地方政府对投资经济增长和就业的影响外文翻译.docx

地方政府对投资经济增长和就业的影响外文翻译.docx

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地方政府对投资经济增长和就业的影响外文翻译

本科毕业论文外文翻译

外文题目：

TheEffectofLocalGovernmentInvestmentonEconomic

GrowthandEmployment:

EvidencefromTransitional

China

出处：

EcologicEconomy

作者：

Theeffectsoflocalgovernmentinvestmentoneconomicgrowthandemploymen：

evidencefromtransitionalChina

Basedonthepaneldataof28provincesintheyearof1987-2001,thispaperexaminestheeffectsofthelocalgovernmentinvestmentoneconomicgrowthandemployment.Theempliricalresultshowathatthelocalgovernmentinvestmentplaysasignificantpositiveroleineconomicgrowthandemployment.However,whiletheproptionoflocalgovernmentinvestmenttoGDPhadaremarrkableriseafter1998,theelasticityoflocalgovernmentinvestmentoneconomicgrowthdeclined,whichshowsthatthereisabigroomforraisingtheefficiencyoflocalgovernmentinvestment.Moreover,theempiricalexaminationshowsthatalthoughlocalgovernmentinvestmenthadpositiveeffectonemployment,theelasticityhadadecreaseafter1994whenthetax-sharingsystemreformwasputintopractice.Thisshowsthatthepositiveroleoflocalgovernmentinvestmentonemploymentisalsolimited.Thispaperarguesthattheroleoflocalgovernmentiasinvestorsmustbeweakedandlocalgovernmentsofdifferentlevelsshouldlessendirecteconomicinterventionandconcerntrateonpublicregulation.

ThetransitingprocessofChinafromtraditionalplanningeconomytomarketingeconomyisalsoaprocessforgovernmentstochangetheirroles．Inthistransitionprocess．Chinatakesapathofgradualreformation，andthecentralgovernmentgraduallyloosesitsdirectcontroloneconomyandlessensitsadministrativepoweronstate—ownedeconomy．However．theCentralGovernmentdidnotgiveenterprisesthecompleteadministrativepower；instead．itpassedthead．

ministrativepowertolocalgovernments．Thus，thelocalgovernmentsgainedmorepowerineconomiedecision，inexamininglargeinvestmentprojects，andinissuinglicenseandincontrollinglandresources．ThismadethelocalgovernmentshavegreatpoweroninterveningIocaleconomicdevelopment．

Ontheotherhand，theestablishmentoffiscaldecentralizationsysteminagreatdegreeintensifledtheeconomicinterestoflocalgovernments．whichurgedthelocalgovernmentstohavemoreincentivetodevelopIocaleconomy．Underthefiscaldecentralizationsystem．therevenueoflocalgovernmentshighlydependsonthelocaleconomicdevelopment．OnIYwhenthelocaleconomyhasagoodperformance，couldthetaxbasebeexpanded，andrevenuebeincreased．Sothatthelocalgovernmentshavegreatincentivetodevelopthelocaleconomy．Inaddition．ThegrowthrateofGDPandtheemploymentsituationareveryimportantindexesforexaminingofficials’achievements；thisfurtherstrengthenstheincentivesofIocalofficialstodeveloplocaleconomy．Thuslocalgovernmentsofdifierentlevelsusuallyplayaroleofentrepreneursinpro·rootinglocaleconomicdevelopment．ThemostdirecteffectivemeasureforIocalgovernmentstodeveloplocaleconomyistoraiselocalinvestmentlevelthroughvariousways．Inthiswaytheproportionoftheinvestmentprojectsoflocalgovernmentstonationalfixedinvestmentgrowscontinuously；theinvestmcntexpenditurefromlocalgovernmentsthemselveskeepsahighlevel．Withtheestablishmentoffiscaldecentralization,thecapabilityoflocalgovernmentsincontrollingtherevenueswithinbudgetincreasesremarkably．Inaddition，localgovernmentshavealargepertionofrightsindisposingtherevenuesbothoutsidethebudgetandoutsidethesystem；thismakeslocalgovernmentshavefinanceresourcestoinvestininfrastructureconstruction．Infact．inthetotalgovernmentalinvestment，theproportionofinvestmentwithinbudgetdecreasesincreasingly,andthatoutsidethebudgetincreasesincreasingly,andthemostofinvestmentoutsidethebudgetisraisedandusedbylocalgovernments．Moreover，inordertoattractmoreinvestmentfromoutsidesoastopromotethelocaleconomicdevelopment．whiletherevenuesbothwithinandoutsidethebudgetareinsufficentforthedemandofinvestmentexpenditures．somelocalgovernmentstakeapathofraisingaloanfromoutsidetospeeduptheurbandevelopment．Inthepastyears，manylocalgovernmentswere

engagedinthesocalled“citymanagement”,speededupthecitydevelopment，renewedtheinfrastructureincitiesinlargescale．andestablishedeconomicdevelopingareas．Thesenvestmentstakealargeportioninnationaltotalinvestment．FromaboveanalysiswecanseethatlocalgovernmentshavebeenoneofthemaininvestorsinChina’seconomiclife．Atpresent．China’sfixedinvestmenthaschangedfromthatthecentralgovernmentplaysadominantroletothatlocalgovernmentsplayadominantrole.LocalgovernmentsofdifferentlevelshavebecomeanimportantparticipantinChina’seconomiclife．Wemustconsidertheeffectsoflocalgovernmentinvestmentoneconomicgrowthandemploymentwhenstudyingthelattertwo．Basedonthepaneldataof28provincesinthyearof1987-2001．thispaperexaminesandanalysestheeffectsofthelocalgovernmentinvestmentoneconomicgrowthandemployment．Thestructureofthepaperisasfollowing：

thesecondpartisliteraturereview;thethirdpartisanalysisanddesign;theforthpartisthedataandresult；thefifthpartistheconclusionandrevelation.

