中小企业融资研究文献综述及外文文献资料.docx

中小企业融资研究文献综述及外文文献资料.docx

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中小企业融资研究文献综述及外文文献资料

本文档包括改专题的：

外文文献、文献综述

一、外文文献

TheRoleofBanksinSmallandMediumEnterprisesFinancing:

ACaseStudyfromKosovo

Abstract

Inthisstudyweinvestigatetheimpactoffirmandentrepreneurshipcharacteristicsinsmallandmediumenterprises（SME-s）investmentfinancethroughdebt（bankloan）.Dataaregatheredfrominterviewsbasedonaself-organizedquestionnairewith150SME-sinKosovo.Basedontheeconometricmodeloflinearregression,keyfactorsareidentifiedwhichinfluencetheinvestmentgrowthfinancedbydebt.Theresultsindicatethatthereismutualcorrelationamongthefirm'sage,size,businessplan,sector,numberofowners,sourcesoffinancingandtheinvestmentgrowthfinancedfrombanksinKosovo.Therefore,findingsinthisworksuggestthattheaccesstoexternalsourcesoffinancingthroughbankloanisanimportantfactorthatinfluencestheinvestmentgrowth.Thepaperprovidessomeimportantconclusionsandimplicationsforpolicymakersandentrepreneurs.

Keywords:

SME,entrepreneurship,financingthroughdebt,investment,Kosovo

1.Introduction

ItisexplicitlyacceptedthatSME-spresentapivotalelementintheeconomicactivityinboth,developedanddevelopingcountries（Acs&Audretsch,1990;Johnson&Loweman,1995）.NumerousauthorsfromacademicandprofessionalworlddesignateSME-sasgeneratorsofboth,economicgrowthandoverallsocialdevelopment（Audretsch&Klepper,2000;WorldBankGroup,2005;McMillan&Woodruff,2002）.

ThediscussionoftherelevantliteraturerelatedtotheaccessofSME-stofinance,aswellastoinvestmentfinanceisofparticularimportance（Krasniqi,2007）.AccordingtoBecketal.（2007）,theSME-saccessto,andcostof,financesisquiteoftencharacterizedasamajordifficulty,uptotheextentof35percent.Itshouldalsobestressedthatthesmallfirmscomewithmoredifficultytoloans,sincetheyencounterhighertransactioncostsandhigherpremiumrisks,fortheyaremorefragileandtheyofferlowercollaterals（Becketal.,2006）.AudretschandElston（2006）alsostressthatsmallfirmsconfrontedhigherfinancialdifficultiesthanlargeones.Similarconclusionscanbefoundamongotherauthorswhohaveworkedinthisdirection（Becketal.,2006;Oliveira&Fortunato,2006）.

Brinckmannetal.（2011）findsthatsmallfirmshavehigherlimitationstoaccessexternalsourcesoffinancingthanbiggerfirms,and,thus,theybecomemoredependentoninternalfundsforfinancingtheirinvestmentneeds.AmajorobstacleinfinancialmarketstotheaccessonfinancesbySME-sisalsotheasymmetryofinformation.Thus,basedonZhaoetal.（2006）,onefromthemajordifficultiesforaccessingfinanceistheasymmetryofinformationamonglendersanddebtors;forinstance,borrowershaveprivateinformationonthefirmthatlendersdonotpossess.Becauseoftheirsmallsize,shorthistoryandinconsistentaccountingdata,theissueofasymmetricinformationforSME-sbecomesmoreserious（Deakinsetal.,2008;EBRD,1999;Pissardiesetal.,2003;Klapperetal.,2002）.

DifficultiesofthiskindareexpressedalsoamongSME-sofKosovo,asonefromthelastcountriesintransition.InspiteofthefactthattheSMEsectorinKosovoisrelativelynew,itconstitutes98%ofallthefirms,thusrepresentingahugepotentialforgenerationofnewjobsandforeconomicdevelopmentofthecountry.BasedondataoftheWorldBank（2010）,themajorobstacletothedevelopmentofSME-sinKosovoisaccesstobankloans.Only10%ofinvestmentsmadebySME-sarefinancedthroughbankloans,andabove85%ofinvestmentsarefinancedfromprivatesources（WorldBank,2010）.

Objectiveofthisworkistoempiricallyinvestigatetheroleandimportanceofthefirmsandentrepreneurshipcharacteristicsthatinfluencetheinvestmentgrowththroughdebtfinance（loans）inKosovo.Therefore,theresearchquestioninthisstudyis:

HowdoestheinvestmentgrowthimpacttheperformanceofSME-s,bydiscussingthefirmandentrepreneurshipcharacteristicsoftheinvestmentgrowthofSME-sinKosovo?

Theorganizationoftheworkisasfollowing:

Partonediscussesthecontextoftheresearch,parttwothetheoreticalaspectandthesummaryofliterature.Inpartthreeweprovidetheresearchmethodologyandmodel.Partfourcontainstheresultsandempiricalfindings.And,partfivedealswiththeconclusions.

2.TheoryandLiteratureReview

Untilnow,thereisnosingleanduniquetheoreticalmodelthatexplainsthefinancingofSME-s,whichinfluencestheperformanceofinvestments,theirgrowthanddevelopment.ThetheoreticalprinciplesunderlyingcapitalstructurecangenerallybedescribesintermsofthestatictradeofftheorybyModiglianiandMiller（1958）,thepeckingordertheory（Myers&Majluf,1984）,managerialtheoryofinvestments（Marris,1963;Baumol,1967）,agencytheorybyJensenandMeckling（1976）andextendedbyStiglitzandWeiss（1981）.

