地方政府对投资经济增长和就业的影响外文翻译.docx
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地方政府对投资经济增长和就业的影响外文翻译
本科毕业论文外文翻译
外文题目:
TheEffectofLocalGovernmentInvestmentonEconomic
GrowthandEmployment:
EvidencefromTransitional
China
出处:
EcologicEconomy
作者:
Theeffectsoflocalgovernmentinvestmentoneconomicgrowthandemploymen:
evidencefromtransitionalChina
Basedonthepaneldataof28provincesintheyearof1987-2001,thispaperexaminestheeffectsofthelocalgovernmentinvestmentoneconomicgrowthandemployment.Theempliricalresultshowathatthelocalgovernmentinvestmentplaysasignificantpositiveroleineconomicgrowthandemployment.However,whiletheproptionoflocalgovernmentinvestmenttoGDPhadaremarrkableriseafter1998,theelasticityoflocalgovernmentinvestmentoneconomicgrowthdeclined,whichshowsthatthereisabigroomforraisingtheefficiencyoflocalgovernmentinvestment.Moreover,theempiricalexaminationshowsthatalthoughlocalgovernmentinvestmenthadpositiveeffectonemployment,theelasticityhadadecreaseafter1994whenthetax-sharingsystemreformwasputintopractice.Thisshowsthatthepositiveroleoflocalgovernmentinvestmentonemploymentisalsolimited.Thispaperarguesthattheroleoflocalgovernmentiasinvestorsmustbeweakedandlocalgovernmentsofdifferentlevelsshouldlessendirecteconomicinterventionandconcerntrateonpublicregulation.
ThetransitingprocessofChinafromtraditionalplanningeconomytomarketingeconomyisalsoaprocessforgovernmentstochangetheirroles.Inthistransitionprocess.Chinatakesapathofgradualreformation,andthecentralgovernmentgraduallyloosesitsdirectcontroloneconomyandlessensitsadministrativepoweronstate—ownedeconomy.However.theCentralGovernmentdidnotgiveenterprisesthecompleteadministrativepower;instead.itpassedthead.
ministrativepowertolocalgovernments.Thus,thelocalgovernmentsgainedmorepowerineconomiedecision,inexamininglargeinvestmentprojects,andinissuinglicenseandincontrollinglandresources.ThismadethelocalgovernmentshavegreatpoweroninterveningIocaleconomicdevelopment.
Ontheotherhand,theestablishmentoffiscaldecentralizationsysteminagreatdegreeintensifledtheeconomicinterestoflocalgovernments.whichurgedthelocalgovernmentstohavemoreincentivetodevelopIocaleconomy.Underthefiscaldecentralizationsystem.therevenueoflocalgovernmentshighlydependsonthelocaleconomicdevelopment.OnIYwhenthelocaleconomyhasagoodperformance,couldthetaxbasebeexpanded,andrevenuebeincreased.Sothatthelocalgovernmentshavegreatincentivetodevelopthelocaleconomy.Inaddition.ThegrowthrateofGDPandtheemploymentsituationareveryimportantindexesforexaminingofficials’achievements;thisfurtherstrengthenstheincentivesofIocalofficialstodeveloplocaleconomy.Thuslocalgovernmentsofdifierentlevelsusuallyplayaroleofentrepreneursinpro·rootinglocaleconomicdevelopment.ThemostdirecteffectivemeasureforIocalgovernmentstodeveloplocaleconomyistoraiselocalinvestmentlevelthroughvariousways.Inthiswaytheproportionoftheinvestmentprojectsoflocalgovernmentstonationalfixedinvestmentgrowscontinuously;theinvestmcntexpenditurefromlocalgovernmentsthemselveskeepsahighlevel.Withtheestablishmentoffiscaldecentralization,thecapabilityoflocalgovernmentsincontrollingtherevenueswithinbudgetincreasesremarkably.Inaddition,localgovernmentshavealargepertionofrightsindisposingtherevenuesbothoutsidethebudgetandoutsidethesystem;thismakeslocalgovernmentshavefinanceresourcestoinvestininfrastructureconstruction.Infact.inthetotalgovernmentalinvestment,theproportionofinvestmentwithinbudgetdecreasesincreasingly,andthatoutsidethebudgetincreasesincreasingly,andthemostofinvestmentoutsidethebudgetisraisedandusedbylocalgovernments.Moreover,inordertoattractmoreinvestmentfromoutsidesoastopromotethelocaleconomicdevelopment.whiletherevenuesbothwithinandoutsidethebudgetareinsufficentforthedemandofinvestmentexpenditures.somelocalgovernmentstakeapathofraisingaloanfromoutsidetospeeduptheurbandevelopment.Inthepastyears,manylocalgovernmentswere
engagedinthesocalled“citymanagement”,speededupthecitydevelopment,renewedtheinfrastructureincitiesinlargescale.andestablishedeconomicdevelopingareas.Thesenvestmentstakealargeportioninnationaltotalinvestment.FromaboveanalysiswecanseethatlocalgovernmentshavebeenoneofthemaininvestorsinChina’seconomiclife.Atpresent.China’sfixedinvestmenthaschangedfromthatthecentralgovernmentplaysadominantroletothatlocalgovernmentsplayadominantrole.LocalgovernmentsofdifferentlevelshavebecomeanimportantparticipantinChina’seconomiclife.Wemustconsidertheeffectsoflocalgovernmentinvestmentoneconomicgrowthandemploymentwhenstudyingthelattertwo.Basedonthepaneldataof28provincesinthyearof1987-2001.thispaperexaminesandanalysestheeffectsofthelocalgovernmentinvestmentoneconomicgrowthandemployment.Thestructureofthepaperisasfollowing:
thesecondpartisliteraturereview;thethirdpartisanalysisanddesign;theforthpartisthedataandresult;thefifthpartistheconclusionandrevelation.
