美国宪法第三条评述文档格式.docx

美国宪法第三条评述文档格式.docx

《美国宪法第三条评述文档格式.docx》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《美国宪法第三条评述文档格式.docx（19页珍藏版）》请在冰豆网上搜索。

U.S.Const,art.Ill,§

1,cl.2（“TheJudges,bothofthesupremeandinferiorCourts,shallholdtheirOfficesduringgoodBehaviour,andshall,atstatedTimes,receivefortheirServicesaCompensation,whichshallnotbediminishedduringtheirContinuanceinOffice.”）.

Response:

GoodBehavior,JudicialIndependence,andtheFoundationsofAmericanConstitutionalism

INTRODUCTION

Theso-calledGoodBehaviorClauseofArticleIII1couldwellbethemostmysteriousprovisionintheUnitedStatesConstitution—andthat,ofcourse,isreallysayingsomething.Whileconstitutionaltextwasonoccasionchosenfortheverypurposeofavoidingtheresolutionof,ratherthanresolving,disputes, Anumberofsuchprovisionsappearinthejudicialarticleconcerningtheextentandnatureofcongressionalpoweroverfederalcourtjurisdiction.See,e.g.,id.cl.1（“ThejudicialPoweroftheUnitedStates,shallbevestedinonesupremeCourt,andinsuchinferiorCourtsastheCongressmayfromtimetotimeordainandestablish.”）;

id.§

2,cl.2（“[T]heSupremeCourtshallhaveappellateJurisdiction,bothastoLawandFact,withsuchExceptions,andundersuchRegulationsastheCongressshallmake.”）.Foranalysisoftheseprovisions,seeMartinH.Redish,FederalJurisdiction:

TensionsintheAllocationofJudicialPower7-52（2ded.1990）.

andwhileambiguitypermeatesmanyofthemostfamedandcontroversialprovisions, See,e.g.,U.S.Const,amend.XIV,§

1（“NoStateshall...depriveanypersonoflife,liberty,orproperty,withoutdueprocessoflaw;

nordenytoanypersonwithinitsjurisdictiontheequalprotectionofthelaws.”）.

rarelyareaprovision’spurpose,scope,andmethodologysototallynonexistenttothenakedeye.

Itissimplyunclear,onthefaceofit,whattheprovisionisallabout.Onecansearchthetextinvainforanyindicationofhowtheconceptof“goodBehaviour”istobedefined,whogetstomakethatdetermination,andwhatthemethodforimplementationandenforcementofthisprovisionactuallyis.Moreover,thetextprovidesabsolutelynobasisonwhichtoattempttoharmonizetheGoodBehaviorClausewiththeConstitution’sotherprovisionspertainingtotheindependenceorcontrolofthefederaljudiciary.Perhapsforthesereasons,bothcourtsandCongresshavelargelyignoredtheprovision,choosinginsteadtofocusthepoliticalcontrolofthejudiciaryontheconstitutionallyrecognizedcongressionalpowerstoregulatefederaljurisdiction Seeid.art.Ill,§

§

1,2.

andtoimpeachfederalofficers（includingfederaljudges）. Seeid.art.II,§

4（“ThePresident,VicePresidentandallcivilOfficersoftheUnitedStates,shallberemovedfromOfficeonImpeachmentfor,andConvictionof,Treason,Bribery,orotherhighCrimesandMisdemeanors.”）;

seealsoid.art.I,§

2,cl.5（givingtheHouseofRepresentatives“thesolePowerofImpeachment”）;

3,cl.6（givingtheSenatethepowertotryimpeachments）;

Nixonv.UnitedStates,506U.S.224（1993）.

Scholars,too,havefocusedontheGoodBehaviorClauseonlyrarely. Thereare,however,certainexceptions.Severalscholarshave,infact,commentedontherelevanceoftheGoodBehaviorClausetothecontrolofthefederaljudiciary.See,e.g.,MichaelJ.Gerhardt,TheConstitutionalLimitstoImpeachmentandItsAlternatives,68Tex.L.Rev.1,65-70（1989）;

CharlesGardnerGeyh&

EmilyFieldVanTassel,TheIndependenceoftheJudicialBranchintheNewRepublic,74Chi.-KentL.Rev.31,35-42（1998）;

SuzannaSherry,JudicialIndependence:

PlayingPoliticswiththeConstitution,14Ga.St.U.L.Rev.795,797-802（1998）.

ForthesereasonsProfessorsSaikrishnaPrakashandStevenSmith,bothnotedandrespectedconstitutionalscholars,aretobeapplaudedforfinallyassumingthisscholarlychallengeandrespondingtoitwithsocontroversialandinnovativeasolution.Intheirarticle,HowToRemoveaFederalJudge, SaikrishnaPrakash&

StevenD.Smith,HowToRemoveaFederalJudge,116YaleL.J.72（2006）.

thesescholarsarguethattheGoodBehaviorClauseisconstitutionallycapableofplayingafargreaterroleinpolicingfederaljudgesthanithasplayeduptonow.Theycontendthatthetraditionallyacceptedviewthatimpeachmentprovidestheexclusiveconstitutionallyrecognizedmeansofremovingfederaljudgesfromofficeis“unpersuasiveandahistorical.” Id.at75.

The“betterreading,”theysuggest,isthatundertheGoodBehaviorClause“offi