyoftheeffectsoffeesforspecificnon-auditservicesonthepricingofauditservices.Iincludeallnon-auditservicesrenderedbytheincumbentauditfirm,categorizingtheseservicesastax,accounting-relatedMAS,andnon-accountingMAS.ThisdecompositionofMASallowedmetoinvestigatewhethertheproximityoftheservicetoaccountinginfluencestheexistenceandmagnitudeofanybeneficialeffectsfromjointsupply.ThemotivationforconsideringthesecategoriesseparatelystemsfromthedistinctionintheindependenceliteraturebetweenMASthatarerelatedtoaccountants'traditionalareasofexpertiseandexperienceandMASthataremoreremote.Finally,toprovideadditionalinsightintothereasonablenessofthebenefitsfromthejoint-supplyscenario,Iincludednon-auditservicessuppliedbypublicaccountingfirmsotherthantheincumbentauditfirm（non-incumbents）.Presumably,thereshouldbenojoint-supplybenefitsbetweenauditservicessuppliedbytheincumbentCPAfirmandthenon-auditservicessuppliedbynon-incumbentfirms,ceterisparibus.

AssistantProfessor,UniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley.IwouldliketoacknowledgethehelpfulcommentsofDanSimunicandananonymousreferee.IappreciatethefinancialassistanceoftheUniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley,ProfessionalAccountingProgramandtheresearchassistanceofHayYoungChung.[AcceptedforpublicationMarch1986.]

Toinvestigatetheseissues,Iregressedauditfeesonvariablesassumedtoaffecttheirgenerallevel,alongwithfourtestvariablesconsistingofthefeestoincumbentauditorsfortax,accounting-relatedMAS,non-accountingMAS,andthefeestonon-incumbentsfornon-auditservices.Anothermethodoftestingforbeneficialeffectsfromjointsupplyistocompareincumbents'andnonincumbents'nonauditservicesfees.Thisstudymakesnoattempttoformulateapricingmodelfornonauditservices.Althoughclassificationofnon-auditservicessuppliedbynon-incumbentsbytypeofserviceispreferred,datarestrictionsprecludedthisdecomposition.

ConsistentwithSimunic's[1984]result,Ifindapositiverelationbetweenfeesforauditandnon-auditservices.WhilethisresultisstrongestforMAS-accounting,therelationisalsofoundfornon-accounting-MASandtaxservicesacquiredfromincumbentauditors.Resultsforasmallsubsetofmysamplealsoindicatethatauditfeeswerehigherthanpredictedwhennon-auditservicesweresuppliedbynon-incumbentfirms.Thisresultisinconsistentwiththejoint-supplyscenariodiscussedabove.

2.Sample

Thesampleconsistsof298publicandclosely-heldcompaniesfrom12industrieswithBigEightfirmsastheincumbentauditor.Thecompaniesfurnishedinformationforfiscalyear-endsthatcoveredthetimeperiodOctober1980throughOctober1981.Thedataonnon-auditservicesarebasedonresponsestothefollowingquestion:

"Whatwasthetotalcost（feesandreimbursedexpenses）forthelastfiscalyearfortaxandmanagementadvisoryservices（MAS）providedbothbyyourauditfirmandbyotherpublicaccountingfirms?

（WherepossiblepleasesegregateMASintoaccounting-relatedandnon-accounting-relatedservices.Anexampleofanaccounting-relatedMASserviceisthedesignofanewpayrollsystem.Anexampleofanon-accounting-relatedMASserviceisamarketfeasibilitystudy）."

IanalyzedonlycompanieswithBigEightauditorstoobtainamorehomogeneousgroupingfrombothademandandsupplystandpointandtobeconsistentwithSimunic[1984],whosesampleincludedonlyBigEightauditors.

Itreportsthefrequencyofpurchasesofnon-auditservicesforvarioussubsetsofthesample.Severalpointsarenoteworthy.First,259outof298companies（87%）withBigEightincumbentauditorspurchasednon-auditservices,and224ofthese259boughtthemexclusivelyfromtheincumbent.Fortheremaining35companies,8purchasedexclusivelyfromnon-incumbentsand27purchasednon-auditservicesfromboththeincumbentauditorandnon-incumbents.Second,ofthe259companiespurchasingnon-auditservices,115（44%）purchasedmorethanonetype.Third,companiesweremorelikelytobuytaxservicesiftheypurchasedjustonetypeofnon-auditservice（104outof144or72%）.Inaddition,confiningtheanalysistoBigEightauditorsminimizestheneedtoconsidercontrollingfortheeffectofanydifferencesinauditservicequalityonthepricingofauditservices.

