土地增值税值得转变吗外文翻译Word文档格式.docx
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landvaluetax:
worththetransition
landtax:
abetterway
LandValueTaxationisanannualtaxonthemarketrentalvalueofland.Itwouldbeleviedasafixedrate,Muellbauersuggests0.5%inchaperthree.Ittaxesthegivenvalueoftheland,notthedevelopmentthathasoccurredonit,anddoessowhetherornotthelandhasbeensold.Ithas,therefore,anumberofadvantagesoverotherformsoftaxationandaddressesanumberoftheconcernsraisedobove,especiallyincentives,equityandeconomicefficiency.
Asanannualchargeontherentalvalueoftheland,LVTwouldnotbeataxontransactionandthereforedevelopment.Asoutlinedabove,notonlywouldthisconflictlesswithgovernmentpolicytodeliveranincreaseintherateofhousebuilding,itcouldactivelypromoteitbyprovidingincentivesforlocalanthoritiestoencouragedevelopment.Anannualtaxonthemarketrentalvalueoftheland-leviedregardlessofthelanduseordevelopmentonit-wouldfurtherpromotethere-useofbrownfieldlandbecauseavacantsitewouldstillincuranannualcharge.Indeed,someargueitcouldalsopromotemoresustainablepatternsofdevelopmentbyencouragingbusinessestolocateinlessprosperousregionsasthemarketvalueoflandwouldbelowercomparedtomoreprosperousregions(LVTCampaign,2002).
LVTalsohasthebenefitofcapturingtheincreaseinprivatewealththataccurethroughpublicinvestment.Asanannualfixedrate,revenueswouldriseastheland’smarketvalue(andthereforetaxbase)increase.Intheory,therefore,thereitcouldprovideanautomaticrevenuestreamtohelpfundinfrastructureprojects.
Thereistheneedforsomecaution,however.Formsoflandtaxationhavebeentriedbefore.AsTable1outlines,therehavebeenfourattemptssinceWorldWarTwo.TheseprevioustaxeshaveaimedtocapturewindfallgainsfromboththegrantingofplanningpermissionandalsointhecaseoftheDevelopmentLandTax,fromdevelopmentitself.Manyreasonshavebeenadvancedfortheirfailure.Somecomplainoftheircomplexityandthefactthatnoneofthemweregiventimetobed-in(ConnellanandLichfield,2000).Othersalsopointtothefactthatdevelopersandlandowernersoftenwaitedforachangeofgovernment(usuallyfromLabourtoConservative)astherewaswidespreadoppositionamongstthisgroupandwithinParliament(Barker,2003).Again,theLVTadvocates’argumenthereisthattaxingdevelopmentisinappropriate.
Table1:
PastUKExamplesofformsofLandTaxationintheUK
Tax
Levy
Yearsofoperation
DevelopmentLandTax
100%ofthevalueupliftinlandvalueduetothegrantingofplanningpermission.
1947-1953
BettermentLevy
40%,duetorisethroughtimetoencourageearlysale,againdesignedtocapturevalueupliftCaptialGainsTaxwasalsointroducedin1967tocaptureincreasesintheesistingusevalueoflandonly.
1967-1971
DevelopmentGainsTax
Aninterimtaxonthecaptialgainsderivedfromthedisposaloflandandbuildingswithdevelopmentvalueorpotential.
1974
Taxeddevelopmentgain–i.e.thedifferencebetweenthenetproceedsafterdisposalofdevelopmentandeirherthecurrentusevalueoflandorthecostoflandacquisition(whicheverwashigher).
1976-1985
Source:
adaptedfromConnellanandLichfield(2000)
Indeed,advocatesoftenpointtoDenmarkandNewZealandasexampleswhereLVThasworked,withbothintrouducingquiteradicalschemesin19thCentury.However,bothcountrieshaveremovedtheirmajorformsofLVTandretainlessradicalpropertytaxation(Andelson,2000).DespitetheseandtheUK’ssetbacksLVTshouldnotnecessarilybedismissed.AnumberofothercountriesuseformsofLVTaspartoftheirfiscalframework-SouthAfica,someCaribbeanstatesandWesternCanada,forexample.SlightlydifferentsystemsoperateinHongKongandSingaporewhereallandmostland,respectively,ispublicyownedandthereforerentflowsdirectlytothestate.
Radicalreform,notsuddenreform
AlloftheseargumentspointtotheneedforreformofhowpropertyistaxedinBritain.SimplyrevaluinghomesandintroducingaPlanning-gainsupplementwillnotpreventtheseproblemsfromrecurning.Butradicalreformdoesnotmeansuddenreform,andthepoliticalandlogisticalbarrierstoLVTmakeitadistantgoalatbest.TomakeLVTachievable,wemustplanhowtogetthere.
Firstly,thecurrenttinkeringshouldbepubliclyacknowledgedasasteppingstone,notadestination.Simplybyannouncinginwhichdirectionitwishestotravel,thegovernmenthasthepowertofocusdebateandengagethethoughtsandexperiencesofacademicsandprofessionals.Itisclearfromthepreviousattemptsatlandtaxationthatbulidingacross-partypoliticalconsensusisalsoimportant.Ippr’srecentcross-partyCommissiononSustainableDevelopmentdidexactlythis,arguing:
alandvaluetaxcouldwellbeausefultoolfordeliveringsustainabledevelopment,aslongasanyfuturereformrecognisestwofundamentalfactors.First,newdevelopmentmustbeincentived.Second,extraresourcesarerequiredtomeethousingneedswithintheSouthEast.(SouthEastCommission,2005:
55).
