在新兴市场如何处理债务重组外文翻译.docx

在新兴市场如何处理债务重组外文翻译.docx

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在新兴市场如何处理债务重组外文翻译

本科毕业论文（设计）

外文翻译

外文题目Howtotackledebtrestructuringinemergingmarkets/Mappingthedangersofdebtrestructuring

外文出处国际金融法律评论/国际税务回顾

外文作者卡格曼.史蒂文/克隆普.赫仑纳

原文：

Howtotackledebtrestructuringinemergingmarkets

Thepresentslowdownintheglobaleconomyhasfocusedrenewedattentionontheissueofrestructuringtroubledloansinemergingmarkets.Debtrestructuringsinthesemarketsoftenrepresentauniqueamalgamoflegal,business,financialandstrategicissues.

TRYINGTOMAKETIMELYINTHERESTRUCTURINGPROCESS

Manyemergingmarketrestructuringscan,forvariousreasons,easilytakeafewyearstocomplete,andthecreditorsanddebtormayhavesharplydivergentperspectivesonwhetheritisintheirfundamentalinteresttoachievearelativelyquicksolution.Itisnotuncommoninrestructuringsituationsfordebtorstobelievethattimeisontheirside,andthisperceptiononthepartofdebtorsisoftengroundedinreality.Bycontrast,thecreditorsmaygenerallyviewtimeastheirenemy.Sincemanyrestructuringsinvolvesomeformofdebtservicemoratoriumordebtstandstill,thecreditorswillbeanxioustoreacharestructuringsolutionaspromptlyaspossible.Thecreditorsobviouslywillwanttheirdebtservicepaymentstoresumeattheearliestpossibledate.

Thedebtor,ontheotherhand,maybelessmotivatedtokeeptheprocessmovingforwardwithanytypeofalacrity.Assumingthatitcancontinuetomeetitsworkingcapitalandotherbasicneedsandotherwisecontinuetofunctionasagoingconcern,somedebtorsmaybeperfectlycontenttomaintainadebtservicemoratoriumordebtstandstill.Byforegoingdebtservicepayments,thedebtormaybeabletoaccumulatesomecashonhand,whichmaywellbebeyondthereachorcontrolofthecreditors.Undersuchcircumstances,itisnotinconceivablethatcertaindebtorsmaythereforeberelativelyuninterestedinactivelypursuingandreachingarestructuringsolutionwiththeircreditors.However,itshouldbenotedthatcertainlynotalldebtorswillbehavethisway.Debtors,forexample,thataregenuinelyconcernedabouttheirlong-termreputationalinterestsand,inparticular,theirabilitytotapthecapitalandcreditmarketsinthefuturemaytakealesscavalierattitudetowardsadvancingtherestructuringprocess.

TIMETABLES

Inlightofthesepossiblydivergentperspectivesbetweenthecreditorsanddebtorontheurgencyoftherestructuringtask,creditorsmayseektoestablishtimetablesforaccomplishingkeymilestonesintherestructuringprocess.Ifpossible,suchtimetablesmaybediscussedwithandagreeduponwiththedebtor.Thisprocesscouldinvolvesomenegotiationbetweenthetwosidesonwhatarerealisticdeadlinesandwhataretheimportantmilestonesintheprocess.Eachofthemajorphasesoftherestructuringprocess—suchasthecreditors'duediligenceinvestigationofthedebtor,negotiationofatermsheet,documentationoftherestructuringdealand,finally,closingthedealwillhaveitsownmajormilestones.Forinstance,intheduediligencephaseoftheprocess,someoftherelevantmilestonesmayinclude,amongotherthings,thefollowingitems:

（1）negotiatingandsigningconfidentialityagreementsbetweensteeringcommitteemembersandtheiroutsideadvisers,ontheonehand,andthedebtor,ontheotherhand;

（2）agreeingonanappropriatescopeofworkfortheduediligenceinvestigation（whichwilllikelybeundertakenbyafinancialadvisertothesteeringcommittee）;and（3）receivingspecifiedfinancialandbusinessinformationfromthedebtor,suchasbusinessplans,cashflowprojections,salesandpricinginformation（historicalandprojected）,andsoforth.

Thepresenceofafairlyspecificanddetailedtimetablemayhelpbringdisciplinetotheprocesssothatitdoesnotproceedinahaphazardordesultoryfashion.Inaddition,atimelinemayhelpthecreditorsdeterminewhetherornotthedebtoristryingtoadvancetherestructuringprocessorisinsteadattemptingtodeliberatelydelaytheprocess.Incertainrestructurings,creditorswillneedtoaskthemselveswhetherthelackofprogressisbasedonjustifiablereasons,suchasthecomplexityofdocumentingagivenrestructuringdealortheintricacyofthedebtor'sbusinessorganizationandstructure,orwhetherthedelayisanindicationthatfundamentallythedebtorisnotnegotiatingingoodfaith.Inthelattercase,thecreditorsmaybeforcedtocometotheconclusionthataconsensualrestructuringwithsuchadebtormaynotbearealisticorviableoption.

DETERMININGTHEROLEOFTHECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERINTHERESTRUCTUREDCOMPANY

Manyemergingmarketrestructuringsinvolvethephenomenonoftheso-calledcontrollingshareholder,meaningtheshareholderthatholdsacontrollinginterestinthedebtorcompany.Thesecontrollingshareholdersmayrepresentinfluentialfamilyinterestsinthehostcountry.Suchshareholdersmaynotonlyholdalargeandcontrollingequitystakeinthedebtorcompany,butvariousmembersofthefamilyofthecontrollingshareholdermayalsooccupyanumberofthekeymanagementpositionswiththedebtor.Inshort,inanumberofemergingmarketjurisdictions,theremaybenocleardemarcationbetweenownershipandmanagementofcertaindebtorsgiventheuniqueroleofthecontrollingshareholders.

Incertainrestructurings,thecreditorsmaybelieve,correctlyorotherwise,thatafairamountofthedebtor'sfinancialtravailscanbeattributedtothemismanagementofthecompany'saffairsbythecontrollingshareholder.Asaresult,intherestructuringprocess,thecreditorsmayinitiallybeinterestedinGraftingarestructuringplanthatinvolvestheremovalofthecontrollingshareholderfromanycontinuingroleinmanagement.Fundamentally,thecreditorsmaybelievethattheyarefacedwithasimplebinarychoice—namely,tokeepexistingmanagementortohaveexistingmanagementforcedoutofthecompany.Yet,inrealityandtotheirpossibledismay,thecreditorsmaybeconfrontedwithmuchlessofaclear-cutchoicethanappearsatfirstblush.

CONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERS

Inmanyinstances,thecontrollingshareholdersmaybedeeplyentrenchedandhenceverydifficulttoremovefromtheirdominantpositionatthedebtorcompany.AstheAsianDevelopmentBanknotedina1999reportoninsolvencylawissuesintheAsian-Pacificregion,theownersoffinanciallydistressedcorporationsareoftendrivenbyafearoflossofcontrolofthecorporation.（Thesameobservationcouldbeappliedwithequalforcetocertainemergingmarketsinotherpartsoftheworld）.AsimilarpointrelatingtoinsolvencyproceedingswasmaderecentlybySamuelTobing,chiefoperatingofficeroftheIndonesian-basedJakartaInitiativeTaskForce,inJuly2002presentationtoanAsiaPacificEconomicConferencesymposium.Hesaid:

“Itshouldbenotedthatincertainemergingeconomies,corporateassetsareconcentratedinthehandsofasmallnumberofwell-connectedindividualsorfamilies.Whenfacedwiththelossofownership,thesegroupsmayseektoexerttheirinfluencetofrustratetheoperationoftheinsolvencysystem.”Giventheattitudesdescribedabove,certaincontrollingshareholdersinvolvedinrestructuringsituationsmaybeunwillingtoagreeto—andindeedmaypossiblyeventrytoscuttle—anyrestructuringplanthatwouldhavetheeffectofremovingthemfrompowerinthemanagementstructureofthedebtorcompany.

However,ifitisclearthatthecreditorswillbeunabletoremovethecontrollingshareholdersfrommanagement,thecreditorsaspartoftherestructuringplanmayneverthelesstrytoinstitutearangeofcorporategovernancereforms.Suchreformsmaybedesignedtolimitandcontrolthepowerandinfluenceofthecontrollingshareholdersintherestructuredcompany.

CORPORATEGOVERNANCEREFORMS

Specifically,amongarangeofsuchpossiblecorporategovernancereforms,thecreditorsmaytrytoreconfigurethecompany'sboardofdirectorsanditscommitteestructure.Forexample,thecreditorsmayseektohaveindependentdirectorsplayagreaterrole,andtheymayseektohavecertainboardcommittees,suchastheauditcommittee,havedirectoversightovercertainmanagementfunctions.Thecreditorsmaybeaidedintheireffortsatsuchcorporategovernancereformbychangesinthelocalcorporateandsecuritieslaw.Forinstance,inMexico,recentchangestothesecuritieslawsrequiretheestablishmentofindependentauditcommitteesforpubliccompanies.

Inaddition,thecreditorsmayseekgreaterinternalmanagementandauditcontrolsincertainkeyareasofthedebtor'soperationssuchasinthefinancefunctionsofthedebtor.Bywayofexample,thecreditorsmayattempttoimposegreatercontrolovertheprocessbywhichcompanyofficialscanapprovedisbursementsandsigncheques,particularlyfordisbursementsoverspecifieddollarthresholds.Thecreditorsmayalsoseektosubjectcertaintypesoftransactions,suchasrelatedpartytransactionsormajorcorporatetransactionsincludingproposedmergers,acquisitionsorassetdispositions,tosupermajorityapprovalrequirementsbytheboardofdirectorsortheshareholders,asthecasemaybe.Suchproposedcorporategovernancereformsshouldbecarefullyanalyzedbylocalcounseltoensurethattheyareconsistentwiththelocalcorporateandsecuritieslaws.

Insum,inanumberofemergingmarketrestructurings,thecreditorsmaybefacedwiththeunpleasantbutstubbornrealitythattheywillnotbeabletoremovethecontrollingshareholderfrommanagementoreliminatethecontrollingshareholder'scontinuedequitycontrolofthedebtor.Thecreditorsmaythereforehavetoshifttheirfocustodevelopinganapproachforarestructuringplanthatseek