城市经济学奥沙利文Chap011PPT推荐.ppt
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Whatpopulationdensityisrequiredtosupportmasstransit?
Howdoestransitrevenuecomparetocost?
Howwouldderegulationaffecttransitoptions?
11-211-3VariationinRidershipAcrossMetropolitanAreasNewYork:
25%commutersusepublictransitShares10-14%:
Chicago,Washington,PhiladelphiaTrillion-mileclub:
NewYork,Chicago,LosAngeles,Washington,SanFrancisco,Boston,Philadelphia,Boston,Seattle11-4CostofTravelandModalChoiceSumofmonetarycost,accesscost,andin-vehiclecostda=marginaldisutiltyofaccesstime;
approximately80%ofwagedv=marginaldisutiltyofin-vehicletime;
approximately50%ofwage11-511-6Result:
AutohasLowestCostAutoadvantageinaccesstimedominatesmonetarydisadvantageAutoadvantageis$6.26overbus&
7.52overrailExampleillustrateswhysolodrivingchosenby75%ofcommuters11-7TippingthebalanceinfavoroftransitLowerincome:
lowerdisutilityoftraveltimeImprovedtransitservice:
Decreaseinaccess&
in-vehiclecostFreetransit?
Parkingcost:
Fullcostof$15forurbanworkplaceInternalizeautoexternalities:
$0.145permileadds$2.90todailydrivingcost11-811-9ElasticitiesofDemandforTransitOverallpriceelasticity=-0.40TransitridershipismoreelasticwithrespecttoserviceBoston:
timeelasticity=-0.80,comparedtofareelasticity=-0.50ServiceimprovementsmatchedwithproportionatefareincreasesridershipRidershipmoreresponsivetochangesinaccesstimethantochangesinin-vehicletime11-1011-11Figure11-1:
AverageCostforTransitSystemAC(operator):
negativelyslopedfromconventionalscaleeconomies:
spreadthefixedcostofindivisibleinputsAC(time):
ridertimecostIncreaseinridershipallowsmorefrequentserviceandloweraccesstimecostExample:
triplingridershipfromR1toR3decreasestimecostfromt1tot3Sumofoperatorandridercost:
Negativelysloped11-1211-13OptimumRidershipandPriceMarginalcostislessthanaveragecostAveragecostincludesfixedcostofindivisibleinputsMohringeconomies:
marginaltimecost30,000HeavyrailisefficientchoiceforNewYorkandChicagoNewheavyrail(Washington,Atlanta,Baltimore,Miami):
ridershipbelowthreshold11-27CloserLookatLightRailLightrailismorecostlythanbussystemHighercapitalcost:
5xcost($881mvs.$168minLongBeach)Higheroperatingcost:
$0.38(PortlandsMAX)$0.35forbusDivertsbuspassengers:
63%ofLABlueLineformerbusridersFeederbusesimposeaccesscostsonriders11-2811-29RoleofDensityFewUSmetroareameetdensitythresholdsforfrequentbusserviceNYmeetsminimumforlightrailandbusHonolulumeetsminimumforintermediatebusservice10mostdensemetroareasnearlymeetminimumforinfrequentbusCentralareasofsomemetroareasexceedthresholdforlightrailandheavyrail11-3011-31RegulationofUrbanMassTransitPublictransitmonopoly:
firmscannotcompeteTaxiscannotserveascommoncarrierRationale?
Preventcreamskimmingandunderminingcrosssubsidiesforlow-volumeroutesAlternativeistodirectlysubsidizelow-volumeroutes11-32ContractingforTransitServicesLocalgovernmentspecifiesservicesandfares,andacceptslowbidCostsavingsof25-30%Lowercostforfirms:
lowwage,flexibleworkrules;
minibuses11-33ParatransitServicesbetweenautomobileandconventionalbusShared-ridetaxis(3-4passengers),jitneys(6-15passengers)Subscriptionbus(10-60passengers)11-34TheBritishExperiencewithDeregulationTransportAct(1985):
entry,competitivebidding,lowersubsidiesResults:
moreminivans,lowercostsfromlowerwagesandflexibleworkrules,eliminationoflow-volumeserviceLessonsCompetitioncombinedwithsubsidiesforlow-volumeroutesCompetitiongeneratesinnovationandcutscostsPoliciestofostercompetitionnecessary11-3511-36TransitandLand-UsePatterns:
BARTCaseObjective:
IncreaseemploymentneartransitstationsClusteringnegligibleoutsidecentralbusinessdistrictCombiningrailtransitinvestmentwithpoliciesthatpromotedensityincreasesemployment11-37