瑞士的股利政策外文翻译文档格式.docx

瑞士的股利政策外文翻译文档格式.docx

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一、外文原文

原文:

DividendpolicyinSwitzerland

Dividendpolicyhaslongbeenasubjectofresearchanddebate.Therearemanytheoreticalandempiricalresultsdescribingthedecisionscompaniesmakeinthisarea.Atthesametime,however,thereisnogenerallyacceptedmodeldescribingpayoutpolicy.Moreover,empiricalfindingsareoftencontradictoryordifficulttointerpretinlightofthetheory.

IntheidealworldofMillerandModigliani（1961）,dividendsareirrelevant.Thevalueofafirmisgivenbyitsinvestmentopportunities.Dividendsarejusttheresidual,andinvestorsfacedwithconsumptionshockscanalwaysgettheirown“homemade”dividends.

In“reallife”,however,dividendpolicyisoneofthemainconcernsformanagersandinvestors.Empiricalstudieshavegenerallyfoundthatdividendincreasesareconsideredgoodnewsbyinvestors,whiledividenddecreasesleadtonegativereactions.

Severalexplanationsfortheexistenceandimportanceofdividendshavebeensuggestedoverthelastdecades.Dividendscouldbeusedassignalsfortheactualpositionofafirm.Companiescouldcommunicatetheirbetterqualitybypayinghigherdividends:

low-qualityfirmswillnotbeabletoimitatethemsincedividendsinvolvecostsintermsofforegoneinvestment,taxes,ortheneedtoattractexternalcapital.Agencytheorysuggeststhatdividendsmaybeawaytoreducetheoverinvestmentproblemorameanstokeepfirmsinthecapitalmarkets.Dividendsmayalsobeusedtoattractinstitutionalinvestors,whoarebettermonitorsandpreferdividendsforregulatoryreasons.Behavioralaspects,suchasself-control,fairness,orregretaversion,mayalsobeimportantpartsofthepicture.

Eachofthemaintheoriesconcerningdividendpolicyhasfoundatleastsome

supportinactualdata.However,empiricalresearchhasalsorevealedweaknessesoftheseexplanations,andabroadconsensusconcerningthe“best”theoryofcorporate

payoutseemsfaraway.Wemayknowmoreaboutthe“dividendpuzzle”,butweare

stillwithoutadefinitesolution.

ThepresentpaperexaminessomeofthecharacteristicsofdividendpolicyusingSwissdata.Thefirstpartpresentsfactorsthatinfluencevariationsindividendpaymentsacrosscompaniesatagivenpointintime.Thesecondpartanalyzesthechangesindividendsovertime.

Thecross-sectionalanalysisforthe2000–2003periodscomparesthe

characteristicsofdividendpayersandnon-payers.Itthenidentifiesseveraldeterminantsofthedifferencesbetweendividendpayersintermsofpayoutratiosanddividendyields.Theresultsshowthatcompaniesthatarelessrisky,larger,withlowergrowthopportunities,andwithlowerleveragetendtopayhigherdividends.Institutionsshowapreferencefordividend-payingcompanies,butthereislittleevidencethattheypreferhigherpayoutratiosordividendyields.

Quiteinterestingly,thefactorthatturnsouttohavethestrongestinfluenceonpayoutratiosanddividendyieldsispricevolatility.Thismaybeinterpretedasasignthatcompanieswithhigherearningsuncertaintyarelesslikelytopayhighdividends-ortopaydividendsatall.

Dividendspersharearemuchmorewidespreadasaheadlineindicatorofdividendpolicy.Thefinalsectionofthepaperlooksatchangesin（split-adjusted）dividendspershareandseekstodeterminewhetherthesechangeshaveinformationalcontent.Theresultsshowthatdividendincreasesfollowperiodsofhighearningsand

cashflowgrowth,whereasdividenddecreasesfollowdeclines.

Acloserlookatthedatarevealsthattheremayneverthelessbesomeinformationconveyedbydividendchanges.Theaveragefuturelevelofearningsafterdividendincreasesissignificantlyhigherthanthemeanoverthepreviousfewyears.Theearningsofcompaniesthatdecreasethedividenddeclineslightlyandremainatapersistentlylowlevelaroundthedividendchange.

Animportantclassofmodelsisbasedontheideathattheassumptionofperfect

informationmaybeunrealisticandthatdividendscanbeusedassignalsoffirmquality.Bhattacharya（1979）buildsatwo-periodmodelwithtwotypesoffirms.Investmentsaremadeduringthefirstperiod;

theirexpectedprofitabilityisknowntomanagement,butnottooutsideinvestors.Inordertosignalthequalityoftheirinvestment,themanagersof“good”firms（managersareassumedtoactintheinterestofinitialshareholders）willcommittopayinghighdividendsinthesecondperiod.Sinceattractingoutsidefinancing（duringthesecondperiod）isexpensiveduetotransactioncosts,“low-quality”firmswillbeunabletoimitate“high-quality”ones.

ThealternativemodelsofMillerandRock（1985）andJohnandWilliams（1985）considerthecostofdividendsintermsofforegoneinvestmentsandtaxes,respectively.