Secondly,thedetailsofupcomingreformshouldbedesignedwithamoreambitiousgoalinmind.Returningtotheproblemsdescribedatthestartofthisintroductiontellsuswhatchangesareneeded.
Tocreateanautomaticstabiliserforthehousingmarket,propertytaxesmustrespondbettertodifferencesovertime,betweenregions,andbetweenproperties.Makingrevaluationanannualprocessandcreatingmorebandswouldgosomewaytoachievingthis.
Tocapturesomeoftheprivateprofitfrompublicinfrastructureinvestment,therelationshipbetweencentralandlocalgovernmentwillhavetobeaddressed.Asalreadystatedabove,thisperennialissueisunlikelytoberesolvedwiththepublicationoftheLyonsInquiry.Thismayactuallybeagoodthing.Itseemsfarmoresensibletostartfromaquestionofwhatlocalgovernmentisfor,andthenhowshoulditbefinanced,ratherthanthepoliticalfire-fightingthatLyonsisengagedwith.Atatimewhenlocalauthoritiesarebeingencouragedtobringforwardhousinggrowthandplayabiggerroleineconomicdevelopment,itwouldseemsensiblethattheyhavefiscalmechanismstoenablethis.Reassessingtheroleofequalisationgrantsandidentifyingwayslocalauthoritiescanbettercapturethegainsfromdevelopmentwouldseemsensiblehere.
ThePlannnig-gainSupplement,proposedbyBarker(2004)andlikelytobeadoptedbythegovernment,establishestheprinciplethatsomeincreasesinvaluearisefrompublicaction,ratherthanprivate,andthatitisthereforelegitimateforittobeusedforthepublicgood.Thisprinciplemustbearticulated.PGSshouldbeusedasa“wedgeissue”,expandingthespaceinwhichtheideaisaccepted(see,forexampleAkerlof2005),andmakingiteasiertoapplyitmorewidely.ThegovernmentmustthereforebaseitsargumentsforaPGSfirmlyandpubliclyonprinciples,ratherthanthepragmaticneedforfunds.
Finally,inthelongerterm,achangeinthetaxsystempresentsanopportunitytoironoutthearbitraryjumpsinstampduty.Simplychanging“slad”structure,sothathigherrateswouldapplyonlytotheadditionalpoundoverathreshold,wouldimposeaconsiderablecosttotheexchequer.Everyhouseover$120000wouldpay$1200lesstax,everyhouseover$250000wouldpay$6200less,andover$500000,$11200less.Attemptingtorecoverthisrevenuethroughanewtop-ratewouldprovepoliticallydifficult,particularlyasLabourhasalreadyincreasedthetopratebythreepercentagepoints.Anewsystementirely,suchasLVT,wouldprovideanopportunitytoironoutthejumpswhilstretainingfiscalneutrality.
Theredoesnotseemtobethepoliticalappetiteforsignificantreformofpropertytaxation.Yetitisclearthatpropertytaxationdoesnotcurrentlyefficientlyorequitablypromotegovernmentobjectives.2005isanimportantyearintheon-goingLyonsInquiryshouldnotservetocloseoffdebateonmoreprofoundreformofpropertytaxation.Thisisnotacallforarevolutionintaxation.WearenotwhatAndelson(2000:
xix)hastermed“whole-hoggers”,wedonotbelievethatLVTis“thesovereignpathtosocialjustice”.Rather,thereisaroleforaLVTwithinabroaderfiscalframework.Thechaptersthatfollowoffersomepositivesuggestions.
Couldlandtaxwork
SinceLloydGeorge,therehavebeenseveralabortiveattemptstotaxthewindfallgainsfromplanningpermission.ThestandardtextontheUKtaxsystem,oneofwhoseauthorsisnowtheGovernoroftheBankofEngland,insiststhat“theunderlyingintellectualargumentforseekingtotaxeconomicrentretainsitsforce”(KayandKing1990,P.179).Since1947,landvalueintheUKhasdependedonitsplanningstatus.Ifafieldiszonedforagriculture,itisworthafewthousandpoundsperhectare.Ifitiszonedforbusiness,itmaybeworthmillionsofpoundsperhectare.Landvaluetaxationisefficient(becauseitdoesnotdistorttheincentivestodevelopland)andequitable(becauseitreturnssomeoftheeconomicrenttothepeoplewhocreatedit,namelythelocalauthorityanditselectores).AsKayandKingexplain(p.181):
Supposetheawardofplanningpermissionincreasesthevalueofaplotoflandfrom$5000to$1million.Theneveniftheresultinggainweretaxedat90%,thedevelopmentwouldstillbebetteroffbyalmost$100000usingthelandforhousingthanretainingitforagriculturalpurposes.Substantialincentivestobringprojectsforwardwouldremain.
Therearetwomainobjections:
theexpectationthatthewouldnotbepermanent,andthecostsofassessment.Propertyinterestshavealwaysseenoffpastattemptsatlandtaxation.Thishappenednotonlyin1909and1914,butalso,asBarker(2003,Box7.3)notes,in1947,1967,1974,and1985.Oneachoccasion,theydi