Weexpecttoexamineifthelocalgovernmentinvestmenthaveremarkableeffectsonemployment，sowetakethelocalgovernmentinvestmentasthemainexplanatoryvariableinmakingtherelevantmodel．Inaddition．inlinewithothervariablesaffectingemployment，weaddedsomecontrolvariables．Accordingto“Philipscarve”．thereisasubstitutionrelationshipbetweeninflationratesandunemploymentrates．ThispaperintroducesCPIintotheempiricaltestofemployment，soastotestiftheinflationlevelhasremarkableeffectsonemploymentinChina．Moreover,thenumberofemoloymentinstate-ownedenterprisestakesagreatratiooftotalemployment．Itshowsthattheestimationvalueisevidentlynot0，whichprovesthattheproportionofemploymentinstate-ownedsectorshasastrongexplanatorycapabilitytothegrowthrateofemployment．

ThereareveryfewliteratureswhichdirectlystudytheeffectsoflocaIgovernmentinvestmentoneconomicgrowthandemployment．mostofliteraturesstartfromfiscaldecentraIization．AWoridBankreportpointsoutthatthoughChinahasasinglegovernmentalsystem,China’ssystemhasastrongcharacteroffederalismbecauseChina’sfinancesystemishighIydecentralizedonsomanydifferentlevelsasCentraIGovernment31provinces,331cities,2,109countiesand44,741towns，

therefore.QianYingyiandWeingastregardthisfederalismofChina，whichformedfromfiscaldecentraIjzation,asmarketpreservingfederalismwithChinesecharacter,QianYingyiandRolandpointoutthattheincentiveofgovernmenttosubsideinefficientprojectsisdeterminedbythetradeofbetweenpoliticalinterestsandeconomiccosts,andtheeconomiccostsdependuponthedegreeofgovernmentaldecentraIization.Theyinsistthat,withthefreemovementofnonstate-ownedcapitals,fiscaldecentralizationhastheeffectofhardeningthebudgetrestrictionofthestate-ownedenterprisescontrolledbylocalgovernments．Thisisbecausethatthecompetitionofattractinginvestmentoflocalgovernmentsmaygenerateexternalities．Thismakestheopportunitycostofsubsidingtheinefficientstate,ownedenterprisestobehigh,thereforeweakenstheincentiveoflocalgovernmenttosaveIosingenterprises.Theyalsobelievethatsuchgovernmentorganizationalreformationasfiscaldecentralizationisanimportantaspectforthetransitionfromplanningeconomytomarketingeconomy.LinYifuandLiuZhiqiang,employingprovincialdataassessedtheeffectsofChina’sfiscaldecentralizationstartedfroml980sontheeconomicgrowth．Theyfoundthat,aftercontrollingtheeffectsofotherreformationsoccurredatthesametime,fiscaldecentralizationraisestheprovincialGDPgrowthrateinpercapitaaspect,thisshowsthatfiscaldecentralizationpromoteseconomicgrowththroughraisingtheefficiencyofresourcedistribution.Theybelievethatthepositiveeffectsofficaldecentralizationoneconomicdevelopmentareduetothat,relativetocentralgovernment，theprovincialgovernmentshaveinformationadvantageinsatisfyinglocaldemand；thus，theycouldprovidebetterpublicgoodsandserviceswhichhavelargeeffectsonlocaleconomicenvironment．ZhangWeiyingandSuShuhearguethatthedecentralizationhappeningintheearlyof1980sledtoregionalcompetitionwhichledtoprivatization．Theestablishmentofdecentralizedsystemacceleratestheincentiveoflocalgovernmentstopursueprofit，whichcausesthehighcompetitionbetweenlocalgovernments,whichfacilitatesthemarketorientedmovementofthewholeeconomy.Duetotheintenseregionalcompetitionintheproductmarket，eachregionhastomakeeffortstodecreaseitsproductioncostsoastooccupyaspaceinthemarketcompetition.Inordertoeffectivelycutthecost,localgovernmentsmakesuchchoiceasgivingthewholeorpartofsharetomanagersto

givethemincentives,whichacceleratesthegrowthofmarketandeconomicdevelopment．

Therearealsosomewriterswhohavenotedthenegativeeffectsoflocalgovernmentinvestingbehavior．Astotheaspectofreducingtheefficiencyofsocialresourcesdistribution,LuMing,ChenZhaoandYanJiwhotaketheangleoftheisolationofregionaleconomy，XuYingwhotaketheangleofconflictofregionaleconomy,HuRongtao，ZhangXuyingandSuMingbingwhotaketheangleofthesimilarizationofindustrialstructure，withgametheory，haverespectivelyanalyzedthestr