Weexpecttoexamineifthelocalgovernmentinvestmenthaveremarkableeffectsonemployment,sowetakethelocalgovernmentinvestmentasthemainexplanatoryvariableinmakingtherelevantmodel.Inaddition.inlinewithothervariablesaffectingemployment,weaddedsomecontrolvariables.Accordingto“Philipscarve”.thereisasubstitutionrelationshipbetweeninflationratesandunemploymentrates.ThispaperintroducesCPIintotheempiricaltestofemployment,soastotestiftheinflationlevelhasremarkableeffectsonemploymentinChina.Moreover,thenumberofemoloymentinstate-ownedenterprisestakesagreatratiooftotalemployment.Itshowsthattheestimationvalueisevidentlynot0,whichprovesthattheproportionofemploymentinstate-ownedsectorshasastrongexplanatorycapabilitytothegrowthrateofemployment.
ThereareveryfewliteratureswhichdirectlystudytheeffectsoflocaIgovernmentinvestmentoneconomicgrowthandemployment.mostofliteraturesstartfromfiscaldecentraIization.AWoridBankreportpointsoutthatthoughChinahasasinglegovernmentalsystem,China’ssystemhasastrongcharacteroffederalismbecauseChina’sfinancesystemishighIydecentralizedonsomanydifferentlevelsasCentraIGovernment31provinces,331cities,2,109countiesand44,741towns,
therefore.QianYingyiandWeingastregardthisfederalismofChina,whichformedfromfiscaldecentraIjzation,asmarketpreservingfederalismwithChinesecharacter,QianYingyiandRolandpointoutthattheincentiveofgovernmenttosubsideinefficientprojectsisdeterminedbythetradeofbetweenpoliticalinterestsandeconomiccosts,andtheeconomiccostsdependuponthedegreeofgovernmentaldecentraIization.Theyinsistthat,withthefreemovementofnonstate-ownedcapitals,fiscaldecentralizationhastheeffectofhardeningthebudgetrestrictionofthestate-ownedenterprisescontrolledbylocalgovernments.Thisisbecausethatthecompetitionofattractinginvestmentoflocalgovernmentsmaygenerateexternalities.Thismakestheopportunitycostofsubsidingtheinefficientstate,ownedenterprisestobehigh,thereforeweakenstheincentiveoflocalgovernmenttosaveIosingenterprises.Theyalsobelievethatsuchgovernmentorganizationalreformationasfiscaldecentralizationisanimportantaspectforthetransitionfromplanningeconomytomarketingeconomy.LinYifuandLiuZhiqiang,employingprovincialdataassessedtheeffectsofChina’sfiscaldecentralizationstartedfroml980sontheeconomicgrowth.Theyfoundthat,aftercontrollingtheeffectsofotherreformationsoccurredatthesametime,fiscaldecentralizationraisestheprovincialGDPgrowthrateinpercapitaaspect,thisshowsthatfiscaldecentralizationpromoteseconomicgrowththroughraisingtheefficiencyofresourcedistribution.Theybelievethatthepositiveeffectsofficaldecentralizationoneconomicdevelopmentareduetothat,relativetocentralgovernment,theprovincialgovernmentshaveinformationadvantageinsatisfyinglocaldemand;thus,theycouldprovidebetterpublicgoodsandserviceswhichhavelargeeffectsonlocaleconomicenvironment.ZhangWeiyingandSuShuhearguethatthedecentralizationhappeningintheearlyof1980sledtoregionalcompetitionwhichledtoprivatization.Theestablishmentofdecentralizedsystemacceleratestheincentiveoflocalgovernmentstopursueprofit,whichcausesthehighcompetitionbetweenlocalgovernments,whichfacilitatesthemarketorientedmovementofthewholeeconomy.Duetotheintenseregionalcompetitionintheproductmarket,eachregionhastomakeeffortstodecreaseitsproductioncostsoastooccupyaspaceinthemarketcompetition.Inordertoeffectivelycutthecost,localgovernmentsmakesuchchoiceasgivingthewholeorpartofsharetomanagersto
givethemincentives,whichacceleratesthegrowthofmarketandeconomicdevelopment.
Therearealsosomewriterswhohavenotedthenegativeeffectsoflocalgovernmentinvestingbehavior.Astotheaspectofreducingtheefficiencyofsocialresourcesdistribution,LuMing,ChenZhaoandYanJiwhotaketheangleoftheisolationofregionaleconomy,XuYingwhotaketheangleofconflictofregionaleconomy,HuRongtao,ZhangXuyingandSuMingbingwhotaketheangleofthesimilarizationofindustrialstructure,withgametheory,haverespectivelyanalyzedthestr