城市经济学奥沙利文Chap011.ppt

城市经济学奥沙利文Chap011.ppt

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UrbanEconomics城市城市经济学城市经济学11MassTransitMassTransit:

IntroductionWhydosofewcommutersusemasstransit?

Whenarebusesbetterthanrailsystems（lightandheavy）?

Whatpopulationdensityisrequiredtosupportmasstransit?

Howdoestransitrevenuecomparetocost?

Howwouldderegulationaffecttransitoptions?

11-211-3VariationinRidershipAcrossMetropolitanAreasNewYork:

25%commutersusepublictransitShares10-14%:

Chicago,Washington,PhiladelphiaTrillion-mileclub:

NewYork,Chicago,LosAngeles,Washington,SanFrancisco,Boston,Philadelphia,Boston,Seattle11-4CostofTravelandModalChoiceSumofmonetarycost,accesscost,andin-vehiclecostda=marginaldisutiltyofaccesstime;approximately80%ofwagedv=marginaldisutiltyofin-vehicletime;approximately50%ofwage11-511-6Result:

AutohasLowestCostAutoadvantageinaccesstimedominatesmonetarydisadvantageAutoadvantageis$6.26overbus&7.52overrailExampleillustrateswhysolodrivingchosenby75%ofcommuters11-7TippingthebalanceinfavoroftransitLowerincome:

lowerdisutilityoftraveltimeImprovedtransitservice:

Decreaseinaccess&in-vehiclecostFreetransit?

Parkingcost:

Fullcostof$15forurbanworkplaceInternalizeautoexternalities:

$0.145permileadds$2.90todailydrivingcost11-811-9ElasticitiesofDemandforTransitOverallpriceelasticity=-0.40TransitridershipismoreelasticwithrespecttoserviceBoston:

timeelasticity=-0.80,comparedtofareelasticity=-0.50ServiceimprovementsmatchedwithproportionatefareincreasesridershipRidershipmoreresponsivetochangesinaccesstimethantochangesinin-vehicletime11-1011-11Figure11-1:

AverageCostforTransitSystemAC（operator）:

negativelyslopedfromconventionalscaleeconomies:

spreadthefixedcostofindivisibleinputsAC（time）:

ridertimecostIncreaseinridershipallowsmorefrequentserviceandloweraccesstimecostExample:

triplingridershipfromR1toR3decreasestimecostfromt1tot3Sumofoperatorandridercost:

Negativelysloped11-1211-13OptimumRidershipandPriceMarginalcostislessthanaveragecostAveragecostincludesfixedcostofindivisibleinputsMohringeconomies:

marginaltimecost30,000HeavyrailisefficientchoiceforNewYorkandChicagoNewheavyrail（Washington,Atlanta,Baltimore,Miami）:

ridershipbelowthreshold11-27CloserLookatLightRailLightrailismorecostlythanbussystemHighercapitalcost:

5xcost（$881mvs.$168minLongBeach）Higheroperatingcost:

$0.38（PortlandsMAX）$0.35forbusDivertsbuspassengers:

63%ofLABlueLineformerbusridersFeederbusesimposeaccesscostsonriders11-2811-29RoleofDensityFewUSmetroareameetdensitythresholdsforfrequentbusserviceNYmeetsminimumforlightrailandbusHonolulumeetsminimumforintermediatebusservice10mostdensemetroareasnearlymeetminimumforinfrequentbusCentralareasofsomemetroareasexceedthresholdforlightrailandheavyrail11-3011-31RegulationofUrbanMassTransitPublictransitmonopoly:

firmscannotcompeteTaxiscannotserveascommoncarrierRationale?

Preventcreamskimmingandunderminingcrosssubsidiesforlow-volumeroutesAlternativeistodirectlysubsidizelow-volumeroutes11-32ContractingforTransitServicesLocalgovernmentspecifiesservicesandfares,andacceptslowbidCostsavingsof25-30%Lowercostforfirms:

lowwage,flexibleworkrules;minibuses11-33ParatransitServicesbetweenautomobileandconventionalbusShared-ridetaxis（3-4passengers）,jitneys（6-15passengers）Subscriptionbus（10-60passengers）11-34TheBritishExperiencewithDeregulationTransportAct（1985）:

entry,competitivebidding,lowersubsidiesResults:

moreminivans,lowercostsfromlowerwagesandflexibleworkrules,eliminationoflow-volumeserviceLessonsCompetitioncombinedwithsubsidiesforlow-volumeroutesCompetitiongeneratesinnovationandcutscostsPoliciestofostercompetitionnecessary11-3511-36TransitandLand-UsePatterns:

BARTCaseObjective:

IncreaseemploymentneartransitstationsClusteringnegligibleoutsidecentralbusinessdistrictCombiningrailtransitinvestmentwithpoliciesthatpromotedensityincreasesemployment11-37