Thesignalingmodelsprovideanexplanationforthepositivestockpricereactiontotheannouncementofdividendincreasesorinitiations.However,theempiricalevidenceonthishypothesisismixed.Inanearlystudy,Watts（1973）foundthatunexpectedchangesinearningsandunexpectedchangesindividendswererelated,althoughheremainedskepticalaboutthepossibilitytomakemoneybyexploitingthisregularity.Penman（1983）findsthat“bothdividendannouncementsandmanagement’searningsforecastspossessinformationaboutmanagement’sexpectations”.Usingasampleofdividendinitiationsandomissions,Healy（1988）findthatdividendinitiationsandomissionshaveinformationalcontent（thechangeinearningsisrelatedtoannouncement-dayreturns,evenwhencontrollingforpreviousearnings）,butthisonlyholdsforyear1.YoonandStarks（1995）andDenisetal（1994）showthatdividendchangeannouncementsarelinkedtorevisionsinanalysts’forecastsofcurrentincome.

Basedonthemixedresultsforthesignalingtheory,Grullonetal（2002）suggestthat,ratherthananincreaseinprofitability,dividendincreasescouldreflectadecreaseinrisk–the“maturityhypothesis”.Theyfindthatwhileprofitabilitydeclinesfollowingadividendincrease,systematicriskinathree-factorFameFrenchmodeldecreases.Theyarguethatasfirmsbecomemoremature（andthereforelessrisky,butwithlowergrowthopportunities）,theywillbemorelikelytopaylarge

dividendstotheirshareholders.

Agencytheorysuggeststhatdividendscanbeusedasameanstocontrolafirm’smanagement.Distributingdividendsreducesthefreecashflowproblemandincreasesthemanagement’sequitystake.Easterbrook（1984）alsosuggeststhatdividendscan

beusedtokeepfirmsincapitalmarkets,wheretheyaremonitoredbypotentialinvestors.Thisisusefulsincemonitoringbyexistingshareholderscanbehinderedbycoordinationproblems.Lang（1989）findthatdividendincreasesareassociatedwithhigherpositivesharepricereactionsforcompanieswithTobin’sqsmallerthanunity,

i.e.,forcompanieswithlowergrowthopportunities.

Otherevidence,however,tendstoqualifytheagencyexplanation.Capitalexpendituresincreasefollowingdividendincreases,anddecreasefollowingdividenddecreasesandomissionscomparedtothepreviousaverage（ThisisinlinewiththefindingsofYoonandStarks1995andDenisetal.1994）.Moreover,companiesthatincreasedividendshavenothadsignificantlyhigherincreasesincapitalexpenditureovertheprevious2years,whilecompaniesthatomitdividendsshowasignificantslowdownoverthesameperiod.Thus,dividendincreasesdonotfollowaninvestmentboom,whiledividendcutsandomissionsarenotassociatedwithsubsequenthigherinvestmentthatmayindicatebettergrowthopportunities.Cashflowsandcashlevelsfordividend-increasingcompaniesremainatahighlevelandevenincreaseoverthemediumterm.

Dividendsmaythusbecomeinformativeaboutearningsinawaynotenvisagedinclassicalsignalingmodels.Sincemanagerswanttoavoiddividenddecreases,theywillonlyincreasedividendswhentheyarereasonablysurethattherehasbeenasustainableincreaseinearnings.Theywillalsocutoromitdividendsonlywhenthefirm’searningspositionhasdeterioratedconsiderably.Asaresult,adividendincrease

willfollowaperiodofsignificantearningsgrowthandconfirmthatthenew,higherlevelofearningsispersistent.Atthesametime,dividenddecreaseswillfollowaslowdownandconfirmthatthefirmwillstillbeinadifficultpositioninthefuture.Indeed,althoughtheirstudyseriouslychallengestheroleofdividendchangesasasignalforfutureearnings,Benartzietal.（1997）findthatearningsarelesslikelyto

decreasefollowingdividendincreases.

ThepaperhasexaminedseveralfeaturesofdividendpolicyforasampleofSwisscompanies.Cross-sectionalcomparisonsshownegativerelationshipsbetweendividendpaymentsandmarket-to-bookratios,pricevolatility,andleverage,aswellaspositiverelationshipswithprofitabilityand（toalesserextent）firmsizeandinstitutionalholdings.Ownershipconcentrationdoesnotseemtohavesignificanteffects.Companiesthatusedrepurchasesovertherecentyearswereriskierandlessprofitablethancompanieschoosingdividends.Whilesomeoftheserelationshipsareexpectable,thenegativerelationshipbetweenleverageanddividendpayments,theweakinfluenceofownershipstructure,thestronginfluenceofpricevolatility,andthecontrastbetweendividendsandrepurchasesarenotobviousresultsinthelightoftheoryandpreviousempiricalstudiesandthusareimportantaspectstonote.

Signalingmodelssuggestthatdividendchangespredictfutureprofitability.Still,theanalysisofthedataindicatesthatwhendividendsincrease,earningshavealreadyincreased.Therearenoobvioussignsoffastergrowth