Ialsonotedthatlargeclientspurchasednon-auditservicesmorefrequently;160outof177companieswithtotalassetsgreaterthan$150millionpurchasedtheseservicesversus99outof121companieswithtotalassetslessthan$150million.ThisdefinitionoflargeandsmallissimilartothesizedefinitionusedbySimunic[1984]exceptthatSimunicexcludedalllargecompanieswithassetsover$3billion.Theeffectofthisexclusiononthepricingresultsisdiscussedinsection3.SeePalmrose[1986]fordetailsonsampleselectionandcharacteristics.

3.PricingModelandResults

Thefollowingmultipleregressionmodelisusedtoconductthepricinganalysis:

InAuditFee=b0+b1InAssets+b2InLocations+b3InReports+b4%RAI+b5PNP+b6ST+b7InMAS-A+b8InMAS-NA+b9InTax+b10InNANA+b11-12IIV+u

WhereInAuditFee=naturallogofauditfee,andtheindependentvariablesaredividedbetweenthosetocontrolforauditfeedeterminantsandthoseusedastestvariables.

CONTROLVARIABLES

InAssets=naturallogoftotalassets,

InLocations=naturallogofthenumberoflocationsrequiringon-sitevisitsbytheauditors,

InReports=naturallogofthenumberofseparateauditreports,

%RAI=percentagereductioninauditfeefromclientinputs（i.e.,internalaudit,internalcontrol,andutilizationofclientpersonnel）asassessedbyparticipatingcompanies,

PNP=ownershipindicatorvariable,

（1）publiccompanyor（0）nonpubliccompany,

ST=reportmodificationindicatorvariable,

（1）reportmodified（otherthanconsistencyexceptionsfromchangesinGAAP）or（0）allothers,and

IIV=industryindicatorvariables.

TESTVARIABLES

Ineachnonauditservicecategory,companieswithnopurchaseshadazerovalueforthetestvariable.

InMAS-A=naturallogoffeeforMAS-accountingservicessuppliedbyincumbentauditfirm,

InMAS-NA=naturallogoffeeforMAS-non-accountingservicessuppliedbyincumbentauditfirm,

InTax=naturallogoffeefortaxservicessuppliedbyincumbentauditfirm,

InNANA=naturallogoffeefornon-auditservicessuppliedbypublicaccountingfirmsotherthantheincumbentauditfirm,andu=errorterm.

Thesignsofthecoefficientsofthevariablesareexpectedtobepositive,exceptfortheclientparticipation（%RAI）coefficientandthecoefficientsfortheIIVvariablesinregulatedindustries.Coefficientsfortheindustryindicatorvariablesarenegativefortheregulatedindustriesandgenerallypositivefortheotherindustriesincludingofficeequipment.Theonlysignificantcoefficientsareinofficeequipment（overall,smallcompanies,andlargecompanies）,electric/combinationutilities（overallandsmallcompanies）,andsavingsandloans（overallandlargecompanies）.

Thepricingregressionsarepresentedintable2forcompanieswithBigEightauditorsinthreeseparategroupings—theoverallsample,smallcompanies,andlargecompanies.AChowtestaffirmedthereasonablenessofanalyzinglargeandsmallcompaniesseparately.Withthenonauditservicetestvariablesinthepricingregressions,aChowtestrejectsthenullhypothesisofnodifferenceinpricingparametersforlargeandsmallcompanies（a=.05）.Theregressionrelationshipsarestatisticallysignificant（F-tests,a=.01）.Diagnosticanalysisproceduresrevealednosignificantdeviationsfromtheassumptionsoftheregressionmodel.Thecoefficientsforthecontrolvariableshavesignsconsistentwithexpectationswhensignificantandarestatisticallysignificantinmostregressions.Ialsocomparedmeansforeachofthevariablesinthepricingmodel;theonlysignificantdifferencesbetweenpurchasersandnonpurchaserswereinauditfeesandsize（assets）.AuditfeeswerehigherforlargecompaniespurchasingAMS-accountingandMAS-nonaccounting.Likewiseforlargecompanies,assetsweregreaterforpurchasersofMASaccountingandNANAandnonpurchasersoftax.

Forsmallcompanies,onlythetestvariablesMAS-accountingandtaxhavesignificantcoefficients.Forlargecompanies,allofthetestvariablecoefficientsexcepttaxaresignificant.Foreachtypeofservice,whenthecoefficientissignificantitispositive.ThefactthatMAS-accountingissignificantinbothsmallandlargeclientregressions,whileMAS-non-accountingandtaxareeachsignificantinone,supportsthewisdomofdecomposingnon-auditservicesbytypeofservice.NotethattheresultisstrongestforMAS-accounting,thetypeofserviceclosesttoaccounting/auditingconcerns.

Positivecoefficie