Accordingtoneoclassicaltheoryofinvestments（M-M）,whichaffirmstheattitudeontheirrelevanceofthecapitalstructureforthevalueofthefirm,internalandexternalsourcesoffinancingareperfectsubstitutes.Intheworldoftheperfectfunctioningofthemarket,thechoicebetweenfinancingthroughcapitalordebtisirrelevant.Therefore,thecostofcapitalandthemarketvalueofthefirmareindependentfromthevalueofthefirm（Modigliani&Miller,1958）.ThetheoryofM-Misbasedonthefollowingpremises:

therearenotaxes,therearenotransactioncosts,therearenobankruptcycosts,theequalcostofdebtforcompaniesandforinvestors,symmetricalinformationinthemarket,thereisnoinfluenceofdebtintheprofitofthecompanybeforeinterestandtaxation.

ModiglianiandMiller（1958）modifytheirtheorybyintroducingthetaxonprofit.Inthiscase,thevalueofthefirmispositivelyrelatedtodebt.Afterintroducingthetaxonprofitintheiranalysis,theyascertainthatthefinancialleverageincreasesthevalueofthefirm,sincetheinterestdecreasesthetaxbase（itisdeducedfromthebusinessprofit）,and,therefore,wehavesavingswhichhavethevalueoftheinterest.Fromthisascertainment,thevalueofthefirmgrowsbigger,asthefinancialleverageincreases,whichmeansthatthehighestvalueofthefirmisachievediftheburdenofdebtbecomes100%.Inthiswaythefirmattainsabsoluteadvantage,giventhatitisdefendedfromtaxes.

Scott（1972）emphasizesthat100%taxshielddoesnotexistinreality,becauseofdistresscosts.Debtleadstolegalobligationtopayinterestandprincipal.Ifafirmcannotmeetitsdebtobligation,itisforcedintobankruptcyanincursassociatedcosts（Fatoki&Asah,2011）.Thistheory,infact,doesnottakeintotheconsiderationalltheotherfactors,suchas:

thecostsofthebankruptcyofthefirm,thecostsoftheagency,theimpactofdebtinprofit,theasymmetryofinformation,and,therefore,thistheoryischallengedbyothertheories（Harris&Raviv,1991）.

Thus,thestatictradeofftheory,whichisbasedontheM-Mtheoryandisitscomplementary,exceptsavingsfromthetaxonprofit,incorporatesintothediscussionalsothecostofbankruptcy,suchas:

judicialtaxes,attorneycosts,administrativecosts,and,also,theagencycosts（thefirmsmanagersdamagetheinterestsofthecreditorsbyworkingintheinterestofshareholders）,andthiscanreducethevalueofthefirm（JensenandMeckling,1976）.Thistheoryis,infact,thedominanttheoryregardingthedeterminationofthefinancialstructureofthefirm,anditisfoundedonthepremisethatitisthefirmthatchooseshowmuchitwillbefinancedfromdebt,andhowmuchfromthecapital,bybalancingthecostofprofits.Accordingtothistheory,theoptimallevelofthestructureofcapitalistheonewhichequatestheprofitandcostsfromdebt.

Accordingtopeckingordertheory,thefirminitiallyprefersinternalsourcesoffinancingtoexternalones,and,regardingexternalsources,theypreferdebttocapital（Donaldson,1961）.Thus,initiallywehavetheuseofaccumulatedprofit,amortization,debt,and,finally,theequitycapital.Accordingtothistheory,thefirmsfinancetheirinvestmentrequirementsbasedonahierarchicorder.Thiscandirectalsotoexistenceoftheasymmetryofinformationbetweenmanagers（insiders）andinvestors（outsiders）.Asaresultofthis,managershavemoreinformationtheninvestors（Myers&Majluf,1984）.

Basedontheagencytheory,StiglitzandWeiss（1981）presenttheproblemthat,asaconsequenceofasymmetricalinformation,occurbetweenmanagersandshareholders,ononehand,andtheproblemamongshareholders,managersandcreditors,ontheother.TheyarguethatonlySME-sknowstherealfinancialstructureoftheirown,therealstrengthoftheirinvestmentprojectsandthetendenciesforsettlingupthedebt,and,therefore,thefirmpossessessuperiorprivateinformation（Mazanai&Fatoki,2012）.

3.Hypothesis

3.1BusinessPlan

AccordingtoGuffey,thebusinessplanisanecessaryrequirementatthebeginningofbusiness,anditisusedasanimportantelementtoacquirefinancialsupportduringapplicationtobankinginstitutions（Guffey,2008）.Anincreaseinthelevelofskillsofthosewhoarelookingforcreditsinthecompilationofbusinessplans,willincreasetheiropportunitiestohaveproperlyprepareddocumentation,andtohaveaclearideaonthecourseoftheirbusiness.AccordingtoMaziku（2012）,theasymmetricinformationbetweenthedebt-seekingSME-sandthebank,isreflectedintheincapabilityofthemajorityofSME-stoprovideconsistentfinancialdataandrealbusinessplans,whichincreasestheoperationalcostduringthedecisionmakingforpermittingtheloansbytheabank（Maziku,2012）.Thus,th